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ABSTRACT
SOURCES OF INTER-STATE ALIGNMENTS:
INTERNAL THREATS AND ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE IN THE FORMER
SOVIET UNION
Eric A. Miller 
Old Dominion University, 2002 
Director: Dr. Steve A. Yetiv
This dissertation develops a framework for understanding the alignment patterns 
o f states of the former Soviet Union (FSU) vis-a-vis Russia. The framework challenges 
traditional alignment theories, such as balance of power and balance of threat theories, 
and suggests that these theories provide less accurate predictions of alignment behavior in 
the FSU than the present framework because of a variety of situational and contextual 
factors. In particular, the present framework highlights the impact of two variables on 
alignment patterns, 1) the internal political threats to leaders, and 2) the economic 
dependence on Russia. These two variables produce a four-outcome model, presented as 
four testable hypotheses. When internal threats are high and economic dependence is 
high, FSU leaders are more likely to adopt a strong pro-Russian alignment. When 
internal threats are low and economic dependence is high, FSU leaders are more likely to 
adopt a moderate pro-Russian alignment. When internal threats are high and economic 
dependence is low, FSU leaders are more likely to adopt a moderate pro-Russian 
alignment. Finally, when internal threats and low and economic dependence is low, FSU 
leaders are more likely to adopt a pro-independence (sometimes anti-Russian) alignment. 
The present framework is then tested against the empirical behavior of Uzbekistan and 
Ukraine.
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The collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 brought with it many changes 
to the international system. One such change was that the Soviet Union as a single 
political entity disintegrated into fifteen newly independent states. While all were part of 
the Soviet Union for the better part o f the twentieth century (and many were initially 
integrated into the Tsarist Empire during the nineteenth century), vast cultural, historical, 
and geographical differences existed, and the political and economic trajectories of these 
countries were anything but clear. Some states welcomed their newfound independence, 
while others were reluctant to step from the “shadow of the bear.”1
This dissertation provides an explanation as to why some former Soviet Union 
(FSU) states were willing to cooperate with Russia while others were not. In particular, it 
examines alignment patterns between FSU states and Russia. By design the analysis is 
not Russo-centric. Rather, this dissertation assesses political and economic developments 
in FSU states themselves and how these forces shaped alignment decisions towards 
Russia. FSU states are not seen as a passive actors waiting for orders from Moscow, but 
as dynamic political entities wrestling with their newfound independence and the 
subsequent political and economic transition.
In this chapter I first introduce the primary puzzle of post-Soviet alignments and 
demonstrate how this emerges from the use of traditional alignment theories, such as
The format for this dissertation follows current style requirements of The Chicago Manual o f  Style: The 
Essential Guide for Writers, Editors, and Publishers, 14th ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1993).
1 Rajan Menon, "In the Shadow of the Bear: Security' in Post-Soviet Central Asia,” International Security 
20, no. 1 (1995): 149-81.
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balance of power and balance of threat theories. Then, I suggest a variety of ways as to 
why the continued study of the FSU is still veiy much needed. What has become apparent 
over the decade is that the forces of continuity and change between Russia and its former 
Soviet republics are critical for understanding the far-reaching importance and policy 
relevance of the region to both regional and world affairs. Finally, I provide a brief 
overview of the rest of the chapters of the dissertation.
THE PUZZLE OF POST-SOVIET ALIGNMENTS
This dissertation addresses seminal questions that pertain to the study of 
international relations (IR), and more specifically alignment decisions. Why do states 
align? What factors are most influential in alignment calculations? Traditional alignment 
theories, such as balance of power and balance of threat theories, lead us astray as to the 
alignment patterns in the FSU, but the framework developed in this dissertation does not. 
The present framework does not embrace the state-centric approach of balance of power 
and balance of threats theories, nor does it narrowly focus on the distribution of power 
and threats in the international system.
Instead, the present framework explains alignment patterns between FSU states 
and Russia by looking within FSU states themselves, and adopting an actor-centric 
approach. In particular, it illuminates the central role FSU leaders played in the policy 
making process as well as the types of threats prioritized in leaders’ alignment 
calculations. Furthermore, the present framework highlights the constraining nature of 
economic dependence and how economic relationships shape alignment choices. 
Traditional alignment theories pay little attention to these domestic political and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
economic factors. Yet, this focus is warranted in the study of the FSU because of the 
tremendous political change occurring in FSU states after independence and the 
widespread interdependence that existed between Russia and its former Soviet republics. 
Below I elaborate on the central puzzle of post-Soviet-alignments for traditional 
alignment theories.
Balance of power and balance of threat theories suggest that states are most likely 
to balance (or resist) other more powerful or threatening states as opposed to 
bandwagoning (or appeasing) with them.2 Kenneth Waltz’s theory of neorealism is the 
most refined articulation of balance of power theory. However, he points out that the 
purpose of his theory is to explain international outcomes, not the foreign policies of 
particular states, suggesting that “the behavior of states and statesmen is indeterminate.”3 
This is not entirely convincing though, since the international structure provides 
opportunities and constraints that shape state behavior significantly. Waltz himself noted 
that “neorealist, or structural, theory leads one to believe that the placement o f states in 
the international system accounts for a good deal of their behavior.”4 Moreover, balance 
of power theory can (and has) been interpreted and applied by generating simple 
deductions from the theory’s causal logic.5 This dissertation does not refute Waltzian
2 Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle fo r Power and 
Peace (New York: Knopf. 1985): Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory o f International Politics (Reading, MA: 
Addison-Wesley, 1979); and Stephen M. Walt Origins o f  Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
1987).
3 Waltz, Theory o f  International Politics. 68.
4 Kenneth N. Waltz. ‘"The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International Security 18, no. 2 
(1993): 45.
5 John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War,” International 
Security 15, no. 1 (1990): 5-56; Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will 
Rise,” International Security 17. no. 4 (1993): 5-51; Colin Elman, “Horses for Courses: Why Not 
Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy,” Security Studies 6, no. 1 (1996): 7-53; and Michael Mastanduno, 
“Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War,” 
International Security 21, no. 4 (1997): 5-58.
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neorealism per se, but rather it takes issue with the explanatory capability of dominant 
realist theories, such as balance of power and balance of threat theories. A basic inference 
can be made from traditional realist theories about the nature of the FSU, and more 
specifically, Russian power and its propensity to be seen as a threat to its former Soviet 
republics. Given the preponderance of Russian power in the region and the intensity of 
neo-imperial statements in the early 1990s, one could infer that Russia would be seen or 
perceived as the greatest external threat to FSU states and the state most likely to be 
balanced against.6
Yet, this theoretical proposition did not play out in reality. The Baltic states, for 
example, embarked upon a pro-Western trajectory favoring European security and 
economic institutions. The resource-rich and culturally distinctive states of Muslim 
Central Asia embarked on predominantly pro-Russian policies, while Ukraine, the most 
populous and militarily strong of the former Soviet republics, shifted from anti-Russian 
to pro-Russian policies. These alignment outcomes are puzzling for traditional alignment 
theories and run counter to their logic, which raises a compelling and unanswered 
question. Why have the most powerful FSU states tended to adopt the strongest pro- 
Russian foreign policies, whereas the weakest states, like the Baltic states, have adopted 
the most anti-Russian foreign policies?
To answer this question, this dissertation develops a framework for understanding 
the alignment patterns of FSU states vis-a-vis Russia. The framework highlights key 
elements of the IR of the FSU, by drawing on domestic political and economic variables 
to explain alignment behavior. It illuminates a competing perspective for studying the IR 
of the FSU that focuses on the central importance of FSU leaders in the policy making
6 For these types of theoretical inferences see, Elman, "Horses for Courses."
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process. In particular, it explains FSU alignment outcomes based on two independent 
variables: 1) the internal political threats that leaders faced after independence and 2) the 
level of economic dependence a country had on Russia. As we will see, the original 
framework forwarded in this dissertation focuses attention to an underdeveloped area of 
research on both IR theory and the IR of the FSU, and in so doing it provides a novel yet 
compelling account of the sources of FSU alignment behavior.
WHY THE FORMER SOVIET UNION STILL MATTERS
Skeptics may suggest that Russia and the FSU have become marginalized in 
world affairs and play less of a role in contrast to the United States. As opposed to being 
a leading actor on the world stage, Russia has taken on the role of spoiler to U.S. efforts 
over the decade, such as in its policy towards Iraq and its response (and eventual 
deployment) to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) bombing of Kosovo in 
the summer of 1999. Moreover, Russia has been tremendously weakened economically 
since the end of the Cold War, and has become heavily dependent on Western economic 
resources to the tune of over $15 billion standard drawing rights (SDRs) from the 
International Monetary Fund alone during the 1990s.7 Indeed, as some suggest, this 
asymmetrical economic interdependence on the U.S.-led West has profound 
consequences on the ability of Russia to extend its influence throughout critical regions 
o f the world, such as in the Middle East.8
Skeptics may thus intimate that the importance of the region sharply declined 
because of Russia’s diminished power felt both regionally and globally. Yet, such
7 Alexander Cooley, “International Aid to the Former Soviet States: Agent of Change or Guardian of the 
Status Quo?” Problems o f Post-Communism 47, no 4 (2000): 36.
8 Steve A. Yetiv, "The Evolution of Oil Stability,” manuscript 2002.
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dismissive logic would be shortsighted at best. The IR of the FSU has a wide-sweeping 
influence throughout Eurasia and failing to fully appreciate the forces o f cooperation and 
conflict between Russia and its former Soviet republics would ignore some of the most 
pressing issues in international affairs today. The importance of the region for the overall 
stability of the world can be seen along four general lines covering security, political, 
economic, and policy-oriented issues.
Security Importance
The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 had a profound impact on the 
international security environment. The first phase of the U.S. response focused on South 
and Central Asia in order to bring pressure to bear on the Taliban in Afghanistan as well 
as against Osama bin Laden and the al Qaeda network. Washington’s attentiveness to the 
region was an anomaly and had not been felt since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 
1979, when the Ronald Reagan administration sought to bog the Soviet army down 
(much in the same way the United States had been in Vietnam) by funding and training 
Islamic fundamentalists, otherwise known as the mujahideen or freedom fighters, to fight 
the Soviet occupying forces. Yet, unlike the first experience, which was rooted in the 
bipolarity of the Cold War system, Moscow would not be Washington’s principal foe, but 
rather one of its strongest allies.
Conducting military operations in the region required Russian approval because 
of the predominance of Russia power in Central Asia and in particular along the Tajik- 
Afghan border. President Vladimir Putin was more than accommodating in joining 
George W. Bush’s burgeoning international coalition against terrorism. This made sense
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
because Russia would help stabilize Central Asia, and by acknowledging the importance 
of combating terrorism the United States presumably would be more tolerant on Russian 
activities in Chechnya (which from Moscow’s perspective are closely linked to 
terrorism). The Central Asian states themselves, especially Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and 
Tajikistan, played leading roles in the war in Afghanistan, by allowing U.S. military and 
humanitarian personnel to work from their countries, military bases, and airports. In this 
regard, without the assistance and cooperation of these regional actors, U.S. efforts in 
Afghanistan, which continue today, would have been logistically impossible. These FSU 
states became major players in Bush’s anti-terrorism coalition, demonstrating in an 
unprecedented fashion how some regions far away can become vital to U.S. national 
security, and the world as a whole.
Beyond terrorism, other more transnational security threats, such as drug and 
arms trafficking, continue to destabilize the region, often to the financial profit of 
religious extremists. Some governments took unilateral actions, such as in Uzbekistan’s 
reinforcement of its borders through stricter controls, the building of fences, and the 
laying of dangerous mines across their borders with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. 
Nonetheless, since almost three-fourths of the world’s cultivation of opium poppies, the 
source of heroin, comes from Afghanistan this concern remains high.
What is perhaps even more problematic for U.S. security interests in the long-run 
concerns attitudes towards opium production. While the Taliban benefited tremendously 
from the drug trade over the years, poppy cultivation was banned in July 2000, although 
the Northern Alliance, Washington’s strongest ally in Afghanistan, never made a similar
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
announcement.9 In any event, regardless of the regime in power in Afghanistan, the drug 
and arms trade will continue to flourish as long as a demand exists abroad, regional 
economies remain stagnant or in decline, and rampant corruption across the borders 
persists.
Concerns also continue over the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, 
Russia continues to enhance Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Not only is Russia finishing 
construction of an $800 million nuclear reactor in Bushehr, where it is feared that Tehran 
will be able to generate weapons-grade fissionable materials, but also plans already exist 
for another five reactors for $10 billion. Similarly, Putin has finalized a $40 billion trade 
deal with Saddam Hussein in Iraq, which presumably will enhance Iraq’s military and 
economic preparedness, all the more disheartening as the Bush administration continues 
its posture on an invasion of Iraq and removal of Saddam from power.
Transnational security threats dominate the FSU security environment. These 
issues influence many actors, cross multiple borders with ease, and require multilateral 
coordination to be dealt with effectively. Ignoring or understating these security threats is 
dangerous for U.S. policy, and therefore, better understanding how and in what ways 
these threats can be dealt with requires greater insight into the relations between the FSU 
and other neighboring regions, which leads to the second aspect of the region’s relevance.
Political Importance
FSU states influence the political landscape from the European continent, through 
the Middle East, and all the way to Asia. Given its vast geographical locale and proximity
9 Pauline Jones Luong and Erika Weinthal. "New Friends, New Fears in Central Asia,” Foreign Affairs 81, 
no. 2 (2002): 65-66.
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to an array of countries, the political dynamics that are at play between Russia and other 
FSU states have a direct impact on the relations between these countries and neighboring 
states. In the Western FSU, the Baltic states have taken the greatest strides towards 
European institutions, such as NATO and the European Union. Membership in the former 
is actively supported by the Bush administration, and appears likely in the near future.
The path towards this end was also smoothed after Bush and Putin agreed in May 2002 to 
a new understanding between Russia and the NATO alliance, with Russia becoming a 
non-voting member of the newly established Russia-NATO Council. Ukraine’s 
orientation has been the subject of tremendous debate as to its appropriate place in the 
region. At times Ukraine appeared to be heading West, then East, or even someplace in 
between serving as a bridge between West and East.
European and Western interest has been felt less in the Caucasus and Central 
Asia, but the interaction of other regional actors, such as Iran and Turkey, occupied the 
interest of scholars and policy makers alike and continues to do so. The Turkish influence 
in the region is based on religious and linguistic similarities. Sunni Islam is practiced 
predominantly throughout Central Asia, while most languages of the region are based on 
Turkish. The Iranian connections stem from similar roots but are connected to different 
groups of people. Shiite Islam is practiced in Azerbaijan, although Azeris also make up 
an important minority in Northern Iran. Linguistic ties exist with Tajiks in Central Asia, 
who are Persian-speaking.
In a different light, Central Asia has also come to the fore, in the midst o f regional 
instability in South Asia over the disputed Kashmir region. Similar to the U.S., Russia 
played an active role in attempts to deescalate tensions between India and Pakistan, when
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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diplomatic talks between Indian and Pakistani officials were held in Almaty, Kazakhstan. 
Thus, in a variety o f ways, Russia and other FSU states shape the international politics of 
the region and will continue to do so in the near future.
Economic Importance
Perhaps the most important economic element in the IR of the FSU concerns the 
exportation o f oil and gas supplies, a consideration that gained more attention in the wake 
of 9/11 with concerns over maintaining a sufficient flow of oil at reasonable prices. This 
latter fear could emerge in two ways: either through general instability in the region that 
threatens the flow of oil, or through a more aggressive move by Organization for 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to control the world market supply, thus 
increasing the demand for Middle Eastern oil, and subsequently the cost as well.
Some are hopeful that Russia and the FSU could head off any potential threats 
from OPEC countries. For instance, for each of the past two years, Russia has quietly 
increased its annual oil output at a rate o f nearly half a million barrels a day (mbd), the 
largest increase in output for any country in the world. Moreover, hopefuls speak of a 
northern oil boom that could emerge if the Russian and Central Asian oil companies and 
their international partners follow through on previous plans. The potential payoff could 
be profound, with some estimates suggesting that total Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) exports could equal Saudi oil exports within four years, although the CIS 
still lacks a highly efficient infrastructure, namely inadequate pipelines and port 
facilities.10 Indeed, as Putin suggested in March 2002, if Ukraine, with its vast pipeline
10 Edward L. Morse and Janies Richard. "The Battle for Energy Dominance," Foreign Affairs 81. no. 2 
(2002): 16, 24-25.
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infrastructure, acceded to Russia’s agreement with Central Asian states on cooperation in 
energy resource transport, “we -will have a very strong ability to influence the European 
economy, and others will have to reckon with us to a greater extent.”11
Russia has demonstrated its willingness to increase production regardless o f the 
impact on OPEC relations, although symbolic production cuts have been issued at times. 
The Russian perspective is understandable. Today Russia is trying to catch up on market 
shares that it feels it deserves, but shares that were unattainable during the political and 
economic transition after the Soviet collapse. To put it into perspective, before the Soviet 
Union collapsed it produced more oil than any other country (approximately 12.5 mbd), a 
sum that is one-third more than Saudi Arabia’s peak share at the end of 2000.12
Policy Importance
Without an understanding of what truly motivates FSU leaders, the U.S. may 
adopt policies that are counter-productive. For instance, when Western governments and 
international financial institutions attempted to assist countries during the post-Soviet 
transition, they channeled large amounts o f assistance to FSU leaders and their respective 
governments that allowed many FSU leaders to entrench their positions at the expense of 
reform efforts, a counter-productive strategy that international financial institutions 
acknowledged by the end of the decade. The failure to appreciate the more narrow 
interests of FSU leaders led to the inefficient allocation of billions of dollars o f Western 
assistance, which further strengthened corrupt practices and undermined the development 
of transparent political and economic institutions.
11 Nezavisimaia Gazeta. 19 March 2002. 6. in Current Digest o f  the Post-Soviet Press 54. no. 12 (2002): 
14.
12 Morse and Richard. “The Battle for Energy Dominance.” 17.
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OVERVIEW OF THE DISSERTATION
Chapter II outlines the framework for understanding FSU alignment patterns vis- 
a-vis Russia developed in this dissertation. I refer to it as the internal threat/economic 
dependence (IT/ED) framework, comparing it balance of power and balance of threat 
theories, and demonstrating how it builds on the work of Steven David’s theory of 
omnibalancing.131 offer a broad assessment of the literature on the study of alignments, 
or what I refer to as alignment theory. While this term has not been widely used 
throughout the IR literature, here it is used to describe the theoretical study of what drives 
states to adopt common postures toward a security issue, leading them to engage in 
cooperative and coordinated security behavior.14
I do not suggest that balance of power and balance of threat theories are void of 
any merit, but I do argue that their explanatory capability is limited in the FSU context 
for numerous reasons. First, they fail to recognize variables that stem from the unique 
experience of the Soviet Union, and ones that were more influential in the foreign policy 
calculations of FSU leaders. Chapter II draws on the Soviet experience to demonstrate 
why FSU leaders were particularly prone to focus on internal political threats to their 
political positions, and why analyzing economic dependence on Russia is critical because 
of its pervasiveness and constraining influence on alignment calculations. Attempts at 
political and economic reform (albeit at varying levels) tended to exacerbate these
13 Steven R. David, '"Explaining Third World Alignment” World Politics 43, no. 2 (1991): 233-57; and 
idem. Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1991).
14 This conception of alignment theory as a field of study is drawn from Richard J. Harknett and Jeffrey A. 
VanDenBerg, "Alignment Theory and Interrelated Threats: Jordan and the Persian Gulf Crisis,” Security 
Studies 6. no. 3 (1997): 112-53.
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problems in the short-term for leaders, further prompting them to focus on the security of 
their political positions over issues more pressing to the state.
Second, many of the assumptions that realists make about the nation-state, 
sovereignty, and the consistency of foreign and domestic preferences were in flux and 
hardly approximate the realities of the post-Soviet transition. That is, because political 
legitimacy was weak for most FSU leaders, and the former Soviet apparatus still held a 
disproportionate share of the country’s wealth, most FSU states are considered to be 
weak, or “quasi-states.”15 Moreover, FSU leaders exerted tremendous influence over the 
policy making process, since there were few political institutions capable o f checking the 
narrow interests of leaders. In this regard, it is more difficult to envision the state as a 
rational unitary, since the state in many ways is beholden to a particularly strong political 
figure with strong connections to the former Soviet system.
The reality that most FSU states are considered to be weak, based on their lack of 
political institutionalization, and that FSU leaders tended to dominate the political system 
is consistent with Steven David’s idea of the Third World state (an issue addressed at 
greater length in Chapter II). For David, the Third World state was not comparable to the 
state in the Euro-centric sense because of the different historical experience and the lack 
of political development in the periphery. In this regard, the states of the FSU, excluding 
Russia, share many similarities with other former colonized regions of the world, 
although Moscow left these countries in better relative positions at the time of 
independence, in contrast to the decolonization of the African continent for instance.
15 In Jackson’s work, other states and international organizations confer international legitimacy and 
juridical sovereignty on Third world states, even though their internal capacity’ to exercise positive 
sovereignty remains weak. Robert H. Jackson, Ouasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the 
Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1990).
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Third, while the “possibility” of conflict may exist between Russia and its former 
republics, the “probability” of it is considerably lower.16 In fact, as this dissertation 
argues, when internal threats to leaders became intense, leaders tended to exert a pro- 
Russian alignment, in large part because Russia was the country most often asked to (and 
most willing to) intervene and provide regional stability, whether in Moldova, the 
Caucasus, or in Tajikistan and neighboring Afghanistan.17 This suggests that the FSU as a 
region relates to one another based on a different set of experiences, which at times 
makes the traditional view of systemic anarchy held by neo-realists less compelling. This 
is all the more true since the Soviet system was based on hierarchical relationships in 
which Moscow was the imperial center with the former republics representing its colonial 
periphery.
David Lake sheds light on these different types of international relations. In 
reality, as he points out, security relationships between states can vary along a continuum 
from anarchy to hierarchy, or alliance to empire.18 On the far side of the continuum, 
under anarchy, states possess the power to make their own decisions and serve as the 
masters of their own fate. States are seen as sovereign entities. However, on the opposite 
side, in hierarchical relationships, dominant states maintain considerable control over 
subordinate states, and can directly and indirectly shape their foreign and domestic 
policies. Thus, states face more difficulty in upholding their sovereignty because of the 
pervasiveness of contacts with a larger, more powerful state. Lake’s work moves beyond
16 For more on the distinction between the possibility and probability of conflict see. Stephen G. Brooks, 
“Dueling Realisms,” International Organization 51, no. 3 (1997): 445-77.
17 For more on this point see. Philip G. Roeder. "From Hierarchy to Hegemony: The Post-Soviet Security 
Complex.” in Regional Orders, ed. David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan (University Park, PA: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997).
18 David A. Lake, “Anarchy, Hierarchy, and the Variety' of International Relations,” International 
Organization 50, no. 1 (1996): 1-34.
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the neorealist preoccupation with systemic anarchy and attempts to reclaim hierarchy as 
an “interesting and variable characteristic of international relations.”19 This is important 
for our purposes because the notion of hierarchy more accurately reflects the nature of 
Russia’s relations with its former republics, especially in light of the extensive political, 
military, economic, and social connections between FSU states (connections that tended 
to favor Russian interests).
Fourth, traditional alignment theories privilege security and militaiy variables 
over economic ones. This is not a significant shortcoming of these theories because they 
do not purport to explain economic outcomes, but rather alignment and security 
outcomes. However, what has become increasingly recognized is that the economic 
dimension of IR matters. More specifically, the level of economic interdependence 
between countries can play a major role in alignment decisions as to whom, how, and 
when to balance other states.20 Within the post-Soviet context, economic issues can 
influence alignment calculations in tremendous ways, especially since Russia was the 
main trading partner and principle provider of cheap and subsidized energy. This context 
thus provided Russia with many outlets to employ coercive economic tactics against FSU 
states because of the asymmetrical interdependence between them.21 This did not ensure 
that Russia’s economic position would allow it to leverage successfully all the time,22 but
19 David A. Lake. Entangling Relations: American Foreign Policy in Its Century (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1999), 31.
20 Paul A. Papayoanou, Power Ties: Interdependence, Balancing, and War (Ann Aibor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1999); and Dale C. Copeland. "Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory' of Trade 
Expectations," International Security 20, no. 4 (1996): 5-41.
21 For an examination of the successfulness of Russian economic coercion in the FSU see, Daniel W. 
Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University' Press, 1999).
22 For a theoretical discussion of conditions under which asymmetrical interdependence may not work in 
favor of the dominant actor see. R. Harrison Wagner, "Economic Interdependence, Bargaining Power, and 
Political Influence,” International Organization 42, no. 3 (1988): 461-83.
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it did serve as a powerful and note worthy constraint that FSU leaders were forced to 
contend with after the Soviet collapse. An underlying current of this discussion is that 
threats to economic security can be as detrimental to a state (or to a leader’s political 
position) as military threats to a country’s national security. Hence by incorporating 
economic dependence on Russia in the explanation of alignment behavior, this 
dissertation seeks to connect security and economic threats to a country, both of which 
are integral to a leader’s alignment calculations.
In subsequent chapters, I articulate the argument in detail for the two main case 
studies of Uzbekistan (Chapters III-V) and Ukraine (Chapters VI- VIII). The findings for 
each case study are divided into three chapters that examine security relations since 
independence, the role of internal threats to leaders, and the impact of economic 
dependence on Russia, respectively. These chapters are based on a variety of primary and 
secondary sources. One of the principle findings is that internal political threats impact 
alignment calculations in a more gripping fashion than does economic dependence on 
Russia. This is primarily because the former has a direct influence on a leader’s political 
security, while the latter exerts an indirect impact that may only influence a leader’s 
political position over a longer period of time. In short, while economic dependence may 
constrain a leader’s alignment choice, the presence of internal threats tends to exert the 
strongest impact on a leader’s decision to align with Russia. Chapter IX offers a more 
thorough assessment of the findings of this dissertation in the two main case studies of 
Uzbekistan and Ukraine as well as providing a brief overview of the alignment choices of 
other FSU leaders in the context of the IT/ED framework. I conclude with the theoretical 
and policy implications of this dissertation.
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CHAPTER II
THREATS, DEPENDENCE AND ALIGNMENT PATTERNS
This chapter serves several purposes. First, it provides a brief literature review of 
alignment theory (or the theoretical understanding of what drives states to adopt common 
postures toward a security issue, leading them to engage in cooperative and coordinated 
security behavior).1 An explication o f the contributions that this dissertation makes to the 
literature on the international relations (IR) of the former Soviet Union (FSU) is offered. 
The internal threat/economic dependence (IT/ED) framework is then laid out at great 
length. The IT/ED framework is an original contribution to the literature that expands 
upon and synthesizes previous work on the study of alignment behavior. The reasons for 
choosing these particular independent variables is analyzed, paying special attention to 
the impact of the Soviet experience on FSU states and how it shaped the immediate 
political and economic environment leaders faced after independence.
The methodology for this dissertation is then put forth. This includes indicators 
used to estimate the independent and dependent variables as well as testable hypotheses 
and the rationale underlying them. The justification for why Uzbekistan and Ukraine are 
chosen as principle case studies is also offered.
ALIGNMENT THEORY
The study of alignments has long been defined by various realist explanations. 
Systemic explanations identify the structure of the international system and a state’s
1 For this conception of alignment theory see, Harknett and VanDenBerg, "Alignment Theory and 
Interrelated Threats.”
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relative position to others within that system as the primary determinant of alignments.
The most traditional of these explanations, balance of power theory, highlights the 
distribution of capabilities in the international system as the most critical variable in a 
state’s alignment calculations.2 These theorists suggest that states tend to balance for two 
reasons. First, by aligning against the strongest power and potential hegemon, states 
ensure that no one state will dominate the system, which stabilizes the system and creates 
a new equilibrium or balance. The traditional British role of continental balancer is 
indicative of this strategy. As Winston Churchill explained joining the stronger side was 
at times both easy and tempting, however, “we always took the harder course, joined with 
the less strong Powers,. . .  and thus defeated and frustrated the Continental military 
tyrant whoever he was.. .  .”3 Based on this propensity to balance power, scholars in the 
post-Cold War applied this rationale to U.S. grand strategy. Christopher Layne 
championed the neorealist cause, arguing that the post-Cold war unipolarity is an illusion 
that is destined to fade within a few decades as other powers rise up to balance 
Washington’s preeminent position.4
Second, by joining the weaker and more vulnerable side, states increase their 
relative influence in the weaker coalition. As Kenneth Waltz theorizes, “secondary 
states, if they are free to choose, flock to the weaker side; for it is the stronger side that 
threatens them. On the weaker side, they are both more appreciated and safer, provided, 
o f course, that the coalition they join achieves enough defensive or deterrent strength to
2 Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations. and Waltz, Theory o f  International Politics.
3 Winston Churchill, The Second World War. vol. 1 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 1948), 208.
4 Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion.” For a discussion of balance of power as a predictor o f a state’s foreign 
policy see. Elman, "Horses for Courses.”
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dissuade adversaries from attacking.”5 For example, by joining forces with England, the 
United Provinces, and the major German states at the turn of the eighteenth century, 
Austria illustrates this motivation leading up to the War of Spanish Succession. Austria 
was more appreciated because the successful repulsion of Turkish forces on their Balkan 
flank allowed for a more active role in the anti-French coalition; and they were safer 
given the accession of Louis’ grandson, Philip V, to the Spanish throne in 1700, greatly 
increasing the potency of the Bourbon bloc.6
This rationale is prefaced on a strong belief in the anarchic structure of the 
international system. While states are seen as the primary actors in world affairs, they 
interact in an international system, which lacks an effective government above states, an 
international policing force, and a widely accepted body of international law. Thus, states 
find themselves locked into a perpetual structure from which, much like Jean Paul 
Sartre’s conception of hell, there is “no exit.” As a consequence of this socialization to 
anarchy, states seek self-preservation and pursue security to ensure their survival.
In a refinement of balance of power theory, Stephen Walt argues that states ally to 
balance against threats rather than against power alone.7 Walt sees the level of external 
threat as a function of four factors including: the distribution of capabilities, geographic 
proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived aggressive intentions. Thus, a state 
might not necessarily balance against the most powerful state. Instead, it will consider 
through these factors which state poses the greatest threat and balance accordingly.
5 Waltz, Theory o f  International Politics. 127.
6 John B. Wolf, The Emergence o f  the Great Powers, 1685-1715 (New York: Harper, 1951), chaps. 1-7; 
and Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall o f  Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 
to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987). chap. 3.
7 Walt, Origins o f Alliance. 5: and idem. "Testing Theories of Alliance Formation: The Case of Southeast 
Asia,” International Organization 42, no. 2 (1988): 277.
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Nonetheless, Waltz and Walt are in agreement that the dominant behavior o f states is to 
balance and not to bandwagon, although they disagree as to the reason why balancing 
would occur (power vs. threat).
Under some circumstances, states may find that the distribution of capabilities 
favors an alignment with the stronger power. Bandwagoning theory suggests that states 
may join the stronger side in order to avoid immediate attack and divert it elsewhere 
or in hopes of sharing in the spoils of victory with the stronger side.8 The Nazi-Soviet 
Pact of 1939 illustrates the dual usage of the term. Through his alliance with Hitler, Stalin 
was able to divert any immediate attack on the Soviet Union.9 The domestic turmoil 
caused by industrialization, forced collectivization, and the Stalinist purges o f the 1930s 
left the Soviet Union unprepared for combat with Nazi Germany. Time was needed to 
mobilize the Soviet economy for war production and strengthen the depleted officer corps 
of the Red Army. Simultaneously, Stalin, through his appeasement of Hitler, was granted 
a buffer zone between the Soviet Union and the Third Reich. The dismemberment of 
Poland provided breathing space for Stalin and allowed Hitler to expand his position with 
relative ease.
In considering weak states that are often fragile, Waltz and Walt both conclude 
that bandwagoning is the most likely occurrence. As Waltz writes, “the power of the 
strong may deter the weak from asserting their claims, not because the weak recognize a
8 Bandwagoning has also been described as a form of appeasement or capitulation in Walt Origins o f  
Alliances. 19-21. Randall L. Schweller argues that states may "bandwagon for profit’' in that they seek to 
reap the benefits of a revisionist state's aggression in "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist 
State Back In,” International Security 19, no. 1 (1994): 72-107. See also Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, 
ed.. Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland 
(New York: Oxford University Press. 1991); and Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on 
International Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962). 124.
9 Adam B. Ulam. Expansion and Coexistance (New York: Praeger, 1972), 276-77; and Isaac Deutscher, 
Stalin: A Political Biography (London: Pelican Books, 1966). 437-43.
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kind of rightfulness of rule on the part of the strong, but simply because it is not sensible 
to tangle with them.”10 For his part, Walt reasons that because weak states offer little to a 
rival coalition and have limited affect on the outcome of a war they are forced to 
bandwagon.11 Therefore, it is rational for weak states to balance power only when their 
capabilities can affect the outcome.12
In building upon Walt’s argument, Steven David contends that states are more 
concerned with threats than power alone, but he argues that the most pressing threats are 
domestic rather than external.13 Thus, the most powerful determinant of alignments in the 
Third World is the “rational calculation of Third World leaders as to which outside power 
is most likely to do whatever necessary to keep them in power.”14 David acknowledges 
that external security threats in an anarchic international system cannot be 
underestimated, but it is the interaction between the distribution of systemic and domestic 
threats that determines a state’s alignment behavior.15 When the most pressing threat is 
internal (e.g., coup, revolution, insurgency16), leaders will seek an external alignment that 
will assist in eliminating domestic threats, even if a state must align with another state it
10 Waltz. Theory o f International Politics. 113.
11 Walt Origins o f Alliances. 29-31.
12 Robert L. Rothstein. Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University'Press, 1968). 11.
13 David. Choosing Sides', and idem. "Explaining Third World Alignment."
14 David. Choosing Sides. 6.
15 For recent work that blends sy stemic theories with other domestic factors see, Jack S. Levy and Michael 
N. Barnett. "Alliance Formation, Domestic Political Economy, and Third World Security',” Jerusalem 
Journal o f  International Relations 14. no. 4 (1992): 19-40; Michael N. Barnett and Jack S. Levy, 
"Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 1962-1973,” International 
Organization 45, no. 3 (1991): 369-95; Robert G. Kaufman. "To Balance or to Bandwagon? Alignment 
Decisions in 1930s Europe," Security Studies 1. no. 3 (1992): 417-47; and Laurie A. Brand, "Economics 
and Shifting Alliances; Jordan's Relations with Syria and Iraq, 1975-1981,” International Journal o f  
Middle East Studies 26, no. 3 (1994): 393-413.
16 Michael E. Brown provides a similar and more comprehensive definition of internal conflict that 
includes events such as violent power struggles involving civilian or military' leaders; armed ethnic 
conflicts and secessionist campaigns; challenges by criminal organizations to state sovereignty" armed 
ideological struggles; and revolutions. Brown, "Introduction,” in The International Dimensions o f  Internal 
Conflict, ed. Michael E. Brown (Cambridge: MIT Press. 1996), 1.
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considers an external, although secondary, security threat. As David writes, leaders may 
even “protect themselves at the expense of promoting the long-term security of the state 
and the general welfare of its inhabitants.”17 This behavior of aligning with the strongest, 
yet secondary, threat would be identified as a superficial form of bandwagoning by 
balance of power and balance of threat theories.18 A bandwagoning explanation, 
however, would mischaracterize the true motivations behind an alignment, which would 
be to balance a leader’s more pressing internal threats.
David qualifies his argument and acknowledges that internal threats are not 
present in all countries. Indeed, his theory of omnibalancing was rooted in the distinctive 
character of Third World states and was prefaced on two conditions: 1) that leaders are 
weak and illegitimate, and 2) that the stakes for domestic politics are very high.19 
Richard Harknett and Jeffrey VanDenBerg went on to identify three more specific 
conditions that contribute to the presence of internal threats.20 They include competing 
national allegiances, a lack of political legitimacy for the leadership, and a state apparatus 
that possesses the predominant source of wealth in society.21 These are characteristics 
commonly associated with what Robert Jackson has identified as “quasi-states,” or states 
that have difficulty upholding their own sovereignty, which tend to be found throughout 
the developing (and formerly colonized) world.22
This dissertation accepts these established conditions about when internal threats 
may exist (and subsequently when they are most illustrative in explaining alignment
17 David. Choosing Sides. 7.
18 David. "Explaining Third World Alignment,” 236.
19 Ibid.
20 Harknett and VanDenBerg, "Alignment Theory and Interrelated Threats,” 120-28.
21 For a more comprehensive discussion of the sources of internal conflict emphasizing structural, 
political, socio-economic, and cultural factors see. Brown, "Introduction,” 12-23.
22 Jackson, Quasi-States.
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calculations). That is, in countries where political legitimacy (measured in popular 
support) is weak and power is concentrated in a strong state apparatus, there is a greater 
likelihood that internal threats to leaders may exist. These conditions need to be met for 
their theoretical insights to apply.23 After the collapse o f the Soviet Union, these 
dynamics were very much present throughout the FSU, which provides an opportunity to 
test these causal relationships. The Baltic states are the main exception to this argument. 
They made the most successful transition to democratic and market reform, and therefore, 
the concept of internal threats is not applicable because the preconditions necessary did 
not exist.
David’s work is helpful in highlighting domestic factors that traditional alignment 
explanations fail to identify. First, David recognizes that a great deal of conflict occurs 
within states as well as between them. In many regions of the world and in many types 
of states, this form of conflict is more common than the invasion of a foreign army.24 
Leaders must react to the immediate security environment in which they exist, and they 
often prioritize such domestic considerations in their alignment calculations. Systemic 
explanations like balance of power theory and its modified version balance of threat 
theory do not capture such calculations because of their focus on factors largely external 
to the state, predominantly the distribution of power and threats.
Second, David correctly asserts that in many countries little political legitimacy 
exists in the political process. Fareed Zakaria coined the phrase “illiberal democracies” to
23 Richard Harknett, letter to author, 15 June 2001.
24 As Ted Robert Gurr found within the early 1990s there were 115 ethno-political groups in serious 
conflict while this figure fell modestly to 95 groups by the late 1990s. Gurr also argues that the intensity of 
these conflicts subsided by the late 1990s and that relatively few new conflicts emerged since the early 
1990s. Gurr, People Versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century (Washington. D.C.: U. S. 
Institute of Peace Press, 2000), 43-44.
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describe countries in which “democratically elected regimes, often ones that have been 
reelected or reaffirmed through referenda, routinely [ignored] constitutional limits on 
their power depriving their citizens of basic rights and freedoms.”25 Zakaria identified 
many of the states of the FSU as illiberal democracies, based on the underlying 
authoritarianism common throughout the region. Pluralist and institutional arguments 
assume that political competition takes place in an accepted policy arena.26 That is, actors 
and groups influence the policy process in a routine, peaceful, and bureaucratized 
manner. This political process enables the state’s decisions to be seen as legitimate. Yet, 
pluralist and institutional approaches (many of which are rooted in the study of foreign 
economic policy) fail to capture the intensity of internal threats to leaders common in 
states where leaders possess questionable political legitimacy.
Harknett and VanDenBerg provide a useful refinement of David’s theory of 
omnibalancing. Whereas David stressed that leaders balanced their most pressing threats 
(which tended to be domestic in origin), they suggested that interrelated threats require 
leaders to keep an eye on external and internal forces, and that both balancing (resisting) 
and bandwagoning (appeasing) are the basic responses to the threats. This is an 
important distinction because it suggests that leaders do not always balance their internal 
threats and may choose to bandwagon with them. As we will see, FSU leaders in more 
democratic systems, where relatively free elections were held, relied more on the 
bandwagoning technique for providing their political survival. They forged political
25 Fareed Zakaria. “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy." Foreign Affairs 76. no. 6 (1997): 22.
26 See, for example. David Skidmore and Valerie Hudson, ed.. The Limits o f  State Autonomy: Societal 
Groups and Foreign Policy Formulation (Boulder. CO: Westview. 1993). 1-22; Peter Gourevitch. Politics 
in Hard Times (Ithaca: Cornell University' Press, 1986); G. John Ikenberry, "The State and Strategies of 
International Adjustment" World Politics 39, no. 1 (1986): 53-77; and Peter Katzenstein, "International 
Relations and Domestic Structures," International Organization 30. no. 1 (1976): 1-45.
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alliances with important and powerful constituents, which enabled them to secure a base 
of political support. This is comparatively different from more authoritarian regimes 
where leaders were more prone to intimidate and repress domestic opponents. 
Authoritarian leaders chose not to bandwagon with domestic opponents, but instead to 
balance and eliminate them altogether.
In sum, various scholars provide insight into why states choose particular 
alignment patterns and what forces are most likely to influence those decisions. Balance 
of power theory focuses on the distribution of power within the international system, 
while balance of threat theory goes beyond systemic variables to include domestic level 
variables, namely the perceived aggressiveness of another state’s intentions. David 
challenged balance of power and balance of threat theories in the context of alignment 
patterns in the developing world, arguing that internal threats to leaders tend to exert a 
stronger influence on a leader’s alignment choices, than questions about which state 
poses the greatest external threat to the state’s security. Moreover, leaders tend to appease 
and superficially bandwagon with the state that poses the predominant external threat to 
ensure their security from more pressing internal threats. This dissertation elaborates and 
refines David’s work, which deepens our theoretical understanding of alignment patterns 
and provides empirical evidence for his principle thesis.
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE LITERATURE
This dissertation makes an original contribution to the study of the IR of the FSU 
in four key ways. First, it addresses theoretical questions central to the IR and security 
studies literature. What types of threats (external or internal) are most influential in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
26
alignment calculations? Traditional alignment theories, such as balance of power and 
balance of threats theories, focus primarily on the distribution of power in the internal 
system or the level of perceived aggression from other states.
The present framework holds prospects for refining traditional alignment theories 
in its incorporation of domestic political and economic variables. That is, traditional 
approaches privilege factors exogenous to the state, whereas the present framework 
bridges the artificial divide between domestic and international politics. In so doing it 
provides a more compelling explanation of the dynamics underlying alignments within 
the FSU. IR theorists tend to give priority to either international or domestic level factors, 
although, not surprisingly, both are likely to influence a particular decision.27
This dissertation also addresses the concerns of other IR theorists, who encourage 
richer theoretical understandings about international relations.28 This falls in line with 
Fareed Zakaria’s plea for scholars to “develop a tolerance for more limited—but also 
more accurate—generalizations,” by developing theories of international affairs that draw 
on both internal and external factors to explain state behavior.29 What is lost in theoretical 
parsimony is more than made up for in the empirical explanatory capability of the present 
framework.
27 For a seminal study see. Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two- 
Level Games." International Organization 42, no. 3 (1988): 427-60.
28 Other studies attempt to create a link between domestic and international pressures and incentives in 
explaining state action in security matters, see, for example. Fareed Zakaria From Wealth to Power: The 
Unusual Origins o f America's World Role (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1998); Bruce Bueno de 
Mesquita and David Lalman, War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives (New Haven: Yale 
University- Press, 1992); Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, ed.. The Domestic Bases o f  Grand 
Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); Jack Snyder, Myths o f  Empire: Domestic Politics and 
International Ambitions (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1991); and Matthew Evangelista "Issue-Area 
and Foreign Policy Revisited." International Organization 43. no. 1 (1989): 147-71. For a good literature 
review' see. Gideon Rose. "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy."’ World Politics 51. no. 1 
(1998): 144-72.
29 Fareed Zakaria "Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay.” International Securitv 17, no. 1 
(1992): 179.
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Second, the present work develops a framework that incorporates critical political 
and economic factors and their impact on foreign alignments. The work of Paul 
Papayoanou on economic interdependence and the balance of power is an excellent 
example of this approach. Papayoanou’s findings reveal that firm balancing policies 
conducive to peace in the international system are most likely when there are extensive 
economic ties among status quo powers and few or no such links between them and 
perceived threatening powers. When economic interdependence is not significant 
between status quo powers or if status quo powers have strong economic links with 
threatening powers, weaker balancing postures and conciliatory policies by status quo 
powers, and aggression by aspiring revisionist powers, are more likely.30
Within IR theory, however, theorists tend to privilege one set of issues over the 
other. Realist theorists tend to focus on security and military issues, while liberal scholars 
focus more on economic issues. Even scholars that appreciate the connection between the 
two fields often focus on how economic and security matters determine, respectively, 
security or economic outcomes.3' Moreover, there continues to be a much-needed 
understanding of the nexus between security studies and international political 
economy.32 With the broadening of notions of security after the Cold War, this research 
path has not gone unnoticed, but more work is needed to increase our overall appreciation
30 Paul A. Papayoanou. "Economic Interdependence and the Balance of Power." International Studies 
Quarterly 41, no. 1 (1997): 113-40.
31 Papayoanou. Power Ties. 160.
32 For seminal studies see, Klaus Knorr and Frank N. Trager. ed.. Economic Issues and National Security 
(Lawrence, KS: Regents Press of Kansas. 1977); and Klaus Eugen Knorr. Power and Wealth: The Political 
Economy o f  International Power (New York: Basic Books, 1973).
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for how both political and economic factors shape international politics and, more 
specifically, the international politics within the FSU.33
Third, this dissertation fills a gap in the literature on the foreign relations between 
Russia and its former Soviet republics. Some scholars have focused on the importance 
and pervasiveness of nationalism and national identity in shaping a country’s foreign and 
economic policies towards Russia.34 Daniel Drezner analyzed Russian economic coercion 
against other FSU states, arguing that states that expected conflict with Russia (what he 
calls a “conflict expectations hypothesis”) influenced the ability of Russia to use other 
states’ economic dependence to coerce their leaders.35 Similar to the framework 
developed here, other scholars have examined various domestic political factors that 
influence a country’s foreign policy towards Russia, such as leadership survival, social 
mobilization, and political institutionalization.36 Other early studies theorized about the 
prospects for imperial revival and provided conceptual treatments of how these relations 
may unfold.37
33 Jean-Marc F. Blanchard. Edward D. Mansfield, and Norrin M. Ripsman. ed.. Power and the Purse: 
Economic Statecraft, Interdependence, and National Security (London: Frank Cass. 2000).
34 Henry E. Hale, “Statehood at Stake: Democratization. Secession, and the Collapse of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics'" (Ph.D. diss.. Harvard University. 1998); Rawi Abdelal. National Purpose in the 
World Economy: Post-Soviet States in Comparative Perspective (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001); 
and Andrei P. Tsvgankov, Pathways After Empire: National Identity and Foreign Economic Policy in the 
Post Soviet World (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. 2002).
35 Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox.
36 Heniy Hale, "Islam, State-Building, and Uzbekistan Foreign Polio.-.'' in The New Geopolitics o f  Central 
Asia and Its Borderlands, ed. Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University 
Press, 1994); Rajan Menon and Hendrik Spruyt. “Possibilities for Conflict and Conflict Resolution in Post- 
Soviet Central Asia.” in Post-Soviet Political Order: Conflict and State Building. ed. Jack Snyder and 
Barnett R. Rubin (London: Routledge, 1998); and Roeder. "From Hierarchy to Hegemony.”
37 For his part Spruyt suggested an eightfold taxonomy that speculated on possible policy7 outcomes within 
the FSU based on the insights of theories of imperialism and systems-level theories of integration. Dawisha 
forwarded her concept of autocolonization or a process by which peripheral elites welcomed Russian pow er 
and were willing to accept a diminution of the state's sovereignty in exchange for enhanced security and 
material benefits. Hendrik Spruyt "The Prospects for Neo-Imperial and Nonimperial Outcomes in the 
Former Soviet Space,” and Karen Dawisha. "Constructing and Deconstructing Empire in the Post-Soviet 
Space,” in The End o f  Empire? The Transformation o f the USSR in Comparative Perspective, ed. Karen 
Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1997).
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However, no study to date has applied balance of power theory, balance of threat 
theory, or omnibalancing specifically against the empirical behavior of FSU states.38 No 
study has differentiated beyond different types of internal threats that leaders face, and 
the varying ways in which they influence alignment patterns within the FSU.39 Finally, 
no study has conceptualized or tested the framework offered in this dissertation that 
integrates the impact of internal threats and economic dependence on Russia on 
alignment choices of the post-Soviet states, which provides a fresh perspective on the IR 
of the FSU.
Fourth, there is an increasingly important body of literature that addresses the 
more complex security environment of the FSU.40 This literature focuses on the non­
military security threats that FSU states face. These real security considerations include, 
among other things, domestic threats such as dislocations within and among states 
brought on by economic change, civil strife driven by nationalist sentiment and disputed 
borders, and the erosion of the stability and political legitimacy of states by the drug 
trade, organized crime, and pervasive corruption. This dissertation builds on the above 
scholarship and attempts to bridge the concerns of both. It seeks a causal explanation for 
why FSU states adopt particular alignment patterns towards Russia by focusing on
38 For a theoretically informed discussion of bilateralism and multilateralism in the FSU see. Paul J. 
D ’Anieri. "International Cooperation Among Unequal Partners: The Emergence of Bilateralism in the 
Former Soviet Union.” International Politics 34, no. 4 (1997): 417-48. For the application of these theories 
in different regional contexts see. David Priess, ”Balance-of-Threat Theory and the Genesis of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council: An Interpretive Case Study,” Security Studies 5. no. 4 (1996): 143-71; and 
Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment.”
39 Some scholars have focused on leadership survival, but they do not draw an analytical distinction 
between various types of threats to leaders. Roeder, "From Hierarchy to Hegemony ”; and Hale, "Statehood 
at Stake.”
40 Rajan Menon, Yuri E. Fedorov, and Ghia Nodia, ed.. Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia: The 21st 
Century Security Environment (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1999): and Roy Allison and Lena Jonson, ed.. 
Central Asian Security: The New International Context (Washington. D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 
2001).
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domestic political and economic variables and it assesses the foreign policy implications 
of non-state centric security threats.
THE IMPORTANCE OF INTERNAL THREATS AND ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE 
The two key variables in the IT/ED framework—internal political threats and 
economic dependence on Russia—vary considerably across the FSU. When considered 
together, they are intended to provide a framework for understanding the dynamic nature 
of alignments within the FSU. These two variables are not intended to be exhaustive but 
are designed to illustrate the core logic of the present argument: FSU leaders tend to 
prioritize domestic threats to their political positions and tend to be constrained by their 
economic dependence on Russia.
This section briefly explains why these variables are particularly relevant for the 
study of the FSU and why they are highlighted in this dissertation. The reasons stem from 
the previous Soviet experience. First, by the way in which the Communist Party 
maintained and upheld the political system, and second, by the way in which party 
leaders in Moscow made economic decisions that influenced the allocation of resources, 
bringing about the narrow specialization of Soviet republics. A final explanation is 
offered as to why other variables were not chosen.
FSU Leaders arid Political Survival
Politically, most post-Soviet leaders faced a precarious situation amid their 
newfound independence. The Communist Party had for many years legitimated (and 
guaranteed through force when necessary) their leadership, but with this formidable
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presence gone, the rules of the political game were unclear. FSU leaders were keenly 
aware that such an environment offered the opportunity for extended political survival, 
provided the right domestic strategies were chosen. Because of this propensity, and the 
difficulties associated with the post-Soviet transition, internal threats were powerful 
motives driving the alignment calculations of leaders.
The IT/ED framework begins with a behavioral assumption about the principle 
motivation of FSU leaders.41 FSU leaders seek political survival as their primary goal, 
and are therefore, mindful of the domestic threats that can influence their careers and 
positions.42 Political survival is seen as a first-order goal, much in the same way that 
realists identify the survival of the state as a first-order goal.
By assuming that FSU leaders perceive threats to their careers to be serious and 
warranting attention, we naturally broaden the analytical scope of what is seen as an 
internal threat, beyond instances of political violence as David suggests. This does mean 
that political violence was unimportant in the post-Soviet context or that it was not a 
factor in leaders’ alignment calculations. Indeed, throughout the decade, FSU leaders 
faced secessionist movements, assassination attempts, and violent Islamic extremists. 
Shortly after independence various regions of the FSU erupted into bloody civil conflict 
from Moldova, to Georgia, to Tajikistan. Russian military power was called on to
41 As Colton pointed out, assuming preferences for post-Communist politicians is problematic and very 
complex. Assuming that leaders maximize power by attaining office is a necessary simplification that may 
not fit for all actors, but it seems a plausible assumption since there are fewer leaders than politicians and 
many leaders that were in power prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union remain there today. Timothy J. 
Colton, "Professional Engagement and Role Definition among Post-Soviet Deputies.” in Parliaments in 
Transition, ed. T. F. Remington (Boulder. CO: Westvievv. 1994), 55-73.
42 Other studies have made similar assumptions about leaders. Brace Bueno De Mesquita and Randolph 
M. Siverson, "War and the Survival of Political Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime Types and 
Political Accountability,” American Political Science Review 89, no. 4 (1995): 841-55; and Randolph M. 
Siverson, ed.. Strategic Politicians, Institutions, and Foreign Policy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1998).
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stabilize the situation at the behest o f various leaders.43 Thus, in many instances political 
violence was the major factor driving a leader to seek assistance from Moscow, and it 
tends to exert the strongest influence on pro-Russian alignments within the IT/ED 
framework.
However, if we focus narrowly on David’s conceptualization, then we would miss 
a variety of other types of domestic actors that also threatened (or were at least perceived 
to be a threat to) the political positions of FSU leaders. Within the FSU context, domestic 
political opposition was a major concern because of the fear that it could mobilize 
support and remove leaders either violently or through the ballot box. In the initial days 
of the post-Soviet transition and during the inchoate steps towards democratization, FSU 
leaders were primarily concerned with ensuring their political positions in the future.44 
This conceptual refinement of David’s work is warranted and justifiable in the case of the 
FSU for two reasons.
First, this assumption factors in the unique political system that was put in place 
and maintained by the Communist Party. The political system was based on formal 
recognition of power as well as informal bargaining practices that were necessary for the 
command economy to work. Formally, the Soviet system was based on various union- 
wide and republic-level ministries, organs, and agencies that were all part of an intricate 
and encompassing bureaucracy. Officially the Communist Party allocated resources to 
meet the needs of the larger Union. Flowever, what began to emerge after Stalin’s death
43 For a good overview see, Fiona Hill and Pamela Jewett, Back in the USSR: Russia's Intervention in the 
Internal Affairs o f  the Former Soviet Republics and the Implications for United States Policy toward Russia 
(Cambridge, MA: Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, Harvard University, January 1994).
44 For a recent overview of regime change in the post-Soviet region see, Michael McFaul. "The Fourth 
Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World.” World 
Politics 54, no. 2 (2002): 212-44.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
was a bargaining system in which informal networks (often based on personal exchange) 
permeated the policy making process. What was important and necessary to succeed 
politically was having the right connections and patronage networks to ensure a person’s 
bureaucratic position while facilitating advancement. The pervasiveness of informal 
networks, coupled with Moscow’s ineffective oversight, contributed to the power of 
regional leaders and various bureaucratic administrators who were able to distribute 
positions and resources for their political benefit (based on traditional social loyalties and 
affiliations).45
After the decentralization of Gorbachev’s perestroika, this bargaining system 
gained even more momentum. As Boycko, Schleifer, and Vishny point out, while the 
state formally owned property and assets, regional leaders, bureaucrats, managers, and 
other economic agents exercised de facto control over resources.46 This enabled regional 
leaders to distribute resources in ways that would maximize their political tenure. By the 
Soviet collapse, regional leaders were well versed in these bureaucratic bargaining 
games, and those that lacked such political skill were more times than not left out of the 
new political systems, or out maneuvered by more cunning politicians. In this sense, the 
Communist legacy shaped the experiences of the initial ruling elites of the new FSU 
states, many of whom were attached in some way to the party apparatus and were trained 
in such bureaucratic wrangling. Beyond these entrenched practices and concerns with 
political survival, there were also structures in place left over from the Soviet era, such as 
an extensive secret police force, which allowed leaders to further control their political
45 Alena V. Ledeneva. Russia's Economy o f  Favours: Blat, Networking, and Informal Exchange (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
46 Maxim Boycko. Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny, Privatizing Russia (Cambridge: MIT Press. 1995), 
chaps. 2-3.
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opponents and clamp down on any source of discontent directed at the leadership.47 This 
leads to a related point about the importance of focusing on leaders, and hence the 
political threats they faced.
Second, prioritizing the internal threats that leaders faced places the analytical 
lens on FSU leaders themselves as the primary actors within post-Soviet politics. This is 
not surprising since, with the exception of the Baltic states, FSU states tended to develop 
strong executive branches, which legitimated and institutionalized the power o f the 
respective leader.48 As we saw above, regional leaders, many of whom were connected 
with the Communist Party, became masters of the political bargaining game, and were 
able to solidify their centrality in the policy making process. In the words of Philip 
Roeder, “post-Soviet politics is dominated by self-interested politicians who seek to 
maximize their control over the policy process.”49 This also suggests that the motivations 
of FSU leaders cannot be assumed beyond what is in their best political and economic 
interest. Such a caveat runs counter to realist alignment theories that assume the state is a 
unitary actor that acts in predictable and rational ways in terms of national rather than 
individual interest. To assume, therefore, that FSU leaders focus on the hypothetical 
“national interest” and what is best for their country and citizenry as a whole is deceptive 
because this assumption is inconsistent with the empirical realities of the post-Soviet 
transition. In short, many of the theoretical assumptions that realists make about the
47 For a good overview see. Amy Knight, Spies without Cloaks: The KGB's Successors (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 1996). 181-90.
48 As Timothy Frye concluded from his work on post-Communist presidents, political institutions can be 
analyzed as the by-products of power-seeking politicians making choices under varying degrees of 
uncertainty. Despite the great uncertainty of the transition, actors understood their interests and strategies, 
which prompted them to hedge their bets when designing political institutions. Frye, “A Politics of 
Institutional Choice: Post-Communist Presidencies.” Comparative Political Studies 30. no. 5 (1997): 523- 
52.
49 Philip G. Roeder, "Varieties of Post-Soviet Authoritarian Regimes.” Post-Soviet Affairs 10, no. 1 
(1994): 61.
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nation-state, sovereignty, and the consistency of foreign and domestic preferences offer
especially poor guidance in the case o f FSU states. This reality requires a different
analytical focus on the FSU leader as a critical actor in post-Soviet politics, a concern that
has been emphasized in academic circles.
There has been a growing call by some political scientists to refocus our attention
on leaders and domestic affairs as the centerpiece for understanding world affairs. The
logic behind such a call makes sense. As Bruce Bueno de Mesquita recently suggested:
Leaders, not states, choose actions. Leaders and their subjects enjoy the 
fruits and suffer the ills that follow from their decisions. Alas, leaders seem 
to be motivated by their own well-being and not by the welfare of the state.
The state’s immortality beyond their own is secondary to the quest of leaders 
for personal political survival... .When we construct theories in which the state 
is the focal actor we miss all o f the institutional and political incentives that 
shape the policies leaders choose. And yet it is those policies—decisions to 
align or not, decisions to build up armament or promote economic growth 
at home, and so forth—that determine whether the international system is 
balanced or not, bipolar or not, and on and on.50
This dissertation addresses these larger concerns of political scientists. That is, there is a
conscious attempt to bring the leaders back into the theoretical and analytical fold for this
dissertation.51 In his study of regime change in the postcommunist world, Michael
McFaul takes a similar actor-centric approach:
Inert, invisible structures do not make democracies or dictatorships. People 
do. Structural factors such as economic development, cultural influences, 
and historical institutional arrangements influence the formation of actors’ 
preferences and power but ultimately these forces have causal significance 
only if translated into human action. Individuals and the decisions they make 
are especially important for explaining how divergent outcomes result from 
similar structural contexts.52
50 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "Domestic Politics and International Relations.” International Studies 
Quarterly 46, no. 1 (2002): 4, 8.
51 For a theoretical discussion of the impact of individuals on international relations and the conditions in 
which they are most likely to be influential see, Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, "Let Us Now 
Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In,” International Security 25, no. 4 (2001): 107-46.
52 McFaul, "The Fourth Wave,” 214.
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This dissertation, therefore, sheds light on these larger concerns for the IR literature on 
leaders and foreign policy outcomes, especially those with a regional interest in the 
international and domestic politics of the FSU.
Soviet Legacies and Economic Dependence
Much like internal threats to leaders, the nature of economic dependence on 
Russia is critical for understanding alignment patterns in the FSU. This is true for myriad 
reasons, most of which are rooted in Soviet economic planning. First, because all 
economic decisions were made in Moscow and implemented in various republics, Russia 
became the hub of the Soviet economy.53 Despite efforts by Gorbachev to restructure the 
economy in the late 1980s, Russia remained at the center of the economy. Independence 
did not necessarily alter these preexisting relationships either.
This pervasive economic dependence was particularly evident in the creation of 
the ruble zone. After independence many countries (with the exception of the Baltic 
states and Ukraine) sought to maintain their existing currency arrangement with Russia 
for fear of sparking rampant inflation and overall economic instability. The belief also 
existed that there was greater security in working with other FSU states because most 
firms lacked the comparative advantage to compete on world markets. But, in July 1993 
Russia’s plans to reform the monetary system placed pressure on FSU states, prompting 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Turkmenistan to issue their own independent 
currencies. It was only after Russia clarified its terms for membership in the new ruble 
zone in November 1993 that the remaining states (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan,
53 For classic studies see. Paul Gregory and Robert Stuart. Soviet and Post-Soviet Economic Structure and 
Performance, 5th ed. (New York: Harper Collins, 1994); and Alev Nove. The Soviet Economic System 
(Boston: Allen & Unwin. 1986).
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Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) decided to opt out of the new arrangement.54 As Rawi 
Abdelal contends, “Russia had changed from a generous leader of post-Soviet monetary 
cooperation seeking to pay post-Soviet republics for their political acquiescence to a self- 
interested hegemon intent on either profiting from the ruble zone or destroying it.”55 
Monetary relations between Russia and FSU states were thus illustrative of how some 
leaders dealt with their initial economic dependence on Russia while others sought to 
sever their ties with Russia altogether by pursuing alternative markets and trading 
partners.
Second, leaders in Moscow made decisions for the command economy that 
allowed some republics to enjoy full or near-full monopolies in the production of various 
goods. For example, Uzbekistan specialized in cotton production, Latvia in electronics, 
and Azerbaijan in oil industry equipment. Communist leaders in Moscow made allocation 
decisions, in that each republic performed different economic functions, while every 
republic was integrated into the larger Soviet command economy. It mattered little if a 
republic had to import all of its energy needs or consumer goods, because the command 
economy would presumably allocate resources to fulfill these needs, although as we saw 
above informal exchanges were as important (and sometimes more so) than formal 
exchanges between Moscow and regional leaders. This also meant that while some 
republics were well endowed with vast natural resources, they did not always have the 
facilities necessary to refine such goods, which relegated them to the producer of raw
54 Among the more stringent conditions, Russia insisted that ruble zone states deposit hard currency or 
gold worth 50 percent of the value of the ruble "loan” in the Central Bank of Russia, that member states 
could trade their old rubles for new rubles at a rate of approximately three to one, and that member states 
could not issue an independent currency for a period of five years. Turkmenistan and Moldova officially 
left the ruble zone in November 1993. Tajikistan exited in May 1995.
55 Abdelal. National Purpose in the World Economy, 58.
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materials for production in Russia with little or no infrastructure to produce and finish 
goods independent of Russia. Hence, some states were left in better relative economic 
positions at the time of independence, and understanding the level of economic 
dependence a state has on Russia is helpful in defining the economic constraints FSU 
leaders faced. It is also important to note that while all the former Soviet republics were 
dependent on Russia to some degree, this did not imply that all states faced the same 
level o f economic dependence, or that they were all dependent for the same items.
Third, this dissertation focuses on energy dependence on Russia as a critical 
indicator in understanding the alignment preferences of FSU states. Accordingly, it is 
important to note that some republics within the Soviet system were energy exporters, 
while others were energy importers, or in other words there were the energy haves and 
have-nots.56 This was not a problem during the Soviet period, but it did pose considerable 
problems for these countries if they sought to adopt independent policies from Russia. 
Countries such as Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan were 
the principle sources of energy within the FSU, most of which was dominated by Russia 
and heavily subsidized during the Soviet era. Other republics, thus, were left to import 
their energy needs from these countries, and Russia tended to dominate this trade after 
the Soviet collapse.
A related issue concerning energy resources and dependence has to do with the 
issue of pipelines. Without pipelines a country that is rich in oil and gas supplies is still 
unable to capitalize on this domestic resource because they cannot get the goods to the 
international market. This places countries, such as Kazakhstan, in extremely vulnerable
56 For an excellent overview see, Robert E. Ebel, Energy Choices in the Near Abroad: The Haves and 
Have-nots Face the Future (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1997).
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positions, and they then have to turn to Russia for the use of preexisting pipelines or else 
accept that their most important export commodity will have to remain in the country. 
Ukraine has at times also used this method of coercion against Russia, since a 
tremendous amount of Russian natural gas is transported across Ukrainian pipelines on its 
way to European markets.
Fourth, the severity of a country’s economic dependence on Russia can also 
directly influence the level of internal threats to leaders. That is, when countries that are 
heavily dependent on Russia attempt to change or alter these relations, economic decline 
and collapse is always possible. When economic conditions begin to deteriorate rapidly, 
there is a greater likelihood hat internal threats to leaders will emerge as a result of large- 
scale dissatisfaction with leaders. In the most severe case, economic crisis may even 
bring about a regime change.57 For these reasons, economic dependence is seen as a 
critical and important variable in understanding the alignment strategies available to FSU 
leaders vis-a-vis Russia.
Alternative Variables Not Chosen
The IT/ED framework offers a bivariate analysis of alignment strategies vis-a-vis 
Russia, focusing on the internal threats to leaders and economic dependence on Russia. 
These variables are chosen because they highlight the critical role that leaders play in the 
alignment decisions of their respective countries, but critics may suggest that other
57 For a good overview of this literature see. Barbara Wejnert, ed.. Transition to Democracy in Eastern 
Europe and Russia: Impact on Politics, Economy, and Culture (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002); James F. 
Hollifield and Calvin Jillson, ed.. Pathways to Democracy: The Political Economy o f  Democratic 
Transitions (New York: Routledge, 2000); Lisa Anderson, ed.. Transitions to Democracy (New York: 
Columbia University Press. 1999); and Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman. The Political Economy o f  
Democratic Transitions (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1995).
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variables played a role in alignment calculations. While this is a fair observation, many of 
the most compelling alternative variables are either subsumed by the logic o f the IT/ED 
framework or they are considered less explanatory. Other alternative variables include:
1) the presence of Russian minorities in a given country, 2) external pressures from the 
West, 3) leadership personalities, 4) the nature of a state’s government (whether 
democratic or authoritarian), and 5) ideological similarities between leaders and/or 
countries. A final discussion is offered about the rationale for excluding Russia’s policies 
towards FSU states in the IT/ED framework.
The presence of significant Russian minorities throughout the former Soviet 
Union is a legacy of the Soviet era.58 To increase their influence throughout the former 
republics, Moscow encouraged and at times directed ethnic Russians to move to 
republics, especially to republican capitals, to strengthen the imperial grip on these 
regions and ensure Moscow’s interests. The presence of minorities is widespread, but 
their distribution is not consistently felt. In countries like Ukraine and Kazakhstan (the 
most Russian of all republics) ethnic Russians made up almost half of the population, 
ranging to others republics such as Uzbekistan, where ethnic Russians totaled only about 
7 percent of the population.
From a theoretical point of view, it could be hypothesized that the greater the 
percentage of ethnic Russians living in a country, the more pro-Russian an alignment 
calculation would be. While this provides another descriptive variable, it is unnecessary 
to formally integrate this variable into the IT/ED framework. This is in large part because 
the issue of ethnic Russians living in a country is part of the domestic political games that
58 Aurel Brown, "All Quiet on the Russian Front? Russia, Its Neighbors, and the Russian Diaspora,” in 
The New European Diasporas: National Minorities and Conflict in Eastern Europe. ed. Michael 
Mandelbaum (New York: Council of Foreign Relations Press, 2000).
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leaders play and therefore is subsumed within the discussion of internal threats. For 
instance, in Kazakhstan the capital was moved from the southern part of the country 
predominated by ethnic Kazakhs to the northern part of the country, where ethnic 
Russians reside, presumably to shore up any irredentist claims that could be made by the 
Russian government. Clearly, if a leader adopts a very anti-Russian alignment in a 
country where there are significant ethnic Russians, this is likely to spark opposition to a 
leader and inherently increase a leader’s internal threats. Accordingly, this variable is 
seen more as a subset under the internal threat variable and can be explained using that 
logic as opposed to a formalized introduction into the IT/ED framework.
The potential for external pressure from the West is similarly an explanation that 
is subsumed by the logic of the framework, and one that warrants qualification given the 
empirical realities of U.S. and Western policy. The idea that Western action influences 
alignments strategies is well founded and incorporated into the IT/ED framework. This is 
most evident in the discussion of economic dependence and how available economic 
resources are from the West. As argued, the main factor influencing access to alternatives 
resources from the West is the implementation of reform. When countries did this, then 
Western aid was likely to follow. When comprehensive reform continued over the years, 
this was the most compelling manner to reorient a country’s economy away from Russia, 
such as in the case of Eastern Europe and the Baltic states.
Moreover, positive inducements were the most common form of Western 
statecraft towards the FSU, as opposed to economic sanctions or other negative 
pressures.59 The Clinton administration sought to assist these countries in their political
59 For a discussion of positive versus negative sanctions see, David A. Baldwin. Economic Statecraft 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1985).
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and economic transition as opposed to pressuring them into adopting various policy 
decisions.60 As we will see in Chapter VI, the one exception to this pattern was found in 
the case of Ukrainian nuclear disarmament. The first George Bush administration placed 
a tremendous amount of attention on Ukrainian leaders to adhere to the Non Proliferation 
Treaty and sign on to Strategic Arms Reductions Talks. However, at the same time the 
policy was not one of pure sanctions and pressure, and in fact positive inducements were 
veiy influential in the overall process of Ukrainian nuclear disarmament, along with 
agreements that addressed the real security concerns of Ukraine. In the end, positive 
inducements and not negative sanctions were the preferred method of statecraft the 
United States, especially under the Clinton administration, and other Western nations 
employed, and this consideration is integrated into the IT/ED framework.
The personalities of individual leaders may also be relevant at times to the 
alignment decisions of leaders.61 For instance, in recent encounters between U.S. 
president George W. Bush and Russian president Vladimir Putin, Bush claimed to have 
seen into Putin’s soul and therefore cooperation, whether on the war against terrorism or 
in the field of strategic offensive weapons reductions, is more credible and possible. 
Similarly, the ongoing tensions between Putin and Georgian president Eduard 
Shevardnadze concerning Chechen guerrillas in the Pankisi Gorge is driven by a general 
hatred and contempt for Shevardnadze. Russians see the former Soviet leader, along with
60 Stephen F. Cohen. Failed Crusade: America and the Tragedy o f Post-Communist Russia (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company. 2000); and Janine R. Wedel. Collision and Collusion: The Strange Case o f  
Western A id  to Eastern Europe, 1989-1998 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998).
61 Not surprisingly most scholarly attentions has focused on Russian leaders. See. for example, George W. 
Breslauer, Gorbachev and Yeltsin as Leaders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); and Archie 
Brown and Liliia Fedorovna Shevtsova. Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and Putin: Political Leadership in Russia’s 
Transition (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2001).
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former Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev, as the principal architects o f the Soviet 
demise and to blame for much of the countries problems.62
However, the analysis of personality does not warrant fuller explication beyond 
what the IT/ED framework offers. Leaders do matter, which is a central consideration of 
the present framework, but calculating for their actual personalities does not add much to 
the framework’s explanatory capability, and instead it would raise other methodological 
issues that would hinder the parsimonious nature of the IT/ED framework. By design the 
IT/ED framework views leaders as self-interested actors that prioritize their security over 
the security o f the country. To factor in different personality measures would lessen the 
ability to generalize across the FSU, and such an analysis would be driven by 
considerations of political psychology, which is an endeavor that goes well beyond the 
present discussion.
Many IR theorists have placed emphasis on the nature of a government and its 
impact on foreign policy. The democratic peace thesis is perhaps the most often cited in 
this genre of research.63 In short, democracies are less prone to fight other democracies, 
in contrast to dyads in which one country is democratic and the other non-democratic or 
both countries are non-democratic.
While the IT/ED framework does not tackle such questions head on, it does factor 
in the importance of regime type. First, the framework attempts to explain alignment 
decisions in countries that are either authoritarian or quasi-democratic. (The only 
countries in the FSU that can be seen as democratic are the Baltic states, and they are left
62 Vladimir Socor, "Putin's New Tune: I’ve Got Georgia on My Mind.” Wall Street Journal. 14 August 
2002, A12.
63 Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lvnn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, ed.. Debating the Democratic Peace 
(Cambridge: MTT Press. 1996).
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out of this present analysis.) Second, from a theoretical standpoint, leaders in different 
types of regimes are expected to respond to internal threats differently. Authoritarian 
leaders are more likely to balance internal threats because of their willingness and ability 
to repress domestic political opposition. On the other hand, leaders in quasi-democratic 
states are more likely to bandwagon with the most powerful groups in the state because 
of their inability to crackdown openly on opposition. Thus, while some could point to 
regime type as a factor that influences alignment decisions, the IT/ED framework 
includes this consideration into its theoretical treatment of alignment calculations vis-a- 
vis Russia.
Ideological considerations could also be highlighted as important factors in 
bringing about stronger policies between a country and Russia. Yet, unlike the above 
alternative variables, this factor is largely discounted in the present work and not 
incorporated in any fashion into the IT/ED framework.
The most significant analytical problem is that FSU leaders did not consistently 
adhere to any preconceived ideology. In large part ideology became less relevant after the 
collapse of Soviet communism. As Francis Fukuyama suggested, the century ended with 
a triumph for liberal democracy over its communist and fascist rivals, signaling the “end 
of history,” or at least the end of ideological clashes.64 But, very few leaders in the FSU 
openly and sincerely embraced the precept of this ideology. It could be argued that the 
Baltic states have, and this would explain why their trajectory has been a linear one 
towards the West. The same cannot be said for other FSU countries, where leaders did 
what was best for them with little or no preconceived ideological underpinnings. 
Moreover, if a leader professed a particular ideology one day, this did not ensure that a
64 Francis Fukuyama. "The End of History?" The National Interest, no. 16 (1989): 3-18.
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few days later the same ideology would be upheld. All of this suggests that ideological 
factors played little role in explaining relations between CIS countries and Russia, and 
therefore the variable is not considered an important explanatory factor.
Finally, the IT/ED framework does not incorporate Russian interests and actions 
into the framework for two primary reasons. First, Russian policy as an explanatory 
factor is largely seen as a constant variable. While Russian policy did fluctuate over the 
past decade, Russia by in large sought to maintain (and at times extend) its influence in 
the FSU, both formally and informally. The region was treated by Western policy makers 
and seen by Russian policy makers as part of Russia’s larger sphere of influence. U.S. 
policy generally took a back seat to Russian interests in these various regions, although in 
the wake of the terrorist attacks of 9/11 the United States has dramatically increased its 
military presence in regions such as Central Asia and the Caucasus. In short, Russia is 
seen a country that wants to maintain its hegemonial status in its former empire, and 
therefore other countries in the region are likely to see this as neo-imperial in some 
respect. Because this was a constant since independence, it is less important analytically 
(although there was some limited change over those years as Russian cabinet officials 
were replaced).
Second, by design the framework is more interested in the forces that are driving 
policies in Russia’s former periphery as opposed to what is driving policy from Moscow. 
Much attention in the early 1990s focused on Russia’s role in the region depicting FSU 
states as relatively passive actors to the exclusion of the many domestic factors that drove 
policies towards Russia. The IT/ED framework is more interested with alignments vis-a-
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vis Russia, and examining the underlying motives for why leaders chose alignment 
towards Russia and not the other way around.
INTERNAL THREAT/ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE FRAMEWORK
This section discusses more specifically the variables of the IT/ED framework 
and provides indicators used to estimate their general values. As noted earlier, the 
framework consists of two independent variables—internal political threats and economic 
dependence on Russia— that are purported to explain alignment patterns. The 
combination of different values of these variables (ranging from high to low) provides 
four alignment patterns. These outcomes are presented as basic hypotheses along with the 
rationale underlying each alignment strategy. Justification for the selection of the two 
cases examined in this dissertation is then provided.
Alignment
The dependent variable is that of alignments. An alignment is defined as a 
relationship between two or more states, which involves mutual expectations of some 
degree of policy coordination on security issues under certain conditions in the future.65 
This definition is drawn from the alignment literature, and thus conforms to the 
conventional usage of the term.66
65 Walt, Origins o f  Alliances, 1; David, Choosing Sides, 29: and Levy and Barnett, "Domestic Sources of 
Alliances and Alignments.'" 370.
66 Alignment should not be confused with the more formal and binding concept of an alliance. For a 
sample of definitions of alignment and alliance in the literature see, Rothstein. Alliances and Small Powers, 
46-64; George Modelski. "The Study of Alliances: A Review."’ in Alliance in International Politics, ed. 
Julien Friedman, Christopher Bladen, and Steven Rosen (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1970), 63-75: Robert 
A. Kann, "Alliances versus Ententes,” World Politics 28, no. 4 (1976): 611-21: and Robert V. Dingman, 
"Theories of, and Approaches to. Alliance Politics.” in Diplomacy: New Approaches in Theory, History, 
and Policy, ed. Paul Gordon Lauren (New York: Free Press, 1979).
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This definition of alignment is not highly quantified in key works on the study of 
alignment theory.67 Instead, IR theorists have offered a more qualitative assessment of 
state alignment. This is not as problematic in the study of alliances and alignments 
because the extent to which a country aligns with another tends to be fairly 
straightforward in practice.68 Countries tend to sign formal agreements with other states. 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact are recent examples in 
which clearly defined alliances were evident. Similarly, the United States maintains a 
formal security relationship with Japan that serves as a signal to other countries in East 
Asia that may seek aggression, such as China or North Korea. For the purposes of this 
study, the extent of a leader’s alignment strategy is not always as clear-cut. There are 
exceptions, for instance, in the signing of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
Collective Security Treaty, or other defense related multilateral treaties, but in general 
this dissertation accepts that there are varying degrees of alignments with Russia, ranging 
from strong, to moderate, to weak.
Accordingly, while the overarching assessment of a given alignment vis-a-vis 
Russia is a qualitative assessment, quantitative factors inform such an assessment. The 
extent to which an alignment towards or away from Russia is observed is based on 
several factors. These include: 1) the extent to which a country coordinates its security 
policies with Russia in bilateral terms, and 2) the extent to which a country coordinates 
its policies within the CIS framework. Indicators for the first aspect of alignment include:
67 Waltz, Theory ofInternational Politics: Walt, Origins o f  Alliances', and David. Choosing Sides.
68 One historical reason for the formality or openness of a particular alliance stems from the experience of 
"secret alliances” shortly before World War I, where the hidden alliance system ultimately collapsed on 
itself leading to a rapid escalation of war. Woodrow Wilson drew attention to secret alliances in his 
Fourteen Points suggesting the need for open covenants in which "there shall be no private international 
understandings of any kind [and] diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.” 
Woodrow Wilson. The Messages and Papers o f  Woodrow Wilson, vol. 1 (New York: The Review of 
Review's Corporation. 1924). 468.
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the frequency of high-level military meetings, bilateral agreements signed between 
Russia and the respective country, joint training of personnel, and military hardware 
transfers. Indicators of the second aspect include: the number of formal agreements 
signed by the respective countries and the choice (or type) of agreements signed.
Internal Political Threats
The first independent variable employed in this project is internal political threats. 
Internal political threats to leaders are estimated in two ways. First, as David suggests, 
they constitute those actors that jeopardize the political position (and often the livelihood) 
of a leader.69 David's conception of internal threats is closely associated with political 
violence (i.e., assassination attempts, coup d’etats). The present usage of internal threats 
builds on his more narrow definition of political violence. It includes other domestic 
threats to the political survival o f FSU leaders, such as opposition political parties, 
political protest, and opposition media.70 As seen above, some scholars emphasized the 
importance of leadership survival, but they have not made the analytical distinction 
between political violence and domestic political opposition. In this regard, this 
dissertation differentiates among different kinds of threats faced by leaders, suggesting 
that variation in the level of internal threat is a function of both types of threats (political 
violence and domestic political opposition).
Because of the sensitivity of these issues, interviewing leaders regarding the
69 For more general discussions see. Raymond Cohen, Threat Perception in International Crisis 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 1979). 4; and Nadim N. Rouhana and Susan T. Fiske, 
“Perception of Power, Threat, and Conflict Intensity in Asymmetric Intergroup Conflict: Arab and Jewish 
Citizens of Israel," Journal o f  Conflict Resolution 39, no. 1 (1995): 54.
70 James Franklin, “IMF Conditionality, Threat Perception, and Political Repression: A Cross-National 
Analysis," Comparative Political Studies 30. no. 5 (1997): 576-606.
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relative stability of their regime is unrealistic. Instead, a leader’s perception of internal 
threats is assessed and inferred from public statements and indirectly by the responses to 
these threats.71 That is, if we assume that leaders are motivated by internal threats in their 
alignment choices, we would expect to see leaders working to eliminate or address these 
sources of threat and dissent (often with direct and indirect assistance).
The two indicators of internal threats to leaders (political violence and domestic 
political opposition) influence alignment patterns in relatively predictable ways. The 
presence of both political violence and domestic political opposition will prompt the 
strongest pro-Russian alignment in the IT/ED framework. If a leader faces only political 
violence and little political opposition, then a leader would still adopt a strong to 
moderate alignment towards Russia. However, if leaders do not face any political 
violence, then the intensity of a pro-Russian alignment is likely to be weaker, unless the 
leader faces significant political opposition that it cannot address itself. If a leader faces 
no political violence and no political opposition, then the value for internal threats would 
be considered low.
Internal threats to leaders is not really a dichotomous variable, in the sense that it 
is has either high or low values. Instead, this should be seen more as a continuum that can 
fluctuate over time and as a result of leader’s responses to these threats. The same can be 
said for the following discussion of economic dependence on Russia, in that the variable 
is not dichotomous but rather exists along a line ranging from high to low values of 
dependence. The decision to discuss the variables in a dichotomous fashion is important 
because it provides the IT/ED framework with its four testable hypotheses.
71 Ibid.
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Economic Dependence
The second independent variable in this framework is economic dependence on 
Russia. It is defined as a condition of significant and severe asymmetry in which two 
conditions emerge: 1) country B has valuable resources that A lacks and 2) country A has 
few if no alternate or substitute relationships to turn to.72 This is not to be confused with 
the concept o f asymmetrical interdependence, which is a relationship in which country A 
needs country B more than B needs A. Economic dependence is a severe instance of 
asymmetry and suggests that a major imbalance of need exists between two states, which 
tends to leave the dependent country in a very vulnerable situation.73
Economic dependence on Russia is estimated using three indicators. These 
include: 1) an examination of a state’s exports and imports with Russia as a percentage of 
its total trade; 2) the availability of energy supplies, which is seen as the most important 
“strategic” good; and 3) a country’s access to alternative (or substitute) economic 
resources, predominantly from Western countries and institutions. The first two 
indicators are commonly used in the statistical study of economic interdependence. The 
third indicator is also important, since as Keohane and Nye argued, dependence is a 
function of a country’s ability to find substitutes or alternatives to a dependent 
relationship. If  alternatives can be found in the West, then countries are less vulnerable in 
their economic relationship with Russia. With respect to the third indicator, assistance
72 Albert 0 . Hirschman. National Power and the Structure o f Foreign Trade (Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 1969): Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence. 3rd ed. (New 
York: Longman, 2001); David A. Baldwin, “Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis,” 
International Organization 34, no. 4 (1980): 471-506; and James A. Caporaso, "Dependence, Dependency, 
and Power in the Global System: A Structural and Behavioral Analysis," International Organization 32, 
no. 1 (1978): 13-43.
73 For more on the distinction between sensitivity and vulnerability under conditions of interdependence 
see, Keohane and Nye. Power and Interdependence. Because this study focuses on economic dependence 
on Russia, it stresses the vulnerability aspects of interdependence over those related to sensitivity.
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can be either in the form of bilateral transfers from individual countries in the West or 
multilateral and channeled through such international financial institutions as the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development.
The main factor influencing the third indicator (access to Western alternatives) 
was the willingness of FSU leaders to implement economic reform.74 This is not to 
suggest that economic reform was the only manner by which resources could be acquired, 
rather our goal is to highlight its implications for the accumulation of economic resources 
and foreign policy.75 The implementation of economic reform is seen as influencing 
access to Western resources in a straightforward manner. The more radical the 
implementation of economic reform, the more likely a state will obtain Western 
economic assistance. The term radical here is most associated with the idea of “shock 
therapy,” a term popularized by Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs, where countries should 
not only embark on a comprehensive strategy of economic reform, but that it should be 
done in as swift a time frame as possible. The explicit purpose of this therapy was to tear 
down the institutional apparatus of the former regime, and pave the way for a new 
outlook and approach.76 Such therapy was based on an equation involving 
macroeconomic stabilization, the initiation of more restrictive fiscal and monetary •
74 For an argument that stresses politics within the IMF see, Strom Cronan Thacker, "The High Politics of 
IMF Lending," World Politics 52, no. 1 (1999): 38-75.
75 For a good statistical study that examines several factors related to donor and recipient conditions and 
the extension of foreign assistance see. Marijke Breuning and John T. Ishivama, "Aiding the (Former) 
Enemy: Testing Explanations for Foreign Assistance to Eastern Europe and the FSU," International 
Politics 36, no. 3 (1999): 357-71.
76 David Lipton and Jeffrey Sachs, Creating a Market Economy in Eastern Europe: The Case o f  Poland, 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, no. 1 (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1990); David 
Lipton and Jeffrey7 Sachs, Privatization in Eastern Europe: The Case o f Poland, Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity', no. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1990); and Peter Murell, “What is 
Shock Therapy? What Did it Do in Poland and Russia?" Post-Soviet Affairs 9, no. 2 (1993): 111-40.
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policies, the privatization of state properties and assets, and general price and trade 
liberalization.77 The framework does not make any prior assumptions about the 
effectiveness of shock therapy. Rather, the principal concern is to draw attention to the 
fact that if countries “enacted” and “implemented” economic reform, then Western 
economic resources were more available to leaders, which could help sever or mitigate a 
country’s economic dependence on Russia.78
These indicators effectively measure my independent and dependent variables.
Data will be obtained from a variety of primary and secondary sources including: 1) 
Russian language newspapers (from Russia and various countries), 2) official CIS 
documents, 3) primary writings and speeches of leaders, 4) primary interviews with 
governmental officials from these countries held in Washington, D.C., 5) primary 
interviews with IMF and World Bank representatives in Washington, D.C., 6) internal 
documents held in the joint IMF/World Bank library in Washington, D.C., and 7) foreign 
broadcasts and newspapers as translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service 
(FBIS), the Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, and Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty.
The two independent variables of the IT/ED framework can influence one 
another. This is mitigated in one aspect because the variables are cast at different levels 
of analysis. Internal threats focus on the individual level and address what factors leaders 
see as most threatening to their positions. Economic dependence on Russia, on the other 
hand, emphasizes the interaction between states. This is evident in the indicators used to
77 Bartlomiej Kaminiski. "Introduction,” in Economic Transition in Russia and the New States o f  Eurasia, 
ed. Bartlomiej Kaminiski (Armonk. NY: M. E. Sharpe 1996), 8.
78 For more on the distinction between enacting and implementing reform see, Andrei Shleifer and Daniel 
Triesman. Without a Map: Political Tactics and Economic Reform in Russia. (Cambridge: MIT Press. 
2000).
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estimate a country’s dependence on Russia (e.g., trade, energy dependence, and access to 
Western economic resources). We would not speak of a leader being economically 
dependent on Russia; rather a leader may govern a country that is economically 
dependent. This contrasts with internal threats where the leader is the focal point of 
analysis.
That being said, the most likely scenario in which the variables influence one 
another is one in which economic dependence influences internal threats. A state that is 
economically dependent on Russia often faces few alternatives, and under such 
conditions, economic decline or collapse is possible, in which case internal political 
pressures to leaders are more likely to increase. When countries face a dire economic 
situation, the populace and other domestic opponents, both mainstream and others 
seeking more radical regime change, may challenge the present leader blaming them or 
their policies for such turmoil, hence there is a rise in the level of internal threats to 
leaders. Economic dependence and subsequent economic pressure creates a reciprocal 
political pressure, forcing leaders either to crackdown on opposition or prompting them 
to adopt even stronger pro-Russian policies. This is the most plausible (and empirically 
consistent) instance in which the two independent variables influence one another. Thus, 
when dependence is severe and the economy declines rapidly or collapses altogether, 
there is a greater likelihood that internal threats to leaders will increase. Internal threats, 
however, do not influence economic dependence in any straightforward manner.
Hypotheses
This dissertation focuses on internal threats and economic dependence as
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determinants of alignment behavior. Four distinct alignment strategies can be inferred 
from the combination of the two independent variables, although this does not imply that 
these combinations are seen in as ideal terms in practice. The rationale underlying these 
particular outcomes is also offered. It is important to note that because the political and 
economic environment was so dynamic after independence, FSU leaders tended to adopt 
a variety of alignment strategies based on variations of the independent variables. Thus, it 
is not uncommon for a state to exhibit the logic of one alignment pattern, while adopting 
a different alignment pattern a short time later, and so on and so forth. The critical factor 
is how leaders dealt with political threats and economic dependence over time.
H I: When internal political threats are high and economic dependence is high, leaders 
are more likely to adopt a strong pro-Russian alignment.
RATIONALE. Leaders that face intense internal political threats and govern 
countries that are economically dependent on Russia generally have few alternatives but 
to continue a pro-Russian orientation. This is largely because there were few countries 
available or willing to assist FSU leaders in their attempt to maintain power, especially if 
there was a lack of democratic reform. Leaders choosing this strong pro-Russian 
alignment tend to face the most intense form of internal threats that of political violence 
in the form of assassination attempts, armed minorities and secessionist movements, and 
radical Islamic extremism. Moreover, in some cases the intense concern for political 
survival can prompt a leader to cede over aspects of a country’s sovereignty (to the 
detriment and subjugation of the state) in exchange for domestic support and political 
backing.
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H2: When internal political threats are low and economic dependence is high, leaders 
are more likely to adopt a moderate to weak pro-Russian alignment.
RATIONALE. When at least one of the independent variables is at a high level, a 
moderate alignment towards Russia is adopted because of the need for continued Russian 
assistance on some level, although there is some variance in terms of the strength of this 
moderate alignment. Leaders that are relatively secure in their political position, in that 
they do not have to contend with political violence or political opposition, do not find it 
as necessary to adopt strong pro-Russian policies. However, in this hypothesis leaders are 
still constrained by the high level of dependence on Russia, and they must still continue 
to work with Russia, prompting a moderate to weak alignment depending on the extent 
on dependence.
The ability of a leader to address its country’s economic dependence on Russia 
influences this alignment strategy over time. For instance, a country that was dependent 
at independence could develop its own domestic resources if available, or it could 
implement reform and obtain economic resources from the West. This may lessen the 
extent of dependence and enable a leader to adopt a more independent alignment (H4). 
The inverse can be true as well. A leader who faces little domestic political opposition 
may attempt to sever the country’s economic dependence on Russia (H2), through radical 
reform, trade restructuring, or other domestic strategies. If these strategies are 
unsuccessful, they may backfire and prompt greater domestic political opposition to the 
leader either through violence or elections, which would inevitably lead to a stronger pro- 
Russian policy (HI). In the end, because leaders are politically secure, there alignment is
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only constrained by the country’s dependence on Russia, and a greater degree of 
flexibility in terms of foreign policy choices is possible.
H3: When internal political threats are high and economic dependence is low, leaders 
are more likely to adopt a strong to moderate pro-Russian alignment.
RATIONALE. Leaders that face internal threats and are therefore concerned about 
their political survival tend to align with Russia, although in this hypothesis because 
dependence is low the intensity o f that alignment is not as strong as HI, but it is stronger 
than H2. This is because in the IT/ED framework internal threats, which have a direct 
impact on a leader’s political survival, have a much stronger impact of alignment 
decisions, whereas economic dependence is seen more as a constraint on a leader’s 
options as opposed to an overarching impetus for stronger relations with Russia. As seen 
in H2, a leader may be able to adopt a more independent alignment (H4) if they are able 
to effectively combat their internal threats, either through their own domestic responses 
or the assistance of Russia.
H4: When internal political threats are low and economic dependence is low, leaders 
are more likely to adopt a strong pro-independence alignment.
RATIONALE. In this alignment strategy, leaders face few political threats and are 
able to address their economic dependence on Russia through domestic self-sufficiency 
and conservation or by finding substitutes other than Russia for their economic 
interaction. Because there is little need for Russian assistance, leaders are able to forge 
stronger alignment away from Russia or at the very least adopt more independent 
policies.
Tins does not assume necessarily that these policies are anti-Russian, but leaders
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in Moscow often perceived them that way. This latter consideration is a subtle nuance of 
the FSU system. That is, by adopting more independent policies away from Russia, a 
leader may be seen as pursuing an anti-Russian alignment although this is not necessarily 
their intent. As we saw previously, this is a product of Russia’s desire to maintain its 
sphere o f influence, and efforts to limit that dominance tend to be seen as anti-Russian. 
Economic cooperation between Georgia, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, 
the so-called GUUAM countries, is indicative of this pattern. These leaders consistently 
and publicly stated that their cooperative efforts were not anti-Russian but aimed at 
increasing the position of the respective members. To those in Russia this was difficult to 
reconcile. These hypotheses are illustrated in Table 1.
Table 1
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CASE STUDY SELECTION
While there are fourteen potential cases (the total number of non-Russian 
republics in the FSU), this article undertakes close examination of two countries— 
Uzbekistan and Ukraine. These case studies should be seen as plausibility studies. That 
is, if the framework provides compelling and accurate predictions about the behavior of 
these states, then it would be plausible to study other FSU states at greater length to 
determine how successful the framework is in explaining their alignment strategies. The 
total number of possible cases also declines from fourteen to eleven, since the Baltic 
states fall outside of the parameters of the IT/ED framework. As discussed earlier, 
internal threats are not present in all countries, and the Baltic states, unlike the other 
countries of the FSU, have a relatively free and open political process. This means that 
the preconditions necessary for using the concept of internal threats (questionable 
political legitimacy and strong state apparatus) are not met in these particular cases. The 
remaining eleven states have all joined the CIS, although their level of political, military, 
and economic cooperation has varied tremendously.
Uzbekistan and Ukraine are appropriate case studies to explore at greater length 
for at least five reasons. One rationale for case study selection is that rival theories, in 
this case balance of power and balance of threat theories, have difficulty explaining 
alignment patterns in the FSU and generate predictions that are not consistent with the 
empirical behavior of FSU states. These states are prime examples of countries that 
should follow balance of power and balance of threat logic, as they are some of the 
largest FSU states in terms of military strength, geographical size, economic resources, 
and population, and are therefore some of the strongest countries based on a traditional
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assessment o f their capabilities. As traditional alignment theories suggest, stronger states 
are more likely to balance against Russia to ensure their security than weaker states.79
However, this balancing behavior did not occur in any meaningful fashion. 
Uzbekistan went from a strong pro-Russian alignment in the early 1990s (HI) to a strong 
pro-independent alignment in the mid 1990s (H4), and then to a more moderate Russian 
alignment by 2000 (H3). On the other hand, Ukraine went from a strong pro­
independence alignment in the early 1990s (HI), to a more balanced pro-Russian and 
pro-Western alignment in the mid 1990s (H2), and then to a strong pro-Russian 
alignment by 2000 (H4). Thus, by choosing the states most likely to follow traditional 
alignment logic, we entertain a prominent and plausible explanation for the alignment 
patterns of these states.
Second, these countries enhance the comparative dimension of this work in that 
they have different political systems. Ukraine is a quasi-democratic state that allows 
opposition parties to register and run for elected office, including the presidency. On the 
other hand, Uzbekistan is an authoritarian regime in which little if any domestic political 
opposition exists. By drawing on these different cases, the various ways in which FSU 
leaders can address their domestic opponents becomes more evident, which allows for 
more general discussion across the FSU. More to the point, if only authoritarian cases 
were selected (or vice versa only quasi-democratic states), then the ability to generalize 
based on domestic political systems would be weakened.
Third, these cases allow for greater generalization across regions o f the FSU. 
Indeed, much of the work on the IR of the FSU remains at the regional or bilateral level,
79 Waltz. Theory o f  International Politics, 113; Walt, Origins o f Alliances. 29-31; and Rothstein, Alliances 
and Small Powers. 11.
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and therefore our understanding of relations within the FSU at a conceptual level remains 
understudied. Fourth, these studies provide ample variation in both the independent and 
dependent variables, which helps illustrate the variety of security and political economic 
relationships within the FSU. To choose cases in which there is little variation is 
dangerous for the researcher, and they should be avoided, as there is little that can be 
learned from their causal explanations.80 Uzbekistan’s Islam Karimov and Ukraine’s 
Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma all experienced varying levels of internal political 
threats and economic dependence on Russia, which naturally led to a fluctuation in the 
respective state’s alignment strategy towards Russia. Finally, these cases are of particular 
importance in terms of their geostrategic positions in Eurasia. Ukraine has one of the 
largest armed forces on the European continent, and Uzbekistan has recently become a 
valued ally in the war against terrorism, and more specifically, in the military campaign 
in Afghanistan. By examining these countries, we attempt to shed fresh light on these 
countries for policy makers as well. To examine smaller and less important cases would 
run the risk of producing a work that is of less interest primarily because many other 
countries of the FSU are less crucial for the future of regional and world affairs than 
those studied here.
LIMITATIONS OF THE IT/ED FRAMEWORK
The development of the IT/ED framework and its original application in this 
dissertation is not without limitations. Three methodological considerations are worth
80 Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in 
Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 130; and Alexander L. George, “Case 
Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison,” in Diplomacy: New 
Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy, ed. Paul Gordon Lauren (New York: Free Press, 1979).
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noting. The first limitation of the framework involves the problem of inferring a leader’s 
intent from political statements. Leaders may use rhetoric or tailor public speeches and 
statements for the consumption of a variety of audiences, whether domestic, vis-a-vis 
Russia, or the international community at large. From an analytical point of view, 
therefore, one cannot assume that just because a leader says something about a given 
subject it is necessarily an accurate depiction of what that leader truly believes.
While this methodological hurdle cannot completely be overcome, the use of 
public statements provides at the very least a starting point to infer about a leader’s intent. 
Moreover, one indirect method can be used to assess intent from statements. That is, if a 
leader makes a public statement and then follows up on it through some type of policy 
initiative, then that leader’s statement is seen as representative of intent. On the other 
hand, if a leader makes a particular statement, but then does not back it up with some 
type of policy decision, then the statement is seen less as a measure of true intent (unless 
there are mitigating factors that inhibit a leader from adopting a particular policy, which 
probably would be addressed by a leader in public). For instance, if a leader is prone to 
making anti-Russian statements, but then they quietly sign cooperative agreements with 
Russia, the initial statement is less compelling than a leader that refuses to engage in 
cooperation. While this is not a perfect solution to the problem, it does lessen the 
difficulty associated with using public statements, especially since other first-hand 
accounts are impossible to obtain and the sensitivity of the topics discussed inhibit 
interviewing leaders.
The second limitation of this work lies in the rigor of the methodology. The 
IT/ED framework is not a purely quantitative or statistical assessment of the impact of
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internal threats and economic dependence on alignments with Russia. That is, data is not 
coded in a way to provide us with a precise measure for internal threats to leaders or 
economic dependence that could then be plotted on a particular grid. Instead, the IT/ED 
framework uses some quantitative indicators to provide the researcher with a baseline to 
make a qualitative assessment of the extent of internal threats and economic dependence.
With respect to internal threats, coding data would not necessarily strengthen the 
overall argument because of difficulties associated with such an endeavor. For example, a 
sterile measure of the number of political parties in a country may or may not provide us 
insight into the extent of political opposition a leader faces. We could hypothesize that 
more parties would mean more opposition, but this might fracture opposition and make a 
cohesive opposition less likely to emerge. This could be identified as hyper-pluralism and 
was seen in some FSU countries as parties sprouted up along vast, compartmentalized 
interests. In some cases electoral laws were adopted to promote party cohesion, for 
instance, by providing greater benefits to parties that received a certain percentage of the 
popular vote. More parties do not necessarily mean that there will be a stronger 
opposition. Moreover, in many authoritarian countries political parties were often 
government sponsored and did not really represent any opposition to the leader at all.
They were used to provide a democratic facade to an otherwise undemocratic regime and 
largely rubber-stamped what the leader wanted to do.
The same could be said for political protest. A country may have several small 
protests that do little in terms of mobilizing opposition to a leader, but if they were 
quantified it might provide a different picture. However, a country may experience one or 
two significant protests that ultimately bring about the collapse o f the system, but a
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quantified protest variable may not accurately reflect such a reality. Another 
consideration that would be difficult to control for in a more statistical assessment of 
political protest involved who is actually protesting. In some cases in the FSU, protesters 
were not really out in the streets because of their open opposition to a given leader, but 
because they were paid by various officials that wanted to put on an illusion of protest, 
once again complicating measure that may be taken out of a given context. In such 
instances, qualitative assessments provide a more accurate depiction of political 
opposition than quantitative measures.
Similarly, when discussing political violence, acts, such as assassination attempts, 
may provide some insight into the extent of internal threats facing a leader, but groups 
themselves may pose a challenge for quantification. In particular, the size of an anti-state 
group may not reveal itself because it has been forced underground, so it would be 
difficult to accurately measure the size of a group. Also, in the case of religious 
extremists or secessionist movements, a smaller number of individuals may be needed to 
extract heavy damage on a foe, such as that seen in the 9/11 terrorist attacks, in which 
case numbers may be misleading. The resolve of such groups would also pose a problem 
for quantification since the willingness of a group to continue the struggle to the last man 
or woman could never be accurately measured.
Economic dependence on Russia is not as difficult to operationalize and therefore 
the indicators used to estimate the variable are more straightforward. The one difficulty 
associated with these indicators, however, is that reliable data is not always available, 
especially with respect to trade statistics generated by the countries themselves. 
Accordingly, two steps are taken to address this dilemma. First, original data is checked
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against other sources to see how well it correlates with Western figures; and second, the 
dominant sources used in this study some from the West, such as in the International 
Monetary Fund trade statistics yearbook. But, these statistics themselves are estimates 
and are not put forth as definitive measures, but merely as accurate as Western 
assessments can be though crosschecking trade with other states.
In the end, the IT/ED framework does not provide a highly quantified rendering 
of its variables, but instead uses basic indicators to provide the researcher with some 
factors to allow for a qualitative assessment. This is both sensible and reasonable given 
the subject matter, and it still provides for a detailed and sophisticated account of these 
variables and their impact of alignment patterns vis-a-vis Russia. The framework 
therefore meets the challenge of being rigorous but not so rigorous that the method 
becomes the problem.
Finally, there are some inherent limits to a two-case approach. These cases are 
chosen for appropriate reasons outlined above, and should not be considered definitive 
cases that prove the merits of the IT/ED framework. Rather, they are seen as plausibility 
studies that either lend credence to or discount the logic of the proposed framework. If 
the findings are not robust against the empirical matter, then the framework either needs 
revising or is largely misplaced in its assumptions. However, if the opposite is true and 
the findings are robust, then the framework can be seen as a compelling explanation for 
alignment patterns that merits further study and scrutiny in the context of other CIS 
states. Beyond this, these cases represent a least similar dichotomy (with the exception of 
the traditional power capabilities and therefore their propensity to balance Russia) that 
provides a more difficult test of the IT/ED framework. If two similar cases were chosen,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
then any conclusions would be less interesting. But in these cases, the types of internal 
threats faced are different, the types of governments in each country are different, the 
length of stay in power for leaders is different, and the extent of economic dependence 
different.
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CHAPTER III
UZBEK-RUSSIAN SECURITY RELATIONS AND ALIGNMENT PATTERNS
This chapter discusses the principal dependent variable in question for this 
dissertation, namely alignments in the context of Uzbek-Russian relations, and provides a 
general timeline of security relations between Uzbekistan and Russia. This is important 
because before we can discuss the impact of the two independent variables of the IT/ED 
framework, we first must have an understanding of what it is that we are trying to 
explain, or more simply, what actually happened.
This chapter focuses central attention on security relations between Moscow and 
Tashkent to be consistent with the conventional usage of the term alignment. It begins 
with a brief discussion of some of the factors that shaped Uzbekistan’s initial alignment 
strategy in the wake of the Soviet Union’s demise, and turns to a more explicit discussion 
of Uzbekistan’s balancing options had it adhered to balance of power or balance of threat 
logic. Most likely, this would have involved strengthening security ties with either 
Turkey or Iran, with Russia representing the state that posed the greatest external security 
threat to Uzbekistan.
However, balance of power and balance of threat theories lead us astray in the 
discussion of Uzbek alignment patterns because they are state-centric. That is, according 
to traditional alignment theories, states are concerned with survival in an anarchic 
international system, and concerns with other more powerful or threatening states are 
seen as the primary determinants of alignment behavior. By contrast the IT/ED 
framework, which will be discussed at greater length in Chapters IV and V, better
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explains the underlying motivations of Karimov’s alignment patterns vis-a-vis Russia.
The IT/ED framework helps us understand why, despite shifts in the distribution 
of capabilities, Uzbekistan continued to engage in security cooperation with Russia; and 
it better identifies and conceptualizes the most pressing security threats in the region, 
which are not state-based but tend to be more transnational in character. The IT/ED 
framework refines the logic of traditional alignment theories and suggests that FSU 
leaders in more authoritarian systems tend to balance internal threats to their positions 
more so than external threats to a state’s security. In fact, as Steven David points out, 
leaders may bandwagon with the greatest external threat to the country, although it may 
be of secondary importance to the more pressing internal threats to a leader’s position.1 
The application of traditional alignment theories would therefore mischaracterize the 
underlying motivations of a leader’s alignment strategy with a stronger outside power.
Two general alignment patterns are observed (with a recent softening towards 
security cooperation with Russia). These two periods span from the initial moment of 
independence until 1995 and from roughly 1995 until 2000, with a renewed phase of 
security cooperation towards extremism beginning in 2001. In this first phase Karimov 
saw aspects of political and military cooperation with Russia as an urgent necessity and 
therefore a strong to moderate security alignment with Russia was adopted. This was 
evident in Karimov’s attitudes and actions towards bilateral cooperation with Russia and 
his cooperation within the CIS framework.
By the middle o f the decade, fiery rhetoric undermined relations between 
Tashkent and Moscow, and Karimov adopted an even more independent orientation, 
which was aimed at limiting security cooperation with Russia. He has also been deft at
1 David. “Explaining Third World Alignment," 236.
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shying away from more institutionalized cooperation with Russia (unlike Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) in favor of a broader cooperative forum in the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO), which includes China. This strategy served Karimov’s 
pro-independence alignment well, and also enabled him to strengthen relations with the 
United States, coinciding with its fight against global terrorism in general and 
Afghanistan in particular.
STARTING POINTS AND BALANCING OPTIONS
Karimov’s initial pro-Russian alignment strategy was shaped by several factors 
related to the Soviet experience. First, the states of Central Asia never experienced true 
sovereignty because of Tsarist and later Soviet domination beginning in the mid 
nineteenth century. Russia incorporated the region into its empire to ensure Russian 
interests vis-a-vis British interests from their position in South Asia. This colonial legacy 
carried into the twentieth century and made transitioning away from Russia a difficult 
and obstacle-prone path after the Soviet collapse.
This was most evident in Central Asia’s emergence to the international stage. 
Whereas some republics, such as the Baltic states and Ukraine, had enjoyed periods of 
independence during portions of the twentieth century, the Central Asian states were less 
ambitious about their new found independence. The nationalist element that drove much 
of Eastern Europe and the Baltics’ drive for independence was less pronounced in Central 
Asia because of the presence o f multiple ethnic groups within each state. For instance, in 
the densely populated Ferghana Valley, significant ethnic minorities are found 
throughout regions of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. This multi-ethnic
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characteristic of Central Asian states is another legacy of Joseph Stalin’s border 
demarcation policy, which served to divide and conquer the various nationalities and 
limit the development of pan-Turkic and pan-Islamic consciousness.2 From Moscow’s 
perspective, such states could pose long-term security problems, if nationalism grew as a 
dominant ideology. This manipulation protected Russian interests in the region and 
placed Central Asia in a severely dependent position relative to Moscow.
The historical ties between Uzbekistan and Russia, and for that matter the whole 
of Central Asia, were significantly different then relations with Eastern Europe and the 
Baltics, and this left these countries in an “independence limbo.” As some scholars have 
suggested, the Central Asian states were actually “catapulted” into independence and in 
many ways were the recipients of an “unsolicited gift” of independence.3 This is evident 
as Central Asian leaders supported Gorbachev’s efforts to reform Soviet federalism, and 
their populations voted overwhelmingly in favor (90 percent) of a continuation of the 
Soviet Union in a March 1991 referendum.4 As we will see later in Chapter IV, this 
sentiment in favor of working with Russia was also a product of the economic advantages 
Moscow provided.
Second, the Central Asian states had only nascent independent military structures 
at the time of independence. Hence, without a developed and indigenously manned 
military, Karimov had to adopt a more pro-Russian alignment. Central Asian states faced 
the daunting task of reforming the armed forces to make them more representative of the
2 For this and other reasons concerning border demarcation see, Robert J. Kaiser, The Geography o f  
Nationalism in Russia and the USSR (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1994), 110-12.
3 Martha Brill Olcott, "Central Asia’s Catapult to Independence,” Foreign Affairs 71, no. 3 (1992): 108-30; 
and Anthony Hyman. "Moving Out of Moscow's Orbit: The Outlook for Central Asia,” International 
Affairs 69, no. 2 (1993): 295.
4 Mark Webber, CIS Integration Trends: Russia and the Former Soviet South (London: Royal Institute of 
International Affairs. 1997). 25.
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various nationalities. Ethnic Russians especially at the higher levels and throughout the 
officer corps heavily penetrated their militaries. This Soviet legacy was readily apparent 
to FSU leaders and warranted considerable attention.
Uzbekistan’s experience with military reform is indicative of this challenge. In 
1992 90 percent of the enlisted personnel were o f Uzbek nationality, yet 70 percent of the 
officer corps were Russian speaking.5 A variety o f initiatives were designed to remedy 
this issue, such as Uzbek language for its officer corps and a gradual shift to making 
Uzbek the operational language.6 Along with more active recruitment of ethnic Uzbeks, 
the military greatly reduced its reliance on non-indigenous officers. For instance, while 
ethnic Uzbeks made up only 6 percent of the officer corps, by 1996 the figure increased 
to over 80 percent.7 Indeed, Karimov’s initiatives proved highly successful at 
strengthening the indigenous component of the Uzbek military.
Based on the logic of balance of power and balance of threat theories, this 
security environment would prompt Uzbekistan to align itself with states to balance the 
most dominant power in the region, Russia. The notion that Russia was the most 
significant security threat to Uzbekistan is also consistent with Walt’s definition of 
threats. Despite its beleaguered military structures after the Soviet collapse, Russia still 
possessed the second largest nuclear stockpile in the world, and its military preeminence 
throughout its “near abroad” was unquestioned. While it does not share a border with
5 Susan Clark, "The Central Asian States: Defining Security Priorities and Dev eloping Military Forces," in 
Central Asia and the World, ed. Michael Mandelbaum (New York: Council of Foreign Relations Press. 
1994), 196.
6 For more on military reform see the interview with Colonel Arslan Khalmatov, deputy' chief of staff of 
the CIS Joint Armed Forces and representative of the Uzbekistan Armed Forces, in A  Dokuchaev, "Pod 
krylom ptitsy khumo" (Under the wing of the khumo bird), Krasnaia Zvezda. 20 May 1993. 2; and U. 
Mirzaiarov, "Armeiskuiu sluzhbu na rodnoi zemle” (Army service in the homeland), Pravda Vostoka, 1 
May 1992, 1.
' Annette Bohr. Uzbekistan: Politics and Foreign Policy (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 
1998), 58.
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Uzbekistan, Russia is still extremely close and its offensive capabilities remain 
impressive.
The fourth indicator for Walt’s conception of threats, perceived aggressive 
intentions, can also be easily inferred from Russian behavior especially in the early 
1990s. For instance, it was not uncommon for Boris Yeltsin or other senior officials, let 
alone representatives in the Duma, to discuss the former Soviet borders as the borders in
A
which Russia is responsible today. Karimov himself questioned the extent to which these 
types of sentiments were indicative of Russian policy. He challenged Yeltsin, for 
example, to state publicly whether the nationalistic ramblings of Vladimir Zhirinovsky 
were acceptable or unacceptable. Yet, as Karimov is quick to point out, “not once have I 
heard [Yeltsin] make such a statement. And this alarms me. Is Zhirinovsky perhaps 
voicing thoughts that certain statesmen are thinking? This is a very dangerous 
symptom.”9 Thus, based on traditional power assessments and Walt’s definition of 
external security threats, Russia was the most powerful and threatening state, and the 
state most likely to balance against.
The need to find balancing partners against Russia was all the more pressing, 
since, as seen above, Uzbekistan lacked the necessary military capabilities to provide for 
its security. Thus, traditional balancing logic would anticipate that Uzbekistan would 
align itself with other states to provide for its national security, presumably to balance 
Russia’s preponderant power. However, few states had the ability or the willingness to
8 For more on this neoimperial sentiment and its impact on Russian foreign policy see, Menon, i'In the 
Shadow of the Bear.”
9 V. Portnikov, "la uzhe mnogo raz prigovoren” (I have already been sentenced many times). Nezavisimaia 
Gazeta. 21 June 1994. 3.
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actively engage Uzbekistan on more intensive security cooperation. The most likely 
candidates were Turkey and Iran.
With its similar heritage and language, Turkey was perhaps the most alluring 
actor for Uzbekistan. The historical connection between the two states led Uzbekistan, in 
the words of Karimov, to “regard Turkey as an elder brother.”10 Upon his first official 
visit to Ankara in December 1991, Karimov, the first Central Asian leader to visit 
Turkey, declared, “my country will go forward by the Turkish route. We have chosen this 
road and will not turn back.”11
Yet, these words lacked substance from both sides. First, Turkey, lacking close 
geographic proximity, was not in a strong enough position to act as a security guarantor 
for Uzbekistan. Second, cooperation between Uzbekistan and Turkey consisted primarily 
of economic and cultural exchanges, not security coordination.12 Moreover, as the 
domestic situation became more unsettled in Turkey, the lack of Turkish resolve, 
especially in terms of direct economic assistance, attenuated the initial thrusts made by 
Ankara. Rising Islamic tendencies, ethnic and sectarian strife, and the ever-present
10 "President Karimov Interviewed on Turkish Ties.” Foreign Broadcast and Information Service-Soviet 
Union-91-249 (hereafter cited as FBIS-SOV), 27 December 1991, 72. In a later statement, Karimov stated, 
"the people of Turkey, the Turkic peoples are very close to us. Their language and their heart but primarily 
their religion and their destiny are very close to us.” "Karimov Cited on Relations with Turkey.” FBIS- 
SOV-94-122,2 2  June 1994. 65.
11 Dilip Hiro, Between Marx and Muhammad: The Changing Face o f  Central Asia (London: Harper 
Collins, 1996), 176-77; and S. Novoprudskii, "Informatsionnoe nastupleniia Turtsii” (Turkey’s Information 
Offensive). Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 22 July 1992. 1.
12 V. Volodin. "My priekhali k krovnym brat’iam, zaiavil prem’er-ministr Turtsii v Uzbekistane” (We 
visited our blood brothers, the Turkish Prime Minister announced in Uzbekistan), Izvestiia, 28 April 1992, 
5; "Foreign Minister on Relations with Turkey and Iran,” FBIS-SOV-92-246. 22 December 1992,49; and 
Hale, "Islam, State-Building, and Uzbekistan Foreign Policy'.” 156-57.
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Kurdish question occupied Turkish leaders. In short, Turkey simply lacked the 
capabilities to serve as an effective balancing partner with Uzbekistan.13
Iran could have served as a potential security guarantor, but these relations were 
also problematic. On his first diplomatic mission in November 1991, Iranian Foreign 
Minister Ali Akbar Velayati stressed that, while Iran respected the aspirations of Uzbek 
self-determination, his government would formulate its policy “within the framework of 
her relations with Moscow.”14 Long-enduring problems from the Iran-Iraq War left the 
Iranian economy in shambles, and much like Turkey, left little leeway for geopolitical 
gambles. Iranian caution was also prudent, since Iran was taking advantage of Russia’s 
economic woes and its large reservoir of defense technology and scientific talent to 
accelerate its nuclear and ballistic missile capability. A strong Iranian alignment with 
Uzbekistan against Russia was the surest way to sever this coveted strategic trade. The 
end result is that Iran was primarily concerned with securing its strategic trade and 
maintaining cordial relations with Russia and was therefore a disinterested party when it 
came to balancing against Russia.
From the Uzbek perspective, the desirability of an alignment with Iran was 
unsettling for other reasons. First, whereas most Uzbeks, and most Central Asians for that 
matter, are Turkic-speaking and followers of Sunni Islam, Iranians are Persian-speaking 
Shiites. This posed an internal problem for Karimov because significant Tajik minorities 
populated the major cities of Uzbekistan, and Tajiks are the only Persian-speakers in the 
region. Furthermore, Karimov openly criticized Iran for their ideological backing of
13 For an analysis of the growing disillusionment betw een Turkey and Uzbekistan see, Philip Robins, 
“Between Sentiment and Self-Interest: Turkey's Policy Toward Azerbaijan and the Central Asian States,” 
Middle East Journal 47. no. 4 (1993): 593-610.
14 “Further on Karimov Talks,” FBIS-SOV-91-233. 4  December 1991,86.
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Tajikistan’s Islamic democrats, which continued to fan the flame of instability in the 
early 1990s.15 Indeed, much like the Balkans, this region resembles a cultural brew that at 
times erupted violently. Thus, Iranian influence was seen as potentially detrimental to the 
delicate ethnic balance in Uzbekistan.
Second, political and military coordination was hampered because each state 
viewed cooperation differently. This divergence came to the fore when the Economic 
Cooperation Organization (ECO), an economic pact signed between Turkey, Iran, and 
Pakistan in 1964 and later expanded to include the Central Asian states began over time 
to take on a more political tone. Speaking to this growing politicization of ECO, Karimov 
asserted before an ECO summit: “We cannot agree with the attempts by some countries 
and their leaders to foist upon us, the ECO Forum, their own vision of how to solve 
important international and political problems. Such a vision is absolutely unacceptable 
to us. In the future, if such declarations and such attempts to turn this forum into a 
political forum continue, I declare with total responsibility that Uzbekistan will leave the 
ECO.”16 In the end, Karimov himself was unwilling to strengthen security cooperation 
with Iran.
Thus, in the initial days of independence Karimov adopted a strong to moderate 
alignment towards Russia primarily because of the relative immaturity of the Uzbek 
military and the lack of alternative security partners willing to provide for the security 
interests of the Uzbek leader. These considerations led Karimov to favor security 
cooperation with Russia within the CIS framework, especially during 1992 when the
15 S. Novoprudskii, "Druzhba s druz’iami, mir s sosediamr (Friendship with friends, peace with 
neighbors), Nezavisimaia Gazeta. 2 December 1992, 3.
16 Ch. Annamuradov and G. Kolodin, “Opredelenv prioritety na budushchee" (Defined priorities for the 
future), Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 22 May 1996, 3.
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initial security alignment was established. As we will see later, Karimov fully understood 
the importance of cooperating with Russia in the short-term in order to buffer the country 
from the adverse consequences o f the post-Soviet transition.
UZBEKISTAN (1991-1995): THE PRIMACY OF STABILITY
After the Slavic republics (Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus) dissolved the Soviet
Union on 7 December 1991, Uzbekistan and the other Central Asian states joined the new
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) on 12 December 1991. The strongest
provision of the new CIS agreement was the provision of equal co-founder status, which
provided the former republics with de jure independence and sovereignty. As we will see
in Chapter V, Karimov consistently favored CIS economic integration over political and
military integration
In subsequent months, Karimov established a basic security alignment with
Russia, one that would intensify in the upcoming year as civil unrest continued to
destabilize Afghanistan and eventually Tajikistan. For instance, in April 1992, to ensure
Uzbekistan’s independence, Karimov pushed for a NATO-style CIS military in which
“each state has its own army and at the same time participates in the pooling o f efforts
and the creation of a unified operational and strategic leadership with a unified
command.”17 By the May 1992 CIS summit in Tashkent then, Karimov was willing to
1 £sign the Treaty on Collective Security. The Tashkent treaty stated that aggression 
towards one member would be interpreted as aggression towards all members and
1' Krasnaia Zvezda. 25 April 1992. 1, in Current Digest o f  the Post-Soviet Press (hereafter cited as 
CDPSP) 44, no. 17 (1992): 20.
18 Besides Uzbekistan and Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan. Turkmenistan, and Armenia signed the 
Tashkent Treaty.
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provided for a CIS peacekeeping force to be sent to areas of real or potential conflict. 
Thus, by the spring of 1992 the basic security arrangement between Uzbekistan and 
Russia was established.
Throughout the summer and fall o f 1992, Karimov continued to support security 
coordination with Russia to provide for greater regional stability. At the eighth meeting 
of the CIS heads of state, held in Moscow on 6 July, Karimov was the first to initiate 
discussion on the idea of creating a collective peacekeeping force to serve in “hot spots” 
throughout the CIS, and as Izvestiia reported, “the discussion proved very emotional.”19 
While the initial fruits of the idea resulted in the deployment of forces to Moldova, it did 
not take long for the Uzbek government to redirect Russian attention. Once the Oliy 
Majlis (Uzbek Supreme Assembly) ratified the treaty in early July, prompt requests by 
the Uzbek Foreign and Defense Ministries called on Russia to provide more troops to aid 
in the defense of the Uzbek-Afghan border.20 At the Tashkent meeting of the CIS foreign 
and defense ministries in late July, Karimov once again, only this time at the last 
moment, made an initiative to add security along the Commonwealth’s southern border to 
the agenda.21
In early September Russia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan convened to 
discuss possible solutions to the growing unrest in Tajikistan. On 3 September the group 
forwarded a warning to the Tajik government stressing how events in Tajikistan were 
endangering the security of the CIS. After the October 1992 summit, Uzbekistan and 
other Central Asian states sought to intensify the military dimension of the CIS by again
19 V. Kononenko, "Itogi moskovskoi vstrechi glav gosudarstv SNG vnushaiut umerennyi optimizm” 
(Result of Moscow meeting of CIS heads of state inspires moderate optimism). Iz\>estiia, 7 July 1992. 1-2.
20 "CIS Peacekeepers To Be Used in Hot Spots.” FBIS-SOV-92-137. 16 July 1992. 3.
21 Moskovskie Novosti, July 26, 1992. 3, in CDPSP 44, no. 29 (1992): 17-18.
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calling on Russian forces to make up the core of a multilateral peacekeeping effort for 
Tajikistan. Beginning in November 1992, this led to a greater Russian military presence 
in the region (primarily by Russia’s 201st Motorized Division).22 Thus, as we will see in 
Chapter IV, the initial impetus for Karimov’s security alignment towards Russia was the 
threat of religious extremism spreading into Uzbekistan and sparking greater instability.
Karimov’s underlying security motivations are evident in Uzbek-Russian 
cooperation during the Tajik civil war and in Karimov’s public resistance to closer CIS 
political and military cooperation. First, throughout the Tajik civil war, Uzbekistan and 
Russia played significant roles in the support of the regime of Emomali Rakhmonov.
The intervention was so extensive that some referred to Tajikistan as a “Russian-Uzbek 
protectorate.”23 While Russia provided far more aid to Tajikistan over the years, Uzbek 
assistance was nevertheless indispensable and played out in a variety of ways. This aid 
included a cooperation treaty, which stipulated that Uzbekistan would defend Tajik 
airspace, the provision of weapons and military equipment (such as helicopters and 
armored equipment), and training for Tajikistan’s internal troops." Indeed, at times 
Uzbekistan directly controlled Tajik forces in areas of Tajikistan populated by ethnic 
Uzbeks, and on some occasions Karimov personally approved particular appointments to 
military and governmental posts in the Tajik government.
~  The official provision for the Tajik operation was issued at the April 1994 CIS summit, although a 
general agreement reached the previous September provided for the deployment of collective peacekeeping 
forces, with no specific reference to Tajikistan. This underscores the fact that peacekeeping action was 
often taken by the most interested regional actors and had less to do with the overarching cooperation of the 
entire CIS. T7ie formal agreement attracted only six signatures including Russia, the Central Asian states 
(excluding Turkmenistan), and Georgia. Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation, Diplomaticheskii 
vestnik (Diplomatic bulletin), no. 9-10 (1994): 46-47.
23 Barnett R. Rubin. "Tajikistan: From Soviet Republic to Russian-Uzbek Protectorate.” in Central Asia 
and the World, ed. Michael Mandelbaum (New York: Council of Foreign Relations Press, 1994), 207-224.
24 Susan Clark, "The Central Asian States.” 191-92; and Olcott. Central A sia’s New States, 120,128.
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Karimov was willing to cooperate with Russia in Tajikistan, but he consistently 
resisted other attempts to subjugate Uzbek autonomy and independence with respect to 
political and military integration. Russian statements during the early 1990s contributed 
to these concerns. For instance in September 1993, Russian President Boris Yeltsin 
declared that the external borders of CIS states “are essentially the borders o f Russia,” a 
sentiment shared by the Russian Foreign Minister.25 Concerns over Russian intentions, 
therefore, shaped the willingness o f Karimov to contemplate greater coordination with 
Russia.
Karimov’s rhetoric is an indication of his public stance towards greater CIS 
integration. As early as January 1993 at the Interparliamentary Assembly of the CIS, 
Karimov proclaimed that “it is wrong to deceive the people by enticing them with fine 
talk of independence and sovereignty, while at the same time, fearing the inevitable 
turmoil and difficulties on the way, making advance preparations for ways o f retreating to 
the past under various specious and seductive pretexts.” In general, Karimov was 
unsupportive of efforts to make the CIS a true confederation, and he disagreed with 
former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev that the former Soviet states were “standing 
on the threshold of new integration processes.”" Moreover, Karimov criticized the 
perceived dominance of Russia in the CIS, going so far as to suggest that Russia is 
playing the role of “dictator” in the FSU.28 Speaking at a conference of six Turkic­
speaking countries in Istanbul, Karimov charged that calls for forming various “unions
Therese Raphael. Claudia Rosett. and Suzanne Crow, "An Interview with Russian Foreign Minister 
Andrei Kozyrev,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report, no. 28 (1994): 38.
26 G. Melikiants. "Piat' byvshikh respublik sovetskogo soiuza idut k novomu soiuzu. Chto by eto 
znachilo?” (Five republics o f the former Soviet Union are entering a new union. What would this mean?) 
Izvestiia. 5 January 1993, 1.
2l "Karimov News Conference Previews Summit,” FBIS-SOV-92-095. 15 May 1992, 7-8; and "Karimov 
Praises CIS, Criticizes Confederation.” FBIS-SOV-92-252, 31 December 1992,65.
28 "President Says Future 'Inconceivable' Without Russia,” FBIS-SOV-94-Ol 7, 26 January 1994, 57.
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and confederations smack of imperial ambitions and of a return to the previous 
systems.”29
In short, concerns with regional instability motivated Karimov to adopt a pro- 
Russian alignment, in large part due to a lack of viable alternative security guarantors and 
available military capabilities. In this sense, Russia was the only state willing and able to 
assist in ensuring regional stability. Despite security cooperation with Russia, Karimov 
was unwilling to subjugate Uzbek independence by strengthening political and military 
ties with Russia, as evident in Karimov’s rhetoric criticizing further integration with 
Russia.
UZBEKISTAN (1995-2001): FORGING GREATER INDEPENDENCE
By the middle of the decade, security cooperation with Russia was effective in 
combating regional instability and calming the situation in Tajikistan. Karimov was still 
unwilling to integrate further with Russia and increasingly adopted a more pro­
independence alignment away from Russia. For instance, Uzbek and Russian strategic 
priorities diverged in Tajikistan, and Karimov continued to speak out against 
integrationist impulses in the CIS. These factors fueled Karimov’s more independent 
alignment, as evidenced by Uzbekistan’s withdrawal from the CIS Collective Security 
Treaty and Uzbekistan’s accession into GUUAM. Karimov’s pro-independence 
alignment has not precluded Uzbek-Russian security cooperation altogether. Yet,
Karimov continues to resist more institutionalized cooperation with Russia under the 
auspices of a rapid reaction force, while he is willing to work within the SCO, which 
includes the other regional heavyweight China.
29 “Calls To Restore Soviet Union Concern Karimov." FBIS-SOV-94-203. 20 October 1994, 30.
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While Russia and Uzbekistan worked to stabilize the situation in neighboring 
Tajikistan, there were strategic divergences between each state’s agenda. Most notably, 
tensions arose as to how to resolve the conflict in Tajikistan. Russia continued to support 
the conservative pro-communist regime of Emomali Rakhmonov, who was elected in a 
race with no opposition and a state-controlled mass media and to the exclusion of other 
factions within the country. On the other hand, Karimov realized that a military solution 
was untenable, and considered the only long-term solution to be a compromise between 
pro-communist forces and the national opposition.30 Karimov also played a role in 
conflict resolution when various factions were willing to negotiate. In April 1995, for 
example, Karimov met with Akbar Turajonzoda, the first deputy of the United Tajik 
Opposition (UTO), who had been the highest Islamic official in Tajikistan until his 
dismissal from the Dushanbe government in 1993. The meeting was held independent of 
Russian, Tajik, and UN counsel, although reportedly the substance of the meeting would 
be “relayed” to these participants.31
Also indicative of these tensions was the way in which a political compromise 
was eventually reached in Tajikistan. Karimov favored a coalition government that would 
place the most pro-Uzbek portions of Tajikistan in power. Prospects dwindled when the 
political alliance secured by Karimov between the Khojand region of the north, which 
Tashkent favored, and the Kulob region of the south began to falter by November 1994. 
After the Kulobis staged parliamentary and presidential elections, they began to drive the 
Khojandis (as well as ethnic Uzbeks) from their positions in both central and local 
government.
30 Rubin, "Tajikistan.’' 220.
"Karimov Holds Talks With Tajik Opposition,’’ FB1S-SOV-95-065. 5 April 1995,70; and 
"Unprecedented Meeting of Uzbek Leaders, Tajik Opposition," FBIS-SOl -95-078,2 4  April 1995.87.
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This unsettled Uzbek officials for several reasons. First, there are significant 
numbers of ethnic Uzbeks, which live in Tajikistan, especially in those areas contiguous 
to Uzbekistan.32 Second and related, the Khojand region had traditionally dominated 
Tajik politics (often in line with Tashkent’s wishes), having provided all of the republics 
top leaders from the late 1930s until the outbreak of the civil war. But, the compromise 
did not favor this region. Indeed, when Rakhmonov met with the UTO in Moscow during 
the summer of 1997, the agreement reached excluded the Khojandi-based Party of 
National Revival from the coalition government. This weakened the position of Uzbeks 
in Tajik politics and eventually led to overt and covert Uzbek military interventions into 
Tajik territory. For instance, the Tajik leadership implicated Tashkent in sponsoring 
armed uprisings in Western Tajikistan in February 1996, August 1997, and October 1997. 
The unfavorable treatment of the Khojandis in the peace settlement also led Karimov to 
refuse to sign the inter-Tajik agreement as one of eight guarantor states (the others 
including Iran, Russia, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and 
Afghanistan), ostensibly because there was no mechanism by which to enforce the 
agreement. A few months later, Karimov changed his mind, but the Tajik settlement 
remained the same.
Karimov also resisted greater CIS political and military integration with Russia. 
Discussions over border protection are a case in point. During a CIS summit in May 1995 
the Uzbek leadership refused to sign the Treaty for the Defense of the CIS External
Three of the principal regions in Tajikistan are heavily populated by ethnic Uzbeks. Khojand is 31 
percent Uzbek; Hissar, the area west of Dushanbe is estimated to be 45 percent Uzbek; and Kurgan Tiube, 
southwest of Dushanbe is 32 percent Uzbek. Rubin. "Tajikistan" 211.
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Borders, making it the only Central Asian state not to have Russian border troops.33 As 
Uzbek officials stated, “we are capable of reliably defending our 156-kilometer border 
with Afghanistan with our own forces and without the intervention of border troops from 
other countries, first and foremost from Russia.”34 Moreover, bilateral agreements were 
agreed upon with most countries of the former Soviet southern border, although 
Uzbekistan refused to coordinate with Russia.35 Karimov did, however, continue to 
maintain Uzbekistan’s formal cooperation by signing the CIS Collective Security 
Concept in 1995.
Throughout the 1990s, Uzbek officials continued to criticize integration with 
Russia and the CIS. This criticism was fueled by perceptions of Russian intentions, such 
as when the Russian State Duma passed a resolution in March 1996 that declared the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union legally invalid. Such sentiments strained relations 
between Tashkent and Moscow, and prompted considerable criticism from Karimov. In 
responding to a question about the increasingly anti-Uzbek tone of articles in the Russian 
media, Karimov suggested, “individual politicians and the press that serve them in 
Moscow, nostalgic for the past and wishing to restore the former Union in one form of 
another, are haunted by the independent policy of sovereign Uzbekistan.”36 Within the 
parameters of CIS cooperation, Karimov challenged the development of supranational 
structures, suggesting that such a relationship “would not be the Commonwealth of 
Independent States... [but] the Community of Dependent States, in which each state
"3 Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation, Diplomaticheskii vestnik (Diplomatic Bulletin), no. 7 
(1995): 43-46.
34 N. Musienko, "Boiatsia dazhe nameka na SSSR“ (They fear even a hint of the USSR), Pravda, 22 
February 1996,2.
35 For more on these bilateral agreements see. Webber, CIS Integration Trends, 42.
36 “My verim v nashi sily i vozmozhnosti” (We trust in our strength and opportunities). Pravda Vostoka. 
17 October 1996. 1.
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would have to surrender part of its independence and sovereignty.”37 The Uzbek Foreign 
and Defense Ministries voiced similar concerns about security cooperation with Russia. 
Uzbek Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov cited the danger that “centralized control” 
could return through such efforts, while Defense Minister (need first name) Akhmedov 
argued that such structures could “lead to future confrontation similar to the Cold War 
between the Warsaw Treaty countries and NATO.”38 By the end of the decade, Karimov 
would be more capable of acting upon these sentiments and forging a more independent 
alignment.
By the late 1990s, the Uzbek military was restructured and greatly enhanced, and 
conflict in neighboring Tajikistan waned. This added sense of regional security provided 
Karimov with the impetus to sever Uzbekistan’s formal security alignment with Russia, 
the CIS Collective Security Treaty. At a January 1999 press conference in Tashkent, 
Karimov sharply criticized the recent developments in the CIS, charging that Russia was 
trying to impose its will on the CIS countries and that all matters were “dictated by 
Russia.”39 This sentiment led to his decision not to renew Uzbekistan’s membership in 
the 1992 Tashkent treaty. As an Uzbek Foreign Ministry spokesman noted: “In its current 
form, the treaty does not meet the requirements of the times and is not performing the 
functions it was designed to perform. [Furthermore], Tashkent objects to Russia’s
31 "Karimov Criticizes Integration Accords,” FBIS-SOV-96-073, 15 April 1996, 66.
38 “Foreign Minister in India; Opposes CIS Military Bloc,” FBIS-SOV-96-168,2 4  August 1996,24; and 
“Defense Minister on Opposition to CIS Military Bloc.” FBIS-SOV-96-177.10  September 1996, 35. 
Accordingly, the Uzbek government passed legislation in December 1996 that outlawed Uzbek 
participation in anv political-military blocs. "Participation in Military-Political Blocs Ruled Out.” FBIS- 
SOV-96-252, 31 December 1996,45*.
39 V. Kuznechevskii, "Karimov khlopnul dver’ iu?” (Did Karimov slam the door?) Rossiiskaia gazeta, 5 
February 1999,4.
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military activity in certain CIS states (presumably Tajikistan).” Karimov has also 
spoken out against virtually every vital political issue for Russia including Russia’s 
position on NATO expansion as well as Moscow’s policy on Iraq and Kosovo. These 
developments along with his decision to join GUAM in April 1999 further weakened 
Uzbekistan’s security alignment with Russia. This did not suggest, however, that 
Karimov was completely unwilling to cooperate with Russia, and more recent events 
have prompted such renewed cooperation. This discussion of increased security 
cooperation aimed at combating religious extremism and terrorism is elaborated on in 
Chapter IV.
Karimov continues to resist more institutionalized cooperation with Russia. For 
example, Uzbekistan did not join Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan in their 
effort to establish a 3,000 man rapid-reaction force to combat Islamic insurgency to be 
based in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.41
Instead, Karimov began to coordinate regional security efforts in the Shanghai 
Forum, now known as the SCO. The SCO, which now includes Russia, China, 
Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, originally was known as the 
Shanghai Treaty and was created in 1996 to ensure the sanctity of the former Soviet 
borders with China and to assist in the demilitarization of shared borders. The 
confidence-building measure agreement between Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
and Tajikistan, signed on 24 April 1997, added additional credibility to the grouping, in 
its successful demilitarization of the border. More recently, Russia and China have seen
40 V. Georgiev. "Uzbekistan zanial osobuiu pozitsiiu" (Uzbekistan has taken a special position), 
Nezavisimaia Gazeta. 4 February 1999, 1.
41 Douglas Frantz, "Central Asia: Force to Fight Muslim Rebels." New York Times, 26 May 2001, A5.
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the SCO as a potential counterweight to U.S. influence in the region, and a way for
members to coordinate their efforts against extremism, terrorism, and separatism.
Karimov joined the SCO because the group could facilitate regional cooperation
in addressing the most pressing transnational threats. He also expressed concerns that
Moscow might try to use the SCO to better its own interests in the region. As Karimov
stated on Uzbek television on 16 June 2001:
I have put my signature under ideas expressed in the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization declaration. It says: cooperation, cooperation, cooperation.
This organization must never turn into a military political bloc...It should not 
be against any country, should not join certain trends, should not organize 
subversive activities against third countries.42
Karimov’s concerns might not be as justified, however, when considering how 
Uzbekistan’s pro-independence alignment is strengthened by cooperation within the 
SCO. First, by joining the SCO and avoiding closer entanglements with the Russian led 
rapid reaction force, Karimov ensures diplomatic flexibility. By avoiding a security 
arrangement in which Russia is the dominant actor, Karimov meets his security 
requirements while avoiding overt and sustained integration with Russia. Second, closer 
cooperation with China is facilitated through the SCO, which also serves Uzbek interests. 
This allows Karimov to play Russia and China off one another to the benefit of his 
government, and it opens up a working relationship whereby greater assistance can be 
provided. For instance, in September 2000 China provided military equipment to 
Uzbekistan such as night vision equipment, sniper rifles and bulletproof vests for its 
special forces, marking the first time Beijing had given military aid to a Central Asian 
state. Thus, in the end, the SCO solidifies Karimov’s more independent foreign policy
42 “Russia has Misgivings about Shanghai Cooperation Organization.” Eurasianet, 20 June 2001.2 
(www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav062001 .shtml. 24 September 2002).
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from Russia, while it continues to address the overarching security concerns with 
religious extremism and terrorism.
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has sought to sketch a basic timeline for understanding the security 
relations between Uzbekistan and Russia, and provides a preliminary assessment of 
Uzbek alignment patterns towards Russia. As we have seen, there were two general 
patterns with a more recent softening towards security cooperation with Russia. From 
1991-1995, Karimov adopted a strong pro-Russian alignment motivated by the 
immediate security environment and unrest in neighboring Tajikistan and Afghanistan. 
From 1995-2000, Karimov adopted a more pro-independence alignment that often times 
took on an anti-Russian tone.
This chronological discussion enables us to talk about reasons as to why 
Uzbekistan’s alignment patterns may have changed over the years and what the primary 
motivations underlying those alignment decisions were. This chapter emphasized the 
traditional view of security as primarily state-centric in its discussion of balance of power 
and balance of threat theories. That is, there was a real emphasis on which state posed the 
greatest external threat to Uzbekistan based on power and threat intentions. However, the 
next two chapters examine the causal logic of the IT/ED framework to establish a more 
accurate picture of why Karimov chose particular alignment strategies vis-a-vis Russia. 
Indeed, as we will see, by 2001 with the resurgence of Islamic extremism in the region, 
Karimov adopted a more moderate alignment towards Russia. Chapter IV examines 
internal threats to Karimov’s position in contrast to external threats to Uzbekistan,
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followed by an examination of Uzbek economic dependence on Russia and its influence 
on Karimov’s alignment strategy in Chapter V.
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CHAPTER IV 
KARIMOV AND INTERNAL POLITICAL THREATS
Whereas in the previous chapter we examined the pattern of security cooperation 
between Uzbekistan and Russia and found that Uzbekistan aligned both towards and 
away from Russia during the decade, this chapter examines the relationship between the 
first independent variable (internal political threats) and Karimov’s alignment strategies 
with Russia. The IT/ED framework suggests that the more FSU leaders are threatened by 
internal political threats, the more likely a leader is to adopt a strong pro-Russian 
alignment. That is, FSU leaders when threatened turn to Moscow for assistance in both 
direct and indirect ways. This is a central thesis of this dissertation that inherently shifts 
the analytical focus from external threats to the state to internal threats to leaders, a 
worthy qualification since FSU leaders dominated the political process in most states.
However, if leaders did not face many internal threats or if they were able to 
eliminate them over time, then the necessity of a strong pro-Russian alignment is weaker. 
Based on the IT/ED framework, a leader would then be constrained only by the extent of 
their economic dependence on Russia, which potentially enables a leader to adopt a more 
independent alignment.
This chapter reveals that both types of internal threats to leaders existed during 
Karimov’s tenure in office. It examines more critically Karimov’s perception of Islamic 
extremism and domestic political opposition and how these factors shaped his alignment 
towards Russia. More to the point, what becomes evident is that Karimov was concerned 
primarily with his political position. Internal threats to his position were the primary
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threats that warranted balancing behavior. This logic runs contrary to balance of power 
theory that emphasizes the primacy o f state survival in an anarchic international system. 
Based on the discussion provided in Chapter III about limited security cooperation, 
primarily dealing with extremism and terrorism, it becomes clearer that internal threats 
were paramount in Karimov’s alignment strategies towards Russia.
The next section sets the context of Uzbek politics and discusses the political 
ascendancy of Karimov. It offers a brief historical background of the period of initial 
political consolidation for Karimov. This discussion sheds light on the more authoritarian 
dimension of Uzbek politics. The chapter then moves to a more explicit discussion of the 
two types of internal political threats (political violence and domestic political 
opposition) that Karimov perceived throughout the decade and how he dealt with these 
threats respectively. As we will see, he was much more effective at thwarting domestic 
political opposition than political violence, given the resurgence of Islamic extremism in 
the latter part o f the decade.
KARIMOV’S POLITICAL ASCENDENCY
Karimov’s unconventional political rise began before the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. Traditionally, Communist leaders were groomed early and rose through the 
political ranks over time, thereby learning the intricacies of bureaucratic maneuvering 
and building bases of political support. Unlike most senior party leaders, Karimov was 
seen as a rising economic technocrat, and not a significant political figure. Before his 
appointment to the head of the republic, he had not held any party post or been a member 
o f a party bureau at any level. He had not even attended a republic Communist Party
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congress until 1986, but different circumstances would make a political outsider more 
appealing. After riots broke out in the Ferghana Valley, the Soviet leadership was looking 
for a fresh face and appointed Karimov the new regional Communist leader in June 1989. 
The lack of political experience worked in Karimov’s favor. Because he was not a major 
figure in the Uzbek Communist Party he avoided the purges of the 1980s, which occurred 
after the scandals surrounding the previous Sharaf Rashidov regime. The regime spanned 
from 1959-1983 and ended after a major cotton scandal revealed extensive corruption in 
the regime.
Due to his unconventional rise, Karimov lacked the political base most senior 
party leaders possessed. Accordingly, he relied on local politicians for support, but these 
individuals saw him as their puppet. They naively assumed that because he needed their 
support and patronage, he would always be malleable. During this transition, Karimov 
relied heavily on his old friend, Shukurulla Mirsaidov, who he shared power with 
informally.1 Mirsaidov was instrumental in Karimov’s political rise because of his own 
influence within the republic, based on his previous positions in planning agencies and as 
mayor of Tashkent for several years. But, once the necessity of working with Mirsaidov 
waned, Karimov was in a stronger relative position to outmaneuver him, thereby 
solidifying his position as the eventual president of independent Uzbekistan.
In subsequent years, Karimov worked gradually to shift power in his favor 
through a variety of political reforms. Karimov’s power rested in his official capacity as 
the head of the Communist Party in Uzbekistan, and secondarily in his election as 
chairman of the local Supreme Soviet. After Supreme Soviet elections in the spring of
1 Donald S. Carlisle, "Islam Karimov and Uzbekistan: Back to the Future?" in Patterns in Post-Soviet 
Leadership, ed. Timothy J. Colton and Robert C. Tucker (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995), 196.
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1990, the body obtained more legitimacy, which paralleled the general power shift from 
the Communist Party to the state organs themselves. Shortly thereafter, Karimov 
strengthened his position relative to Mirsaidov, by drawing on the example of Mikhail 
Gorbachev and creating the office of the presidency, which would be beholden to a 
legislature and have the power to issue decrees under the rule of law. The Supreme Soviet 
subsequently elected Mirsaidov as chairman of the Council of Ministers, or in essence a 
prime minister.
The next step in Karimov’s power consolidation occurred in October 1990, when 
the Supreme Soviet eliminated the Council of Ministers (headed by Mirsaidov), in favor 
of a Cabinet of Ministers subordinate to the president. With Mirsaidov’s former post 
abolished and the president as the new chairman of the Cabinet, the Supreme Soviet 
created the post of vice-president, which Mirsaidov was appointed to. Thus, through a 
variety of legal and political reforms, Karimov was able to solidify his legitimate position 
as head of state, even before official independence. The power struggle between Karimov 
and Mirsaidov continued and resembled a struggle “between two bears that could not 
continue unresolved much longer.”2 The struggle ended in Karimov’s favor, but the 
impetus would come from events in Moscow.
After the failed August 1991 putsch in Moscow, Karimov further strengthened his 
grip on Uzbekistan, since Mirsaidov appears to have backed the coup-plotters3 Sensing 
his precarious and desperate situation, Mirsaidov called for a no confidence vote on 
Karimov in the republic Supreme Soviet in October 1991. While secrecy surrounded the
2 Carlisle. ‘"Islam Karimov.” 198.
3 For more on the legal cases the Uzbek government has against Mirsaidov see, "Soobshchenie press- 
sluzhb prokuratury i MID respubliki Uzbekistan” (Press announcement of the prosecutor office and the 
Interior Ministry of the republic of Uzbekistan), Pravda Vostoka, 8 March 1997. 3.
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“October mutiny,” Karimov survived the vote, and Mirsaidov’s political ouster was only 
a matter of time.4 After the failed putsch, Karimov called for presidential elections and a 
referendum on Uzbekistan’s independence to take place on 29 December 1991. Karimov 
eventually won this election, although they were only partially competitive. The populace 
also voted resoundingly in favor of independence.
This chapter now turns to an examination of the two basic types of internal threats 
leaders face—political violence and domestic political opposition. As we will see,
Karimov has been very successful at thwarting internal political threats. However, his 
early successes through overt repression have also contributed to an even stronger 
backlash of political violence in recent years. In this regard, the persistence of internal 
threats prompted Karimov to increase security cooperation with Russia, which as Chapter 
III pointed out occurred in 2001.
POLITICAL VIOLENCE
The IT/ED framework suggests that leaders tend to focus on the internal political 
threats to their regime because of concerns with their political survival. This 
consideration is intensified when these threats come in the form of political violence.
This section examines internal threats to Karimov’s regime in the form of political 
violence. It finds that political violence, closely linked to Islamic extremism in the region, 
was a major factor in shaping his alignment with Russia, especially in light of a February 
1999 assassination attempt in Tashkent allegedly masterminded by domestic political 
opponents and religious extremists. In recent years the threat posed by Islamic extremists
4 D. Sabov and I. Cherniak. "Golobnyi bunt v khlebnom gorode” (Hunger riot in a grain-rich city), 
Komsomol 'skaia Prmda 30 January 1992, 2.
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and more specifically the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) resurfaced, prompting 
renewed security cooperation with Russia.
Political violence in Uzbekistan was not without precedent. In the past it was 
closely linked to socio-economic conditions. When the economic climate declined and 
there were fewer resources, jobs, and living space available, tensions were inevitable and 
at times violence erupted. Shortly before the Soviet demise, Uzbekistan experienced 
domestic unrest twice that ended in violence. In June 1989 some Uzbek youths turned on 
local Meshketian Turks, who were forced to move to the region by Stalin during World 
War II. More than one hundred deaths occurred over several days. A year later an even 
bloodier clash between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz over housing in the Kyrgyz border city of 
Osh led to over one thousand deaths. Despite this ethnic dimension, these were primarily 
examples of conflict with an economic and social basis. Indeed, these clashes, as one 
regional observer noted, were rooted in the internal social and political conditions of 
Soviet rule, where the underlying causes of conflict were more complex than simply 
interethnic hostility.5
These examples underscore how economic decline can produce political 
instability and violence. In January 1992 a similar shock was felt when Russia decided to 
engage in Western-assisted shock therapy with little concern for its impact of other FSU 
states. Russia’s unilateral economic decision undermined other members of the Ruble 
Zone, causing a short-term economic crisis. In Uzbekistan students took to the streets to 
protest, and Karimov subsequently cracked down on these demonstrations in Tashkent. 
These events were fresh in his mind, with the first in 1989 actually sparking his political
5 Anara Tabyshalieva. The Challenges o f Regional Cooperation in Central Asia: Preventing Ethnic 
Conflict in the Ferghana Valley, U.S. Institute of Peace Peaceworks. no. 28 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Institute of Peace Press. 1999). vi.
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rise. Coupled with religious extremism in neighboring Tajikistan and Afghanistan, these
experiences shaped Karimov’s perceptions of internal political threats and what measures
were necessary to ensure his political position.
By the spring of 1992, security cooperation between Russia and Uzbekistan
intensified, as we saw in Chapter III. Regional instability closely associated with Islamic
extremism in Afghanistan and its penetration into Tajikistan was the primary catalyst. As
Karimov suggests,
the political and military crisis in Afghanistan and the instability in 
Tajikistan cannot avoid having a negative impact on both the regional 
stability o f Central Asia as a whole and the national security of Uzbekistan 
in particular.6
From a security perspective, the most serious concern was that the porous nature of the 
Tajik-Afghan border allowed individuals to pass with relative ease, which complicated 
efforts to stabilize the situation. The crises were “sobering” to Uzbek officials and 
underscored the importance of Russia as a guarantor of regional security and border 
defense.7
Indeed, Karimov demonstrated great interest in the events in Tajikistan, primarily
because of his understanding of the threat environment in Central Asia. He did not fear
that Tajikistan would invade Uzbekistan, but rather that the local intercommunal conflict
there could spread into Uzbekistan itself. In his most recent book he elaborates on the
dynamics of regional conflict:
So what is the real threat of regional conflicts to the well being and the 
progress of Uzbekistan? At first glance, it may seem that the conflicts taking
6 Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan on the Threshold o f  the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge, Mass., 1998), 14; 
and "Karimov Assesses Situation in Tajikistan," Foreign Broadcast and Information Service-Central 
Eurasia-94-151 (hereafter cited as FBIS-SOV), 5 August 1994, 39.
' V. Portnikov, "Govorit" o granitsakh—znachit razorvat’ sredniuiu aziiu” (To speak of borders means to 
tear up Central Asia), Nezavisimaia Gazeta. 15 May 1992,2.
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place close to our borders have no direct impact on the political, economic, 
and social stability of our state. But that view is short-sighted. A similar 
political myopia leads to the opinion that the alarming developments nearby 
will avoid our country, that our stability will be preserved of itself, 
and that the future of the country will be secured automatically. These 
myopically “optimistic” views do not see the huge efforts it costs the state to 
secure peace and order and to prevent adverse developments from spilling 
over onto our soil. If acute problems, like those surrounding us, are ignored, 
they lead to crisis, and an unmanageable crisis sooner or later grows into a 
destructive cataclysm indifferent to state borders and to other political, 
economic, and ethnic realities.8
There was also concern that religious extremism could flourish in such an 
unstable environment and spread from neighboring Afghanistan and Tajikistan. On 
Tashkent Television in 1992, for instance, Karimov stated, “I assure you that tomorrow, 
when they declare Tajikistan an Islamic state, they won’t stop at that. An Islamic state 
with its ideology will come to us for sure through the Ferghana Valley. While I’m 
president, we won’t allow any Islamic order in Uzbekistan.”9 As Karimov has stated, the 
fundamentalist threat “to the security of Uzbekistan is not hypothetical, but its existence 
is obvious.”10
Karimov’s depiction of Islamic extremism in the region does warrant 
qualification. The Islamic fundamentalism typically associated with the creation of 
politics embodying the strict tenets of the Koran and the shari 'a (e.g. post-1979 Iran, 
post-1991 Afghanistan) does not accurately reflect Islam in post-Soviet Central Asia. 
Because of the nomadic and merchant ways of life that flourished during the height of the 
Silk Road, Islam became more of a way of life than a strict code of religious piety and
8 Karimov, Uzbekistan on the Threshold, 13.
9 Bess Brown, "Whither Tajikistan?” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) Research Report, no. 24 
(1992): 1-6; "Karimov Views Regional Security Issues,” FB1S-SOV-92-180.16 September 1992,49; Bess 
Brown, "Tajik Civil War Prompts Crackdown in Uzbekistan,” RFE/RL Research Report, no. 11 (1993): 1- 
6; and "Karimov Speaks About Regional Security at UN,” FBIS-SOV-95-205.24 October 1995,63-64.
10 Karimov, Uzbekistan on the Threshold, 13.
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order. Indeed, Islam in Uzbekistan has been tolerant to other religions and not radical, as 
for instance, Wahhabism. Much of the radical Islam that exists in the region today, thus, 
has been exported there from other states, such as Saudi Arabia, and accordingly it lacks 
the deep-seated roots necessary for its spread throughout the region. Moreover, political 
Islam is further weakened by diversity and competing allegiances to clan, tribe, and 
region.11 Therefore, while Islam does provide a deep-rooted sense of identity and 
community in Uzbekistan, and Central Asia for that matter, it has not translated into 
widespread political extremism.
In many ways, Karimov has been instrumental in his use of the term 
“fundamentalism.” Indeed, as one Russian editorial charged, “the Uzbek leadership is not 
simply afraid of fundamentalism, seeing it as a real and dangerous rival, but is also using 
it to try to scare Uzbekistan’s neighbors (Russia and the West), which is particularly 
sensitive to fundamentalism.”12 Moreover, by latching onto it as a bogeyman, he has 
attempted to keep Western governments (especially the United States) from isolating his 
regime, which in the post 9/11 international system translated into even greater 
engagement with the United States in the military campaign against the Taliban and al 
Qaeda in Afghanistan. In this regard, Karimov’s efforts to prevent regional instability 
have been received warmly, despite the extent to which he maintains authoritarian control 
in Uzbekistan. Even the United States praised Uzbekistan for being an “island of 
stability” upon Secretary of Defense William Perry’s visit to Tashkent in the mid 1990s.
11 Mehrdad Haghayeghi. Islam and Politics in Central Asia (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995); and 
Pauline Jones Luong, Institutional Change and Political Continuity in Post-Soviet Central Asia: Power, 
Perceptions, and Pacts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
12 A. Malashenko, “Kem prigovoren Islam Karimov?” (Who sentenced Islam Karimov?) Nezavisimaia 
Gazeta. 22 July 1994. 3.
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This is important to keep in mind when discussing Karimov’s rhetoric, as it provides a 
more accurate depiction of his fundamentalist bogeyman.
The murder of seventeen policemen in the Ferghana Valley in December 1997 by 
alleged Islamic extremists served as a catalyst for a renewed crackdown. Eight men were 
eventually tried and sentenced for the acts of violence, while hundreds more were 
detained and imprisoned.13 After the disturbances, little was said about the events and 
Karimov’s subsequent crackdown. In January 1998 Karimov provided journalists with an 
official account that claimed the “Islamists” came from neighboring Tajikistan.14 Later in 
February, Uzbek Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov held a news conference in 
Tashkent in which he suggested that Islamic groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan were 
training young Central Asians in terrorism in order to destabilize the region and bring 
about Islamic governments throughout the region. According to Kamilov, it was these 
groups that were responsible for the December attacks in Namangan.15
Karimov continued to infuse the situation with vitriolic rhetoric. In a speech to 
parliament in May 1998 that was broadcast on Uzbek radio, Karimov stated that Islamic 
guerillas “must be shot in the head” or else “Tajikistan will come to Uzbekistan 
tomorrow.” He went on to say, “if necessary I’ll shoot them myself, if you lack the 
resolve.”16 This rhetoric was also backed up by an increase in security cooperation with 
Russia. In May 1998 Russia, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan signed an agreement to counter
13 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Democratization and Human Rights in Uzbekistan: 
Hearing before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 106th Cong., 1st sess., 18 October 
1999, 26.
14 ‘"Dushanbe prisoedinitsia k ‘soiuzu trek”' (Dushanbe will join the "union track’), Rossiiskaia Gazeta, 6 
January' 1998,3.
15 G. Zhukova, ""Protest Tashkenta Islamabadu” (Tashkent's protest to Islamabad), Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 
19 February 1998, 5; and G. Chemogaeva and Iu. Chemogaev, "Uzbekistan obviniaet Pakistan v 
podgotovke boevikov” (Uzbekistan charges Pakistan with training militants), Kommersant ’-daily, 18
February’ 1998, 5.
16 Paul Goble. “Reading Fundamentalism Right," RFE/RL Newsline, 7 May 1998.
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Islamic extremism in the region, although the agreement remained ambiguous as to what 
such cooperation would entail.17
As part of the continued crackdown, parliament also enacted tougher laws on 
religious freedom. The amendment to the country’s law “On Freedom of Conscience and 
Religious Organizations” of 1991 forced all mosques, churches, and synagogues and 
other places of worship to register with the state, and re-register in many cases. Thus, any 
non-registered organizations became subject to criminal prosecution. Moreover, the 
previous law held that organizations only need ten adult members to register with the 
state, but the more stringent version raised that figure to 100, thereby criminalizing 
previously recognized organizations with fewer members. Some estimated that 80 
percent of all mosques working in the country were closed in late 1997-1998.18
Despite Karimov’s repressive tactics, and perhaps directly because of them, 
political violence continued. On 16 February 1999 car bombs exploded in Tashkent 
killing over a dozen people, injuring 120 people, and destroying government buildings. 
Karimov accused exiled opposition leader Mohammad Solih, who had run against him in 
the first presidential election, with plotting the president’s assassination along with the 
leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Tahir Yuldash, and other Islamic 
radicals from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Afghanistan. Many domestic political 
opponents living in exile asserted that the bombings were organized by Karimov to 
legitimate his repressive tactics. As Abdurahim Polat suggests, Tashkent organized the
17 "More on Karimov Visit to Moscow." RFE'RL Newsline. 7 May 1998.
18 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Democratization and Human Rights in Uzbekistan. 
26.
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attacks because many leaders of the democratic opposition were seriously considering 
returning to Uzbekistan prior to the upcoming elections.19
Karimov’s extreme actions incited greater Islamic extremism in the form of the 
IMU. This group emerged after a number of Islamists fled Uzbekistan into neighboring 
Tajikistan as a result o f Karimov’s domestic crackdown. There they were better able to 
launch raids into southern Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. The IMU leader, Yuldash, stated 
publicly his aspirations to continue the armed struggle against the Uzbek government in a 
BBC interview in September 1999. Thus, with the IMU publicly stating its intentions to 
undermine and potentially destroy the present regime, Karimov focused on the threat of 
political violence posed by Islamic extremists. In early 2001, Kyrgyz General Askar 
Mameev estimated that there were still between 1,500 and 2,000 IMU militants operating 
from Tajikistan.20
Beyond the more radical and violent IMU, another secretive organization, the 
Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HuT) has emerged from the political and economic stagnation common 
in Central Asia. This group shares the IMU’s goal of establishing Islamic states across 
Central Asia, but its methods vary substantially. Whereas the IMU has taken up arms 
against the Karimov regime, HuT pursues its objectives by propagating its tenets at the 
grassroots level with leaflets and fliers.21 Active members of HuT tend to be the 
relatively educated, urban youth, but great attention is spent on spreading their message 
to more rural areas, which are some the poorest segments of society.
*9 Ibid., 41.
20 "‘Shanghai Forum’ Participants Anticipate New Incursions By Islamic Militants,’’ RFE/RL Newsline, 15 
February 2001.
21 For more on HuT see. Uran Botobekov, "Spreading the Ideas of the Hizb-ut-Tahrir in South 
Kyrgyzstan,” and Bakhtiyar Babadzhanov, "On the Activities of Hizb-ut-Tahrir in Uzbekistan,” in Islam in 
the Post-Soviet Newly Independent States: The View from Within, ed. Alexei Malashenko and Martha Brill 
Olcott (Moscow’: Carnegie Moscow Center. 2001).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
100
Regional security services have arrested hundreds if not thousands of suspected 
members of HuT, but its membership continues to grow. In southern Kyrgyzstan it is 
estimated that 10 percent of the population are active members.22 The group has also 
played on the perceptions of ethnic minorities as second class citizens to further swell its 
ranks, most notably disenfranchised ethnic Uzbeks living in southern Kyrgyzstan, Uzbeks 
in Tajikistan, and Tajiks in Uzbekistan.23
The rise of HuT underscores the importance of economic conditions and how they 
can influence the political stability of a region, and more specifically the political security 
of a particular leader. As long as the economic picture remains bleak, such organizations 
will continue to gamer support from various sources. Indeed, Karimov acknowledges the 
connection between poverty and Islamic extremism. He suggested that militants are able 
to find recruits because of the “disastrous socioeconomic status of people, demographic 
problems in some regions, mass unemployment, and economic insecurity, especially 
among young people.”24
The IT/ED framework suggests that when internal threats to leaders rise, a more 
pro-Russian alignment is likely to emerge. This became evident in Karimov’s case as the 
threat from Islamic extremists grew by the end of the decade. During talks between the 
deputy foreign ministers of Russia and Uzbekistan on 28 August 2000, Russian officials 
stated that they were ready “to provide the necessary assistance to Uzbekistan and other 
members of the Commonwealth in their struggle against subversive activities of
22 Svante E. Cornell and Regine A. Spector. "Central Asia: More than Islamic Extremists,” Washington 
Quarterly 25, no. 1 (2002): 200.
23 Alisher Khamidov, "Frustration Builds among Uzbeks in Southern Kyrgyzstan.” Eurasianet, 26 March 
2001, 1-3 (\vwvv.eurasianet.org/departments/right/articles/eav032601 .shtml. 24 September 2002).
24 “Government Response to IMU Threat Fuels Radicalism in Uzbekistan,” Eurasianet, 24 July 2001, 1-2 
(wvw.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav072401 .shtml. 24 September 2002).
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extremists.”25 Similarly, in February 2001 Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, head of the 
Russian Defense Ministry's Department for International Military Cooperation, and 
Uzbek Defense Minister Kadyr Gulyamov concluded three days of talks in Tashkent. 
Those discussions focused on military-technical cooperation and regional security, 
including the threat posed by guerrillas of the banned IMU, counter-terrorism measures, 
the situation in the districts o f Uzbekistan that border on Afghanistan, and the possibility 
of training Uzbek servicemen at Russia military colleges.26 In late April 2001, General 
Anatolii Kvasnin, the chief of the Russian Staff, also visited Tashkent to help Uzbekistan 
plan for its defense against an expected onslaught of Islamic fighters in the summer.27
Security cooperation between Uzbekistan and Russia entered a qualitatively new 
phase after Karimov’s official visit to Moscow in May 2001. During his state visit,
Russian President Vladimir Putin stressed the importance of military cooperation in 
dealing with regional security, and stated that Russia “is doing much” to provide
2g
Uzbekistan with up-to-date arms to combat extremist threats. For instance, Russia 
plans to deliver 23 Russian-manufactured armored personnel carriers to Uzbekistan.29 
The Uzbek Defense Ministry also struck a barter deal with Russia in which $30 million 
worth of cotton and natural gas were traded for Russian mortars and multiple-launch 
rocket systems.30 At an informal CIS summit in Sochi on 1 August, Putin and Karimov 
again met on the side to discuss military cooperation as well as measures to combat drug
25 "Uzbekistan Denies Requesting Russian Military Help,” RFE/RL Newsline. 30 August 2000.
26 "Uzbek, Russian Defense Officials Conclude Talks.” RFE'RL Newsline. 1 March 2001.
27 "Russian General in Tashkent for Defense Planning,” RFE/RL Newsline. 30 April 2001.
28 "Uzbekistan, Russia Discuss Economic, Military' Cooperation,” RFE/RL Newsline. 1 May 2001.
29 "U.S. Holds Talks in Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan on Regional Security' Threats.” RFE'RL Newsline. 21 May 
2001 .
30 Ariel Cohen, "The Arms Trade nourishes in Central Asia.” Eurasianet. 5 September 2001,2  
(\\ww.eurasianet.org/departraents/business/articles/eav090501 .shtml. 25 September 2002).
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trafficking and terrorism 31 Thus, the rise of Islamic extremism in the region prompted 
Karimov to adopt a more moderate alignment towards Russia.
Political violence against the Uzbek government cannot be seen in isolation. That 
is, by the very actions taken against not only Islam but also political opposition in 
general, Karimov’s extremism has produced a counter-reaction. As Vitality Ponomarev, 
Director of the Information Center for Human Rights in Central Asia, pointed out, “total 
persecution and a crackdown on secular opposition in the early 1990s created the vacuum 
inside Uzbekistan that is now being filled by radical ideology. Karimov himself is 
responsible for this.”j2 By denying individuals legitimate outlets within the political 
process, groups turn to less legitimate methods of political change such as the use of 
political violence. In this sense, the rise of political violence is closely correlated with the 
actions o f the Karimov regime, and as we have seen in neighboring Afghanistan most 
recently, such extremism is difficult to root out.
Beyond political violence, leaders also perceive domestic opponents as viable 
threats to their positions. The next section discusses the role and evolution of domestic 
political opposition in Uzbekistan and how Karimov greeted it.
POLITICAL OPPOSITION
Given Karimov’s concerns with religious extremism and his desire to stay in 
power, domestic political opposition was thwarted. Karimov’s concerns with political 
opposition were closely linked to his fear that economic decline could increase his 
political insecurity. If groups were allowed to speak against the government in such
31 “Putin. CIS Leaders Meet Without Ties to Form New Ties,” RFE/RL Newsline. 2 August 2001.
32 “Government Response to IMU Threat Fuels Radicalism in Uzbekistan.” Eurasianet, 24 July 2001, 1.
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times, then the threat to a leader’s position could increase dramatically. In Karimov’s 
view, for instance, conflict in Tajikistan resulted from a proliferation of political 
movements and the subsequent demands placed on the government for “radical” political 
reform.33 With such a perception, there was little room for criticism of Karimov.
Before independence, some limited domestic political opposition existed.
However, Karimov was hesitant to allow political opposition much room to maneuver 
because of his concern that political parties, such as Birlik (Unity), Erk (Freedom 
Democratic Party), and the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP), could mobilize popular 
support against him through demonstrations or open elections, such as on the issue of 
Uzbek independence. Birlik leaders tended to demand Uzbek independence from Russia 
much stronger than Karimov. Erk, which splintered off from Birlik in early 1990, was 
often seen as a more moderate version of Birlik, but they too sought greater autonomy for 
Uzbekistan within the Soviet system. These parties placed political pressure on Karimov 
to embrace independence, if he was to win popular support.
The IRP was the greatest concern for Karimov because of its religious orientation. 
Yet, its political influence was limited. For instance, the party enjoyed limited support 
outside of the traditionally devout Ferghana Valley.34 Furthermore, popular support for 
the IRP stemmed more from a revival of local Islamic culture, than any desire to establish 
a strict theocratic state similar to Iran35 As we saw in the last section, the demonization 
o f Islamic extremism by Karimov often blurred many of these distinctions.
At first, Karimov tolerated this opposition. Birlik and Erk elected members to the
33 Stuart Horsman, "Uzbekistan's Involvement in the Tajik Civil War 1992-97: Domestic Considerations,” 
Central Asian Survey 18, no. 1 (1999): 42.
34 James Rupert, "Dateline Tashkent: Post-Soviet Central Asia.” Foreign Policy, no. 87 (1992): 188.
35 Robin Wright, "Islam, Democracy, and the West,” Foreign Affairs 71, no. 3 (1992): 141.
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republic Supreme Soviet in the 1990 elections, which provided them with a legitimate 
political outlet in the government. Karimov was not without reservations though. In 
commenting about this burgeoning opposition in a March 1991 interview, Karimov 
stated:
Were it a healthy opposition which had its own ideas, understanding, and 
view of the future, I would welcome it. But if we are talking of those I have 
run into and had to debate with, it is absolutely clear: The majority of them 
are straining for power. Give them a place in the sun, and they’ll relax and 
forget the people. And they’ll turn into conservatives who are worse than 
the present ones.36
Uzbek leaders also questioned democratic principles on cultural grounds. In a 
June 1991 interview, Karimov remarked, “before talking about comprehensive 
democracy; one should think about whether this democracy is governable, whether you 
can control the processes, or the processes will control you.”37 As Karimov is quick to 
point out, “in other parts of the Soviet Union, like the Baltics and Moscow, people are 
able to conduct themselves peacefully for hours at a demonstration. But here people 
quickly get excited and violence begins.”38 In September 1991, the Presidium of the 
Supreme Soviet and the Cabinet of Ministers issued the following joint statement: “At 
this difficult time, there are destructive elements that want and are striving to disrupt 
people’s tranquility, introduce disorganization and disorder, pit some groups against 
others, sow distrust in their bodies of power, and instill suspicion, fear, and panic among 
the population.”39 Opening the political system would presumably only strengthen such 
destructive forces. In the words of one senior Uzbek official, “diplomats try to teach us
36 A. Alimov and A. Mursaliev, "Nas uchili prygaf cherez kapitalizm" (We have been taught to leapfrog 
capitalism), Komsomol'skaiaPravda, 7 March 1991, 1.
37 “Uzbek President Karimov Interviewed.” FBIS-SOV-91-106. 3 June 1991,101.
38 “Prezident schitaet, chto ego respublika ne gotova k demokratii” (President believes his republic is not 
ready for democracy), Izvestiia, 17 September 1991.1.
39 V. Vyzhutovich. "Ottseplennyi vagon: Uzbekistan posle provozglasheniia nezavisimosti” (Uncoupled 
train car: Uzbekistan after the proclamation of independence), Izvestiia, 13 September 1991. 3.
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lessons, but our traditions are different. Uzbek people are very kind, but it is dangerous 
to give [them] things like democracy. We have to practice how to be a democratic state 
[first].”40 Similarly, Akmal Saidov, the head of the National Center for Human Rights, 
suggested that “Western norms and social structure are not appropriate to the Uzbekistan 
mentality and the tradition of the East as a whole, and therefore it is necessary to develop 
one’s own understanding of civil rights and liberties, adequate to local conditions.”41 
Thus, many in the Uzbek leadership questioned the practicality of an open political 
process, where various interests could voice their direct opposition to the president.
Shortly after independence, Karimov saw domestic political opposition, both 
religious and secular, as a threat to his political position. In the December 1991 elections, 
Karimov blocked the entrance of the other political heavyweight in Uzbekistan,
Abdurahim Polat of Birlik, leaving only one minor candidate to run against him 42 
Karimov enjoyed a monopoly in public communication and held the support of former 
communists throughout the country that had joined his People’s Democratic Party (PDP). 
Prior to the election, Karimov was featured on daily news bulletins televised nationwide 
by state-run television stations, while his opponent, Mohammad Solih of Erk, received 
only fifteen minutes of airtime one week before the polling day. Out of those fifteen 
minutes, three minutes were officially censored. Karimov received 86 percent of the vote 
with Solih a distant second with 13 percent. With victory in hand, he ensured his 
political survival both in the short and long term.
40 Hiro, Between Marx and Muhammad. 187.
41 A. Musin, "Vyrabatyvactsia natsional'naia kontseptsiia prav cheloveka" (A national concept of human 
rights is being developed). Nezcnisimaia Gazeta, 22 November 1996, 3.
42 In late November the electoral commission required that all opposition groups present 100.000 voter 
signatures within three days to make a candidate eligible for election. Birlik, it was reported, obtained the 
appropriate number of signatures. However, when they arrived at the commission's office during the 
afternoon of the deadline day. a Fridav. they found the office closed. Hiro. Between Marx and Muhammad. 
176-88.
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The first targets o f political repression were religious organizations. In December 
1991 some residents o f the regional center o f Namangan, in the heart of the densely 
populated Ferghana Valley, seized the local administrative building.43 They demanded 
that Karimov swear on the Koran that their concerns be met. This incident set the tone 
for Karimov’s relationship with Islamic groups to come. He struck first at the IRP and 
Adolat (Justice Party), who drew their strongest support from Muslims in the Ferghana 
Valley. Shortly after his meeting with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker concerning 
democratic reform in February 1992, Karimov arranged for seventy-one opposition 
figures to be arrested.44 The Islamic center in Namangan was ransacked, and its property 
thrown into the streets. For some time after, the Ministry of Interior Affairs maintained a 
presence in the region.
Violence against secular political opponents also started in the summer of 1992. 
As the Birlik leadership struggled to gain political recognition, they also found 
themselves under physical attack. When Polat refused to cancel a political rally, for 
which he had already gained government approval, four unknown assailants attacked 
him 45 Shukhart Ismatullaev and Pulat Akhunov, co-chairmen of Birlik, also reported 
being severely beaten during incarceration.46 Polat and Ismatullaev were forced to leave
43 R. Tazhetdin. "Nega soobshchaet: Uzbekistan” (Independent newspaper reporting: Uzbekistan), 
Nezax’isimaia Gazeta. 1 February 1992. 3.
44 ‘'Nega soobshchaet: Uzbekistan" (Independent newspaper reporting: Uzbekistan), Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 
21 March 1992, 3.
45 "Prosecutor Investigates 'Birlik* Leaders Attack,” FBIS-SOV-92-128.2 July 1992, 72.
46 Knight, Spies Without Cloaks, 188. After a similar attack, Polat and fellow Birlik leader, Muralim 
Adylov. were denied treatment and refused as inpatients. The hospital called the police, and a senior police 
officer informed the two that they would have to leave, or else they would be removed by force. “Police 
Evict Opposition Leaders From Hospital,*’ FBIS-SOV-92-139, 20 July 1992,64. Adylov was also assaulted 
in late May. while Ravshan Dzhuraev. leader of Birlik’s youth organization, was attacked on the streets a 
week earlier. "Nega soobshchaet: Uzbekistan” (Independent new-spaper reporting: Uzbekistan), 
Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 28 May 1992.3.
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the country, while Akhunov was jailed on a fabricated charge of petty hooliganism 47 By 
December 1992, the Uzbek Supreme Soviet ordered the Supreme Court to consider the 
legal status of Birlik 48 Once Erk began to assert its claim for more political freedom, 
their leader, Solih, who had run against Karimov in 1991, was brought in for questioning, 
after which he fled the country in the spring of 1993 49
With the ratification of a new constitution in December 1992, Karimov’s 
eradication of opposition continued unhindered. Article 57 prohibited political parties 
based on national and religious principles. In January 1993 this meant that the 
government would no longer recognize Birlik. Upon appeal, the Justice Ministry claimed 
the abolition of the movement was “legal and expedient,” citing the arrests of 166 Birlik 
members between 1991 and 1993, and upheld the ban for an interim period ending on 15 
April 1993.50 Re-registration attempts in 1993 again proved futile because Birlik lacked 
an official address after the government confiscated their headquarters shortly before the 
registration deadline.
Erk also came under fire when plans for a “long-term” coup were discovered. In 
September 1994 the Uzbek Security Service began a thorough investigation of Erk plans 
to recruit young Uzbeks and send them to Turkey for political and military training.51 
The hope was that ties with Turkey would help ensure the survival of the opposition 
movement. The trial was held several months after September to avoid darkening the
47 I. Rotar’, ""Demrossiia" i 'Birlik’ obviniaiut Uzbekskoe rukovodstvo” ("Democratic Russia” and 
"Birlik” accuse Uzbek leadership), Neza\’isimaia Gazeta, 26 September 1992, 3.
48 "Nega soobshchaet: Uzbekistan” (Independent newspaper reporting: Uzbekistan), Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 
12 December 1992,3.
49 O. Panfilov, "Khersinki Voch o Situatsii v Srednei Azii” (Helsinki Watch on the situation in Central 
Asia), Nezavisimaia Gazeta. 7 May 1993. 3.
50 “Gtovemment Suspends Activities of Birlik Opposition Group.” FBIS-SOV-93-012,21 January' 1993,73- 
74.
51 "Sentenced Erk Leaders’ Activities Profiled,” FB1S-SOV-95-IOO, 24 May 1995,66-67.
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52mood of citizens before the parliamentary elections to be held in December. Several 
defendants were arrested for possession of the banned Erk publication and illegal 
weapons. Murad Dzhuraev, the editor of the banned publication, was arrested by the 
Uzbek secret service in Kazakhstan. All told by April 1995 severe sentences were 
administered ranging from four to twelve years for Dzhuraev. The weight of evidence 
against these individuals sealed Erk’s political fate.
The new constitution retained its democratic facade. The Oliy Majlis was 
intended to be a legislative body of elected officials on a “multi-party basis.” There was 
also a renewed commitment to a “free mass media with no censorship.”53 These phrases 
again highlight the gap between what is said and what is practiced in Uzbek politics. 
Even on the day of ratification, political repression could not be resisted. Abdumannov 
Polat, chairman of the Uzbekistan Society for Human Rights and brother of Birlik leader, 
Abdurahim Polat, was abducted by the Uzbek secret police after addressing a human 
rights conference in neighboring Kyrgyzstan.54 He was rushed to Tashkent and charged 
with insulting the honor of the president.55 International outcry led to his release eight
A. Musin, "V Tashkente gotovitsia krupnyi sudebnvi protsess nad oppozitsiei" (Tashkent is preparing a 
big trial of opposition). Nezmisimaia Gazeta. 23 September 1994, 3; and "Erk Party' Trial Resumes,’’ FBIS- 
SOV-95-029. 13 February 1995, 76-77. In light of Erk allegations. Uzbek spokesman, Fakhritdin Parpiev. 
responded that "anyone who is in jail belongs there for seeking to publish underground newspapers or for 
other illegal activities. No one has the right to agitate against power, against the regime, against 
nationalism.” Fred Hiatt. "Uzbekistan Cracks Down on Dissidents.” Washington Post. 24 September 1994, 
A24.
53 According to public opinion research. Uzbek respondents seriously doubt whether any uncensored 
material is obtainable. 60 percent of the people polled stated that there were no forms of media, readily 
accessible, free of government control. Steven Wagner. Public Opinion in Uzbekistan, 1996 (Washington, 
D.C.: IFES. 1997), 69.
54 I. Rotar’, "Vlasti provotsiruiut Tadzhikskii variant” (The authorities provoke the Tajik variant), 
Nezavisimaia Gazeta. 12 January 1993, 3; and M. Lebedeva, "V Tashkente novii raund davleniia na 
oppozitsiiu. V Bishkeke—otstavka zamministra VD” (A new round of pressure on the opposition in 
Tashkent. In Bishkek, the resignation of the Interior Minister), Izvestiia, 12 February 1993, 2.
55 The charge stemmed from a 1992 photograph taken of Polat with two students who had a portrait of 
Karimov bearing the slogan “some animals eat their young.” For more on the trial see. M. Lebedeva. 
“Uzbekskogo pravozashchitnika Abdumannoba Pulatova khotiat upriatat' v tiurmu na 6 let, khotia vina ego 
ne dokazana” (They want to imprison Uzbek human rights leader Abdumannob Pulatov for sL\ years.
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days later, but such a demonstration reinforces the control that Karimov has within and 
outside his country.56
The effectiveness of Karimov’s domestic repression is evidenced by the first post- 
Soviet “multi-party” elections held in December 1994.57 While these elections were truly 
multi-candidate (634 candidates stood for 250 legislative seats), there were only two 
registered political parties that participated. Karimov’s PDP dominated the new 
legislature: 69 deputies were directly elected from the PDP, 167 deputies came from local 
administrative bodies, which favor Karimov,58 and 14 were elected from Vatan 
Tarakkiyeti (Progress of the Homeland Party).59 This latter party, which emerged on the 
coattails of the PDP in 1992, served the same function as Erk had back in the 1991 
elections. It upheld the democratic facade and gave the illusion that political opposition
although guilt has not been proven), Izvestiia. 27 January 1993. 2; and idem, "Abdumannob Pulatov 
otpushchen na svobodu” (Abdumannob Pulatov set free), Izvestiia, 28 January 1993,1. Similarly. Vasiliia 
Inoiatova. a well-known Uzbek human rights activist and secretary of Birlik. was charged with insulting the 
dignity’ of Karimov in a poem that depicted a ruler issuing orders to execute people by firing squad. The 
depictions closely resembled events that occurred during unrest in January’ 1992. and supposedly warranted 
her charge disrespecting the head of state. O. Panfilov. “Sud nad poetessoi-pravozashchitnitser (Trial of 
poetess-human rights activist), Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 27 February 1993. 3.
In his trial Polat’s lawyer was not able to see any materials pertaining to the case until shortly before the 
trial began. Ironically, the court released Polat. even though he had been convicted of the crime. Earlier 
that year another attempt was made to abduct Polat from a similar conference in Kazakhstan. This attempt 
was unsuccessful because of the intervention of Kazakh authorities. Martha Brill Olcott. Central Asia's 
New States: Independence, Foreign Policy, and Regional Security (Washington. D.C.: U.S. Institute of 
Peace Press. 1996), 107. In September 1993 Uzbek secret police also tried to arrest Abdurashid Sharif, 
Yadigar Abit, and Abdurahim Polat while the three dissidents were in Baku, Azerbaijan. "Uzbek Secret 
Service Tries to Seize Dissidents.” FBIS-SOV-93-185.27  September 1993. 29.
57 On face value the elections appeared completely democratic, but the parties themselves conducted the 
nominations for deputy seats. The old conservatives nominated themselves for various positions and 
limited outside nominees except for the occasional non-party members. A. Pulatov, "Uzbekistan vstupaet v 
polosu sotsial’nykh potriasenii” (Uzbekistan enters a period of social upheaval), Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 15 
February’ 1995,2.
58 Out of the unaffiliated block of candidates sponsored by regional legislative councils, 124 members 
were also members of the PDP, giving that party’ a much higher de facto  count. Roger Kangas, "The Heirs 
of Tamerlane,” in Building Democracy: The OMRIAnnual Survey o f  Eastern Europe and the Former 
Soviet Union (Armonk. NY: M. E. Sharpe. 1996), 278.
59 "Pervaia sessiia Olii Mazhlisa respubliki Uzbekistan pervogo sozyva” (Convening of the first session of 
the Oliy Majlis of the republic of Uzbekistan), Pravda Vostoka, 25 February’ 1995. 1.
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existed.60 The inability of the independent political opposition (Birlik and Erk) to field a 
candidate then left three groups in the Oliy Majlis all beholden to Karimov. Citing the 
results of the elections, Karimov urged the world to accept Uzbekistan “as a society that 
is being transformed into a democracy.”61
Despite Karimov’s take on Uzbek democracy, he apparently was aware that the 
democratic facade needed strengthening, and the state sponsored the creation of another 
political party. In late February 1995, five days before the opening session o f the Oliy 
Majlis, Adolat was created.62 Once the government recognized Adolat, 47 deputies 
elected from the regional bloc, who had become members of the newly formed party, 
were officially registered as another parliamentary faction. In May 1995 two other 
political groups emerged. The political party, Mili Tiklanish (the National Revival Party), 
was founded supposedly at the initiative of a group of artists; and the Birlik Social 
Movement was permitted, although it was not a political party and therefore could not 
nominate candidates for elected office.
The official programs of these pro-govemment groups varied little, as all were 
dedicated “to the development of an independent and democratic state.”63 The dominant 
PDP officially endorses “a gradual, evolutionary development of the economy and the 
preservation of social peace and interethnic harmony.” In contrast to its former 
Communist ideology, the PDP claims to support the interests of all citizens and not just 
the proletariat, such as workers and farmers. Other recognized groups have comparable
60 Vatan Tarakkiyeti began under the leadership of Uzman Azim, who left Birlik to join Karimov’s 
Presidential Council, the body charged with carrying out governmental policy.
61 “Uzbekistan Elects a New Legislature,” New York Times, 26 December 1994, A10.
62 “Novara politicheskaia partiia" (New political party), Pravda Vostoka, 21 February 1995, 1.
63 For more on these platforms see. Bohr. Uzbekistan, 12.
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goals, but differ in the interest groups they supposedly represent. For instance, Vatan 
Tarakkiyeti supports the interests of businessmen and entrepreneurs; Mili Tiklanish 
defends the interests of the intelligentsia; and Adolat professes that its primary goal is “to 
facilitate the development of a law-based state and the strengthening of social justice.” 
Finally, the Birlik Social Movement advocates “the construction of a just civil society on 
the basis o f socio-political stability, cultural dialogue, and openness.” Despite this 
appearance of pluralism in Uzbekistan, the purpose of these groups is not to defend the 
interests o f their respective constituents, but rather to contribute to the democratic fa?ade 
within Uzbekistan and provide Karimov with a compliant national parliament willing to 
support his initiatives. This became clear when the newly elected legislature came to 
office.
In its first session, the pro-Karimov legislature voted to hold a referendum in
March 1995 on extending the president’s term until the year 2000. As in Soviet times,
official returns recorded that 99.3 percent of the eligible voters turned out to vote, with
99.6 percent of them voting in favor of extending Karimov’s presidency. Thus, Karimov
successfully secured his political position for another five years without holding another
presidential election scheduled for 1996.64 In response to the vote, he stated,
I regard the referendum results as a mandate of confidence, a mandate of 
confidence in the president and the government, and in the course that is 
being pursued in the republic. I regard the referendum results as being the 
faith and confidence of our society and people in their own future.65
64 By this extension of his first presidential term. Karimov also remained eligible to run in the 2000 
election, thereby bypassing the provision in the constitution that limits a president from holding office for 
more than two consecutive terms.
65 “Referendum Results Reflea Confidence in Reform,” FB1S-SOV-95-062, 21 March 1995, 74. Karimov 
also stated, “the initiative to hold it came from the parliament elected by the people, and it based its 
decision on the Constitution. Therefore, the legitimacy of the arrangement cannot be doubted in the 
slightest.” "Put" Uzbekistana -  integratsiia v mirovoe soobshchestvo” (Uzbekistan’s path is integration into 
the world community). Pravda Vostoka. 30 March 1995. 2.
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Independent political opposition fared little better in subsequent years. In 
December 1998, another political party, Fidokorlar (Altruistic People), was formed, in 
response to Karimov’s call for a political movement to bring honest people to office. The 
birth o f this party brought the total number of political parties to five that could 
participate in the December 1999 parliamentary elections.66 Yet, once again political 
parties were less a tool to channel and lobby for the interests of the Uzbek people, and 
more a manipulation by Karimov to support some semblance of political pluralism.
Karimov’s political security was further enhanced after the most recent 
presidential elections. On 9 January 2000 Karimov retained the presidency with 92 
percent of the vote (as 95 percent of eligible voters turned out) against nominal 
opposition, which attests to the success of his domestic tactics. His opponent, 
Abdulhafez Jalalov, First Secretary of the Central Council of the People’s Democratic 
Party (which Karimov headed until he left the party in 1996), received 4 percent of the 
vote but was rarely seen during the election. Ironically, among those that voted for 
Karimov were Jalalov himself, who told reporters that he had done so in the interests of 
“stability, peace, our nation’s independence [and] the development of Uzbekistan.” When 
asked why he ran in the first place, he stated: “So that democracy would win.”68 Given 
recent events, Karimov’s political position seems even more secure. On 6 December
66 The PDP won 48 seats, Fidokorlar 34 seats, Vatan Tarakkyeti 20 seats, Adolat 11 seats. Mili Tiklanish 
10 seats, while local and regional groups that tend to support Karimov won 110 seats. There was one 
vacancy and independent initiative groups claimed 16 seats.
67 Abdumannob Polat, "Karimov Will Stay in Office. But Recent Elections Send Mixed Messages,” 
RFE/RL Newsline, 7 January 2000; and "Uzbekistan’s President Re-Elected.” RFE/RL Newsline, 10 
January 2000.
68 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Human Rights and Democratization in Uzbekistan 
and Turkmenistan. 106th Cong., 2nd sess.. 2000, 8.
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2001 Uzbekistan's parliament endorsed a proposal to extend Karimov's current term from 
5 to 7 years.
Throughout the decade, Karimov embarked upon the systematic and calculated 
elimination of internal political threats to his political position. As we saw in the previous 
chapter, this prompted increased security cooperation with Russia especially in light of a 
resurgence of religious extremism by the late 1990s.
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter examined the domestic political setting within Uzbekistan and 
highlighted the impact of internal threats, in this case political violence and domestic 
political opposition, on Karimov’s foreign policy calculations. The principle assumption 
of the IT/ED framework, that leaders focus on their political survival, was clearly 
demonstrated by Karimov over the past decade, as he continued to consolidate his 
position in the government. While much of the previous discussion demonstrated the 
extent to which Karimov thwarted any domestic political opposition, the fear of religious 
extremism continued to shape his alignment towards Russia. This prompted Karimov to 
adopt a rather strong pro-Russian alignment early on in the 1990s because of his own fear 
of domestic religious and secular opponents, the rising intensity of regional instability, 
and the need for Russian military assistance in securing the Tajik-Afghan border and 
providing a stabilizing force during the Tajik civil war. This falls in line with the logic of 
the IT/ED framework, which suggests that the more internal threats to leaders exist, the 
more likely a pro-Russian alignment will be adopted.
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The necessity of this alignment changed when Karimov was able to secure his 
political position by the 1995 referendum (as well as lessen Uzbek economic dependence 
on Russia discussed in Chapter V). With his political security in hand and a decline in the 
number of internal threats challenging his regime, Karimov was in a stronger position to 
adopt a more independent alignment, which eventually led to Uzbekistan’s withdrawal 
from the CIS Collective Security Treaty. The lingering specter of religious extremism 
emerged again in the late 1990s, prompting Karimov to cooperate with Russia to combat 
this common enemy.
Karimov’s actions against extremism have also shaped the changing geopolitical 
landscape and made Uzbekistan a welcomed partner of the United States in Bush’s 
international coalition against terrorism. For instance, Uzbekistan supported on several 
occasions the establishment of an international antiterrorism center under the auspices of 
the United Nations. As Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov pointed out recently, 
Uzbekistan raised the issue twice before the September 11th terrorist bombings.69 The 
difficulty is that Karimov’s actions towards religious groups in Uzbekistan have directly 
contributed to the resurgence of extremism in the region. At present the United States is 
willing to lend political and military assistance to Uzbekistan, especially given Uzbek 
approval to use its military airspace, to assist in the fight against extremism.
While Karimov’s stock rose post 9/11, the United States must keep in mind the 
regional peculiarities o f the extremist threat and the underlying motives of leaders in this 
international struggle. In the short-term, Karimov’s attempts to balance his internal 
political threats has greatly been enhanced through overt security cooperation with Russia 
and the United States. This is also interesting because it suggests that the United States,
69 "Uzbekistan Again Proposes International Antiterrorist Center," RFE/RL Newsline, 14 September 2001.
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and perhaps only in this limited capacity in the fight against global terrorism, is willing to 
assist Karimov in his struggle against internal threats. Previously, this was a role that was 
almost exclusively held by Russia. The Clinton administration either stressed human 
rights in their dialogue with Uzbekistan, or they chose not to speak out against these 
violations when it was deemed necessary for regional stability. Given the shifting 
priorities of the Bush administration, the United States does see Karimov’s political 
security as a vital security interest, especially insofar as Uzbekistan is a critical regional 
power neighboring Afghanistan and willing to actively cooperate with the United States. 
Yet, beyond this political dimension, there were also considerable developments on the 
economic front that influenced Karimov’s political security and shaped his alignment 
strategies towards Russia.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
116
CHAPTER V
UZBEKISTAN AND ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE ON RUSSIA
This chapter examines the second independent variable of the IT/ED framework, 
economic dependence on Russia, and assesses its influence on Karimov’s alignment 
calculations towards Russia. The IT/ED framework suggests that the more economically 
dependent a country is on Russia, the more likely a pro-Russian alignment will be 
adopted because of the need for Russian direct and indirect economic assistance. 
However, when leaders can mitigate or sever this dependence, then they are less 
constrained in their relations towards Russia, allowing for a more independent alignment 
strategy. As we will see, Karimov looked to Moscow for economic assistance after 
independence. But becoming aware of the asymmetrical nature o f these relations, 
Karimov developed a self-sufficiency strategy to lessen Uzbek dependence on Russia.
The first section of this chapter examines Karimov’s perceptions of Uzbek 
dependence on Russia and strategies envisioned by the president to address the 
dependence. The initial phase of Uzbek-Russian economic relations (1991-93) are 
analyzed in light of Karimov’s stated economic objectives (drawn from a series of 
booklets and pamphlets written by Karimov). This period is chosen purposefully because 
it relates to the lifespan of the Ruble Zone, the post-Soviet monetary system FSU states 
adopted. The collapse of the Ruble Zone is thus a defining moment in the economic 
independence of FSU states since thereafter they were forced to introduce their own 
currencies. During this period, Karimov became increasingly aware of the inherent 
asymmetries in Uzbek-Russia economic relations, and sought to meet Uzbekistan’s
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economic needs through a self-sufficiency strategy that increased domestic production, 
thereby lessening Uzbek economic dependence on Russia.
After setting the context, this section turns to a more explicit discussion of 
Uzbekistan’s dependence on Russian trade and energy, while also examining the 
availability o f alternative economic resources from Western countries and institutions. As 
the chapter shows, Karimov has been highly successful at first understanding the 
economic needs o f Uzbekistan, and then developing an economic strategy that was 
intended to lessen Uzbek dependence on Russia. The success of Karimov’s self- 
sufficiency strategy made an independent alignment away from Russia economically 
feasible. This was critical because he was unable to obtain significant Western economic 
resources that were necessary to adopt a more independent foreign policy. The lack of 
economic reform and consistent state intervention into the economy were the main 
factors that undermined continued Western assistance.
KARIMOV’S ECONOMIC APPROACH
Several factors shaped Karimov’s understanding of Uzbekistan’s economic 
dependence on Russia, and most were the result of years of Russian and Soviet 
domination. First, Uzbekistan was a relatively poor republic within the FSU at the time of 
independence, a consideration true for all Central Asian states. Second and related, the 
Uzbek economy traditionally focused on the extraction of raw materials. However, under 
the Soviet system, only 10 percent o f the materials were processed within Uzbekistan, 
with the lion’s share being sent to Russia. Uzbekistan’s main export is cotton, dominating 
exports at roughly 80 percent. Other resources exist such as vast mineral deposits
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including gold, silver, copper, lead, zinc, wolfram, tungsten, uranium and other minerals.
Natural gas and oil deposits also exist in sizable quantities. Third, as we will discuss at
greater length below, the structure of trade was tilted strongly towards Russia, with
Russia making up about 53 percent of both imports and exports in 1992.1 Karimov
recognized these factors, which led to several conclusions: 1) Uzbekistan needed to
readjust its trade balance with Russia, 2) Uzbekistan would need to restructure its
domestic production of goods, and 3) given the difficulties of these transitions, economic
cooperation with Russia would be necessary in the short-term.
Karimov’s assessment of Uzbek economic dependence on Russia fundamentally
shaped his economic strategy. In a March 1991 interview, Karimov highlighted the many
challenges that justified cooperation with Russia:
After sober analysis of the situation in Uzbekistan, however, we have come 
to the view that our republic’s best prospects lie in a renewed federation. I 
would like to give you just two figures. The per-capita national income in 
Uzbekistan is not only three times lower than in the Baltic states, but it is also 
only half of the Union average. The republic has a completely underdeveloped, 
one-sided economy. We are mainly deliverers of raw material, and even 
the existing processing industry provides mostly only intermediate products.
A total of 92 percent of all Uzbek cotton fibers are not processed in our 
country. On the other hand, we have to import more than half of the goods 
needed by the population.2
The country’s concentration on raw material exports, most notably cotton, was the first 
hurdle to overcome for the Uzbek economy. Even before the Soviet collapse, the 
Communist Party of Uzbekistan suggested that despite the benefits from Uzbekistan’s 
membership in the Soviet Union, its economy was heavily skewed towards raw material 
exports and that its main social and economic indicators were low in comparison to other
1 International Monetary’ Fund, Uzbekistan: IMF Economic Reviews. no. 4 (1994): 73.
2 "Uzbek President on Nationality Conflicts." FBIS-SOV-91-051. 15 March 1991,85.
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Soviet republics.3 At times, Karimov even suggested that this was a result of Moscow’s 
exploitation of Uzbekistan natural resources, where, he noted, profits were taken out of 
the country.4 Uzbek leaders agreed that Uzbekistan needed to focus less on the 
exportation of raw materials.5
Unlike other former Soviet countries that adopted “shock therapy,” Karimov 
preferred gradual economic reform. The experiences of shock therapy in Eastern Europe, 
the Baltic states, and Ukraine were unsettling, where reform brought with it severe short­
term costs, such as unemployment, inflation, and general economic uncertainty. These 
short-term costs would presumably threaten Karimov’s political security and place added 
pressure on his regime. Thus, while it was widely accepted that Uzbekistan needed to 
reorient its economy and address its dependence, cooperation with Russia was needed in 
the short-term.
Based on these factors, Karimov’s initial economic strategy outlined a gradual 
path to economic reform. His strategy of state construction and economic reform focused 
on several related principles. First, the economic realm has priority over politics. Second, 
the state is to serve as the main agent of reform, in essence controlling the economy 
during the transition. Third, priority is given to law and legal obedience. Fourth, the state 
must adhere to a strong social policy that takes into account the demographic structure of 
the country. And fifth, the transition to a market economy must come through 
evolutionary means, thereby buffering the country from the instability associated with
3 "Kompartiia Uzbekistana: pozitsiia v perestroike" (Communist party of Uzbekistan: position on 
perestroika), Pravda Vostoka. 9 June 1990, 1.
4 Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan: Sobstvennaia model'perekhoda na rynochnye otnosheniia (Uzbekistan: Its 
own model for transition to a market economy) (Tashkent: Uzbekiston Publishers. 1993), 13-14.
5 Karimov. Uzbekistan: Svoi put ’ obnovlenniia i progressa (Uzbekistan: The road of renewal and progress) 
(Tashkent: Uzbekiston. 1992), 57.
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shock therapy.6 Karimov’s strategy placed a tremendous amount of power in the hands of 
the state, and more specifically the president, to ensure that the transition and the 
distribution of economic resources would occur in the most favorable manner to 
Karimov. This also placed Karimov in the position to maintain and support when 
necessary the social safety net that would provide for Uzbeks hit hard by the economic 
conditions.
The next section discusses how Karimov went about implementing this strategy in 
his relations with Russia. After establishing the pattern of cooperation or lack thereof 
with Russia, this chapter returns to the key economic indicators of this framework (trade, 
access to energy, and economic reform) to suggest ways in which they influenced 
relations with Russia and the West.
ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA AND THE CIS: THE EARLY YEARS
Before independence, Karimov supported a renewed relationship between Russia 
and the former Soviet republics, although he stressed the necessity for Uzbek sovereignty 
and independence. To this end, he added a second question to the March 1991 
referendum ballot on the Soviet Union: “Do you agree that Uzbekistan should remain 
within the renewed Union (federation) as a sovereign, equal republic?”7 The Uzbek 
people widely supported the March 1991 referendum, with over 90 percent of the voters
o
in every region voting to preserve the Soviet federation. This was a clear mandate that 
there was a willingness to continue cooperation with Russia.
6 Karimov. Uzbekistan: Sobstvennaia model’perekhoda. 37-38.
7 A. Orlov, "Vtoroi biulleten’ dlia referenduma v Uzbekistane” (Second ballot for referendum in 
Uzbekistan). Izvestiia 21 February 1991,1.
8 The only exception was in Tashkent, where the referendum received 87 percent of the vote.
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After the failed 1991 August putsch, Karimov continued to support a renewed 
Economic Community Treaty, which would maintain links between Russia and other 
Soviet republics. However, he was still skeptical of a rekindling of the old Soviet 
hierarchy. For instance, in October 1991, he drew attention to the proposed executive 
bodies: “Coordination is needed. But when they write ‘executive-managerial organs,’ this 
means that they are again creating new structures over us. I would pose the question thus: 
‘coordinative-managerial,’ but ‘executive,’ not in any instance."9 The new Economic 
Community Treaty, which was signed by Uzbekistan on 18 October 1991, contained an 
executive body, the Interstate Economic Committee, but the emphasis was on 
coordination and not top-down approaches. The new treaty was short-lived as the three 
Slavic states agreed to disband the Soviet Union. Uzbekistan, as did the other Central 
Asian states, agreed to join the new Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which 
would presumably serve many of the same functions as the Soviet system.
Karimov’s decision to join the CIS was based on Uzbekistan’s economic needs. 
Karimov realized that economic cooperation with Russia at least in the short-run was 
necessary to achieve “genuine independence” faster, since inter-republic cooperation 
could presumably address the most difficult economic problems the countries would 
face.10 As Henry Hale found through interviews with Uzbek officials and presidential 
advisors, while there was some disagreement over the scope and nature of cooperation 
with Russia and the CIS, there was consensus that such coordination was necessary.11 
Indeed, Karimov continued to speak of the utility of CIS cooperation, as opposed to
9 V. Kuznetsova and V. Desiatov, "V Alma-Ate v mukakh rozhden dogovor ob ekonomicheskom 
soobshchestve byvshikh soiuznykh respublik” (An agreement on economic community of the former soviet 
republics is partially bom in Alma-Ata). Nezcn’isimaia Gazeta, 2 October 1991. 1.
10 Karimov, Uzbekistan: Svoiput’ obnovlenniia iprogressa, 25.
n Hale, "Statehood at Stake." 54-55.
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Ukrainian president Leonid Kravchuk who believed that the CIS was not really a viable 
institution. " There were limits however.
Given Russia’s preponderance within the CIS, economic policies initiated by 
Moscow tended to have far ranging consequences and because of Russia’s economic 
preponderance it was not constrained by other CIS states. By January 1992, for example, 
it became clear that Russia intended to engage in economic liberalization despite its 
impact on other CIS states. These decisions had a direct impact on the political stability 
of Uzbekistan, as price hikes sparked student riots in Tashkent. Karimov consistently 
voiced his concerns with Russian policies throughout 1992. Shortly after the student riots 
he argued:
Economic reform, price liberalization, and privatization should take place 
in a coordinated manner. And not like this: One president, to put it crudely, 
releases prices on a whim. We are not living on the other side of the fence, 
so we too are forced to hurry, even if our situation is different. Then you get 
the campus demonstrations and inflamed passions. I am basically now 
a hostage to decisions made in Moscow.... The main point is that the 
Commonwealth should make decisions collectively, collegially, after 
careful consideration, in an atmosphere of tolerance.13
As Karimov pointed out in the spring of 1992: “Moscow is not taking us into
consideration in formulating its next measures. This is a cause of great concern for us.
What will the reforms produce tomorrow? What will the Russian government reconsider
next? And in what kind of situation will these developments put us?”14 This sentiment
and a growing awareness of Russia’s unwillingness to work -with other CIS members
prompted Karimov to suggest in April 1992 that each republic should conduct its own
pricing policy. Individual strategies would take into account demographic and cultural
12 "'Karimov News Conference Previews Summit." FBIS-SOV-92-095. 15 May 1992,7-8.
13 ”Kak zhit’ v sodmzhestve” (How to live in the Commonwealth), Sovetskaia Rossiia 23 January 1992,2.
14 V. Portnikov, "Govorit o granitsakh—znachit razorvat sredniuiu aziiu” (To speak of borders means to 
tear up Central Asia), Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 15 May 1992. 2.
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factors since comparable price adjustments “could cause the situation to explode” in 
Uzbekistan.15 Tensions also arose when Russia pressured other members of the Ruble 
Zone, and by November 1993 Uzbekistan announced its own currency and left the Ruble- 
zone altogether, therein ending the first phase of Uzbek-Russian cooperation.
Perhaps even more significant in these initial years of independence, Uzbekistan 
looked to Russia for a continuation of direct and indirect subsidies. However, after 
independence, these subsidies became increasingly scarce. In 1992, for example, 
Uzbekistan effectively received subsidies equal to 69 percent of its GDP in the form of 
printed rubles.16 Yet, as Russia looked inward, these much-needed subsidies dried up. 
Thus, Karimov focused on ways in which Uzbekistan’s economic dependence could be 
addressed. Tremendous inroads were made in the trade and energy sectors, while the lack 
of economic reform limited Karimov’s access to alternative economic resources from the 
West.
STRUCTURE OF TRADE WITH RUSSIA
The inherent economic dependence that existed between Russia and Uzbekistan 
prompted Karimov to adopt an economic strategy that sought to limit the import of 
industrial and finished products from other countries of the FSU (notably Russia) while 
increasing the domestic production of critical supplies that tended to be imported. As 
seen above, there was also an awareness of the need to orient the Uzbek economy away 
from the exportation of raw materials.17 To this extent, Karimov’s strategy was one of 
self-sufficiency and adjusting the structure of trade with Russia was of paramount
15 “Presidents Hold News Conference.” FBIS-SOV-92-080. 24 April 1992. 9.
Hale, “Statehood at Stake,” 467.
1' Karimov, Uzbekistan: Sobstvenniia model'perekhoda, 108.
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concern. By the end of the decade, the trade balance with Russia would be drastically 
restructured. In the early 1990s, when the trade balance favored Russia, Uzbekistan 
adopted a pro-Russian alignment, but once Uzbek trade dependence on Russia was 
lessened by the mid 1990s, a more independent alignment was possible.
The structure of trade between Russia and Uzbekistan gradually improved in 
terms favorable to Uzbekistan. For instance, between 1994-95, Uzbek exports to Russia 
declined as a percentage of Uzbekistan’s total trade from 38.9 percent to 29.7 percent, 
while total Uzbek exports increased over the same period of time by about 40 percent 
(See Table 2). After 1995, in which Uzbek foreign policy became more independent, 
Uzbek exports to Russia as a percentage of total trade continued to decline and averaged 
around 20 percent annually.
Part of the reorientation of Uzbek exports was offset by an increase in regional 
trade with neighboring Central Asian states, especially Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and to 
a lesser extent Kazakhstan. While Uzbek exports to neighboring Central Asian states 
averaged 14 percent of total trade between 1994-96, this figure increased to 24 percent 
between 1997-2000. More to the point, between 1999-2000 intra-regional trade made up 
the largest share of Uzbek exports, with energy being a major export to Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan. This has proven problematic for Uzbekistan when trying to collect payments 
from these states, which themselves face dire economic conditions. The inability to pay 
for Uzbek energy exports prompted Karimov repeatedly to reduce or cut supplies to these 
countries until deals were reached concerning outstanding debts.
This shifting trade balance was also offset by an increase in Uzbek exports to 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. Between
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1994-1996, for example, exports to OECD countries averaged 31.7 percent of total 
exports, while exports to Russia averaged 30.4 percent over the same period of time. 
Despite these optimistic figures, exports to OECD countries declined between 1997- 
2000, averaging 24.7 percent of total exports, although they remained slightly higher than 
exports to Russia at 23.2 percent of total exports.
Table 2
Uzbek Foreign Export Trade, 1994-2000 {millions of US dollars)
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Total















































Sources: International Monetary Fund. Direction o f  Trade Statistics Yearbook (Washington, D.C.: 
International Monetary Fund, 2000), 479; and International Monetary Fund. Direction o f  Trade Statistics 
Quarterly (Washington. D.C.: International Monetary Fund, June 2001). 268.
Exports remained focused on the export o f raw materials, like cotton and gold. 
The rationale behind this policy was two-fold: 1) it allowed Uzbekistan to mitigate its 
existing dependence on Russian markets, and 2) it increased Uzbekistan’s access to hard 
currency. For example, between January and August 1992, $411 million in hard currency 
was obtained through cotton fiber, while the second highest export (copper and copper
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products) secured only $31 million.18 This was inconsistent with Karimov’s long-term 
goals of reorienting the Uzbek export market, but cotton remained the primary source of 
hard currency and this could not be ignored. Cotton production and its share of Uzbek 
exports remained strikingly high. Based on exports to countries outside the CIS (which is 
a more accurate measure of competitiveness in world markets), cotton exports continued 
to account for roughly 70 to 80 percent of exports followed by nonferrous and ferrous 
metals between 4 to 6 percent.19
Beyond reorienting exports towards OECD countries, there was also an additional 
effort to improve Uzbekistan’s import structure. Uzbek imports from Russia continued to 
decline throughout the decade (See Table 3). In 1994, Russia represented 36.4 percent of 
total Uzbek imports, while this figure declined to 29.9 percent in 1995. Much like export 
values, imports from Russia continued to decline to 21.2 percent of total imports in 1997, 
17.4 percent in 1998, with this figure hitting a decade low in 1999 at 9.9 percent of 
Uzbek imports. The decline in Russian imports was primarily the result of an increase in 
the domestic production of goods typically imported from Russia, especially energy, fuel, 
and cereal grains. Prior to independence, Uzbekistan received the vast majority of its oil 
from Russia, approximately 4.5 million tons each year. As we will see in the next section, 
the increased domestic production of oil within Uzbekistan enabled the country to sever 
this dependence on Russian supplies.
Part of Karimov’s economic strategy also entailed diversifying the country’s 
sources of imports, especially in finding alternative trading partners. Preference was
18 Internal government document cited in Hale, “Statehood at Stake." 31.
19 This structure does not factor in the export of uranium or gold, however. Eshref F. Trushin, “Uzbekistan: 
Foreign Economic Activity." in Central Asia: The Challenges o f Independence, ed. Boris Rumer and 
Stanislav Zhukov (Armonk. NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1998). 215.
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given to the OECD countries that could provide the largest source of economic resources. 
For instance, Russian imports as a percentage of total Uzbek imports dropped steadily 
from 36.4 percent in 1994, to 24.5 percent in 1996, and hitting an all-time low at 9.9 
percent in 1999. This was balanced with a reciprocal increase in the amount o f imports 
received from OECD countries. Between 1994-1997, imports from OECD countries 
averaged 32 percent of total Uzbek imports, while that figure increased to 39.3 percent 
between 1998-2000 (a figure almost three times that of Russian imports).
Table 3
Uzbek Foreign Import Trade, 1994-2000 {millions o f US dollars)
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Total















































Sources: IMF, Direction o f  Trade Statistics Yearbook. 479: and IMF. Direction o f Trade Statistics 
Quarterly, 268.
This shift towards Western imports stemmed from Uzbekistan’s desire to import 
new machinery and equipment. These imported goods represent roughly one third of all 
Uzbek imports, with over 70 percent of them coming from the countries o f the OECD.20 
This fell in line with Karimov’s state industrial strategy that emphasized a need to
20 Ibid., 214.
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upgrade and modernize the industrial base through state investment. This top-down 
strategy focused on importing technology to increase domestic production, and resembled 
import-substitution strategies, but the results have not been spectacular in the economic 
development of Uzbekistan.
Perhaps the most significant economic factor that allowed Karimov to adopt a 
more independent alignment from Russia was his ability to restructure the balance of 
trade, by eliminating the import of Russian energy supplies in favor of heightened 
domestic production. This issue is discussed below.
STRATEGIC GOODS
The IT/ED framework suggests that the availability of domestic energy supplies is 
a crucial if not determining factor in a country’s ability to forge more independent 
relations from Russia. Uzbekistan was fortunate in this regard because it possessed 
natural gas and oil deposits that enabled it to sever its energy dependence on Russia, 
unlike other states of the FSU like Ukraine. Under the Soviet system, Uzbekistan’s role 
as an energy producer was muted. Instead, it was a leading producer of cotton and gold. 
This underdevelopment of energy resources would not last long.
A fundamental element in Uzbekistan’s self-sufficiency strategy was domestic 
energy production. Uzbekistan relied heavily on oil deliveries from Russia, and as of 
1991, the republic imported almost three-quarters of its oil needs, approximately 4.5 
million tons of oil each year. After independence, Karimov embarked on a more 
ambitious plan for the development of indigenous oil and gas supplies. Indeed,
Uzbekistan holds a rare distinction among the energy producers of the FSU, in that it is
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the only state in which oil and gas production increased every year from 1991-1997 (See 
Table 4). Domestic production started off slowly, but by the middle of the decade 
Uzbekistan severed its dependence on Russian energy imports. Whereas in 1991, the 
republic produced 2.8 million tons o f oil, this figure increased to 5.5 million tons in 1994,
7.6 million tons in 1995 and 1996, and 7.9 million tons in 1997. Thus, these figures 
exceeded what Uzbekistan was able to produce as well as what it imported from Russia 
before independence.
Table 4
CIS Oil Production, 1991-19973 (millions o f tom)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Ukraine 4.9 4.5 4.2 4.2 4.1 4.1 4.1
Uzbekistan 2.8 z.z 3.9 5.5 7.6 7.6 7.9
Russia 462 399 354 316 307 301 306
Kazakhstan 26.6 25.8 23.0 20.3 20.5 23.0 25.8
Azerbaijan 11.7 11.1 10.3 9.6 9.2 9.1 9.1
Turkmenistan 5.4 5.2 4.9 4.1 4.5 4.3 -
a Crude Petroleum, including gas condensate.
Sources: CIS Interstate Statistical Committee. Sodruzhestvo Neza\>isimykh Gosudartsv i strani mira. 
Statisticheskii Sbornik (Commonw ealth of Independent States and the world. Statistical yearbook) 
(Moscow: CIS Interstate Statistical Committee 1999). 132,134; and CIS Interstate Statistical Committee, 
Sodruzhestvo Nezavisimykh Gosudarst\’ v 1994 godu (Commonwealth of Independent States in 1994) 
(Moscow': CIS Interstate Statistical Committee, 1995), 46-47.
Similarly, gas production, which Uzbekistan is even more endowed with, 
increased steadily over the decade (See Table 5). In 1991 41.9 billion cubic meters were 
produced, which increased to 45.0 billion cubic meters in 1993, 48.6 billion in 1995, and 
51.2 billion in 1997. Programs that capitalized on Uzbekistan’s vast natural gas reserves 
complemented the increased production. For example, Karimov initiated programs, such
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as the conversion o f250,000 state-owned vehicles from gasoline to compressed natural 
gas, which capitalized on Uzbekistan’s vast gas reserves.21
Table 5
CIS Natural Gas Production, 1991-1997 (billion cubic meters)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Ukraine 24.4 20.9 19.2 18.3 18.2 18.4 18.1
Uzbekistan 41.9 42.8 45.0 47.2 48.6 49.0 51.2
Russia 643 641 618 607 595 601 571
Turkmenistan 84.3 60.1 65.3 35.6 32.3 35.2 —
Kazakhstan 7.9 8.1 6.7 4.5 5.9 6.5 8.1
Azerbaijan 8.6 7.9 6.8 6.4 6.6 6.3 6.0
Sources: CIS Interstate Statistical Committee. Sodruzhestvo Nezavisimykh Gosudarsh> i strani mirz. 132, 
134; and CIS Interstate Statistical Committee. Sodruzhestvo Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv v 1994 godu. 46-47.
While it is seen as secondary importance to energy supplies, another strategic 
good that was highlighted by Karimov was grain production and overcoming Uzbek 
reliance on grain imports. This strategy called for a reallocation of arable lands for 
agricultural purposes. To compliment this gradual reduction of land used for cotton 
production, more advanced technologies were introduced that made production more 
efficient. Land that was once used to produce cotton was now used to produce cereals and 
grains. More specifically, the government from 1990-1996 reduced the areas sown to 
cotton (from 44 to 35 percent), while increasing the arable land used for cereal 
production (from 24 to 41 percent).22 Accordingly, the gross output of cereals grew by
21 Akira Miyamoto. Natural Gas in Central Asia: Industries, Markets and Export Options o f Kazakstan, 
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997), 56-57.
22 Eskender Trushin, “Uzbekistan: Problems of Development and Reform in the Agrarian Sector,7’ in 
Central Asia: The Challenges o f  Independence, ed. Boris Rumer and Stanislav Zhukov (Armonk. NY: M. 
E. Sharpe. 1998), 272.
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1.6 times, which enabled domestic producers to meet almost half of the republic’s 
demand for cereals. Although cereal imports remain high (almost half o f grain and 
cereals are still imported), some added level of security was provided by Karimov’s 
initiatives. While this strategy proved effective in the short-term, long-term issues need to 
be addressed to more sincerely alter Uzbek dependence on grain imports.23
Karimov addressed the dependence on imported goods through a consistent policy 
o f domestic self-sufficiency and increased production. This proved the decisive factor in 
alleviating Uzbek dependence on Russia, especially since Karimov had difficulty 
obtaining Western economic resources from individual countries and international 
financial institutions. As we will see, this was a direct result of Karimov’s unwillingness 
to engage in economic reform and restrict state intervention the economy.
ALTERNATIVE RESOURCES FROM THE WEST
Uzbekistan has been somewhat successful at reorienting its trade balance to gain 
greater access to Western markets and hard currency. But despite Karimov’s previous 
inclinations, this reorientation merely capitalized on the export of raw materials. This 
strategy allowed Uzbekistan to mitigate its economic dependence on Russia, but more 
sincere economic reorientation towards the West has been less forthcoming. As the 
IT/ED framework suggests, the main factor determining the extent to which FSU leaders 
can obtain Western economic resources rests on a leader’s willingness to enact and 
implement economic reform. In this regard, Uzbekistan’s limited and inconsistent path of 
economic reform undermined efforts to obtain more Western economic resources. This
23 For instance, this policy does not increase hard currency earnings; it will be increasingly difficult to 
maintain in the event of privatization once state intervention is curtailed; and its yields significantly less 
value than cotton production. For more on these long-term problems see, ibid.. 272-73.
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section surveys the extent to which economic reform was implemented, and its influence 
on Karimov’s ability to obtain alternative economic resources from the West.
The initial interaction between Uzbekistan and the IMF proved difficult. By 1994 
Karimov appeared to be willing to implement economic reform as evidenced by his 21 
January decree. The decree, “On Measures for Further Deepening Economic Reforms, 
Providing for the Protection of Private Property and for the Development of 
Entrepreneurship,” was seen at the time as a major turning point and bolstered the power 
of the state to promote economic reform. Among the most important aspects of this 
initiative were the establishment of an inter-ministerial committee on economic reform, 
entrepreneurship, and foreign investment and the expansion of powers of the privatization 
committee to include aspects of private sector development. However, by increasing the 
role of the state in the reform process, a consideration largely consistent with Karimov’s 
objectives, the country faced problems when dealing with the IMF and other international 
financial institutions.
Support of the fledgling Uzbek currency was the first pressing issue. Negotiations 
began in February 1994 but broke off in May. Uzbekistan independently introduced its 
new currency and provided for a transfer of the sum-coupon to the sum on 1 July at a rate 
of seven to the dollar. The Uzbek government and the Central Bank of Uzbekistan 
believed this was possible without IMF assistance because Uzbek foreign exchange 
reserves ($700 million) and gold ($440 million) could allow the currency to be floated.24 
This proved shortsighted, however, as inflation and the anticipated currency risk 
undermined the stability of the new currency, which depreciated to 20 to the dollar by
24 Michael Kaser. The Economies o f  Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (London: Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, 1997), 29.
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October. By the end of 1994, Uzbek officials sought IMF economic assistance, and the 
first agreement with the IMF was signed in January 1995. Uzbekistan received $74 
million under the systemic transformation facility to support the government’s program 
o f macroeconomic stabilization and systemic reform. These funds were negotiated 
against the Uzbek government’s program of reducing the fiscal deficit to 3.5 percent of 
GDP (of which 2 percent was funded by domestic banks), and other reforms including 
the further liberalization of prices, the phasing out o f budgetary subsidies, and the 
increased privatization of medium and large-scale enterprises.25
The IMF apparently was pleased by the progress of the Uzbek government on 
these measures since it continued to extend assistance in December 1995 (See Table 6). 
The IMF approved a package totaling $259 million to support the government’s 1995-96 
economic reform program. Of this total, $185 million was made available under a 15- 
month stand-by credit, while a second drawing under the systemic transformation facility 
was made for $74 million. As per the negotiated agreement, the program sought to reduce 
real economic activity to 1.5 percent in 1996, cut the rate of inflation to 21-25 percent, 
while keeping the overall deficit at about 4 percent of GDP. The IMF also established 
clear expectations for the Uzbek government with respect to structural reform. The 
government was required “to add momentum to its structural reform efforts, with 
particular emphasis on the privatization of medium and large-scale enterprise, enterprise 
reform, continued liberalization of foreign trade, and further disengagement of the 
government m economic activity. “
25 IMF Press Release no. 95/7 of 25 January 1995 (www.imf.org/extemal/np/sec/pr/1995/pr9507.httn, 26 
October 2001).
26 IMF Press Release no. 95/67 of 18 December 1995 (■www.imf.org/extemal/np/sec/pr/1995/pr9567.htm, 
26 October 2001).
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This interaction underscores how Western assistance could be obtained when 
economic reform was initiated. However, initial reform successes did not last long, 
especially when the IMF continued to criticize administrative interventions into the 
economy. This was consistent with Karimov’s strategy to make the state the main agent 
in the reform process. Government intervention was also necessary to capitalize on the 
most valuable raw materials Uzbekistan had to offer, including cotton and gold for 
exportation and oil and gas production for domestic consumption. Karimov’s top-down 
strategy was not well received in international financial institutions, but it stemmed in 
part from his unwillingness to relinquish control over economic decisions fearing 
economic decline and the resultant political consequences.
Table 6
IMF Summary of Disbursements and Repayments 









Source: "Republic of Uzbekistan: Financial Position in the Fund," 
(wvvw.imf.org/extemal/countr\'/UZB/index.htm, 10 November 2001).
As reform slowed, so to did Western assistance. Many problems identified during 
1995 became apparent as Uzbekistan fell into economic crisis. The most serious 
problems related to the production of cotton, which remained a major source of hard 
currency. First, the 1995 domestic cotton harvest proved disastrous; and second, world
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
135
prices for cotton remained low. These realities compelled the government to disregard 
IMF advice and increase its intervention into the economy, most notably through the 
imposition of foreign exchange controls and an increase in the printing of money that 
stoked inflation. These decisions ran counter to the conditions of the December 1995 
stand-by credit, and the IMF suspended it on 19 December 1996. Officially, the IMF 
suspended the funds because the government missed its inflation targets, and the 
imposition of tighter state control over currency transactions further limited foreign direct 
investment. Karimov was unwilling to weather the short-term adjustment costs associated 
with economic reform, as seen in the Baltic states, Russia, and Ukraine.
During 1997 and 1998 Karimov continued to resist economic reform. He was 
unwilling to restructure and privatize enterprises and postponed the privatization of the 
oil and gas sectors, which as we have seen, were critical in Uzbekistan’s drive for energy 
self-sufficiency. In this regard, Karimov preferred a more mercantilist approach, which 
protected vital industries in Uzbekistan, in contrast to a more open integration into the 
world economy.
By 1998, the possibility of obtaining Western economic resources remained 
bleak. Negotiations with the IMF stalled over currency convertibility. This issue remains 
a significant obstacle in IMF negotiations because it has become increasingly difficult to 
promote and attract foreign direct investment. The main stumbling bloc is over multiple 
currency exchanges. In essence, there are three types o f exchange rates in Uzbekistan: 1) 
the official rate established by the Republican Hard Currency Exchange through a 
complex system of administrative transactions; 2) the commercial rate which differs from 
the official rate in that a surcharge of up to 15 percent is levied for bank services, and 3)
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the black market rate which differs from the official rate by a factor of two or more.27 
This multiple exchange rate system allows the government to control vital aspects of the 
country’s economy. This is consistent with Karimov’s objectives because it ensures state 
purchases of imports, especially investment goods and allows the government to improve 
the balance of payments by establishing control over import transactions. However, such 
practices run counter to the more laissez-faire attitude of the IMF and other international 
financial institutions, and continue to inhibit Uzbek access to Western economic 
resources. The lack of reform even prompted the IMF to remove their representative in 
Tashkent when his term is over.
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter set out to examine the extent of Uzbek economic dependence on 
Russia and to determine how this shaped Karimov’s patterns of cooperation with Russia. 
Karimov’s pursuit of economic resources did not propel the leader strongly towards 
Russia (i.e. Belarus) or the West (i.e. the Baltic states). Rather, Karimov pursued a 
different path; one of economic self-sufficiency. There were two overarching economic 
considerations that shaped his relations with Russia: 1) the need to cooperate with Russia 
in the short-term to assist the country’s transition and prevent economic collapse, and 2) 
the need to increase domestic energy production so as to sever Uzbekistan economic 
dependence on Russian energy imports.
Shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it became apparent that economic 
cooperation with Russia came at great cost. In the early years Uzbekistan sought to
For more on the multiple exchange rate system and its consequences see, Trushin, “Uzbekistan: Foreign 
Economic Activity.” 216-19.
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reorient its structure of trade to limit its dependence on Russian markets and increase 
access to Western markets and goods. This strategy proved fairly successful although it 
relied on the export of raw materials, notably cotton. By the middle o f the decade 
Uzbekistan severed its energy dependence on Russia. The balance of trade became less 
skewed towards Russia, and domestic energy production proved highly successful. This 
left Karimov less economically constrained, and coupled with a decline in his internal 
threats, enabled the leader to adopt a more independent alignment by the mid to late 
1990s.
Western economic resources have been less forthcoming because o f Karimov’s 
unwillingness to implement comprehensive economic reform. There were initial signs 
that Uzbekistan may work with the IMF, but this became increasingly unlikely by the 
middle of the decade. Karimov continued to intervene in the economy in order to buffer 
the country from the economic consequences of reform. The rationale is simple and 
closely linked to his pursuit of political survival. By embracing radical economic 
restructuring, the likelihood of economic dislocation within Uzbekistan would increase 
dramatically. This decline in the country’s economy ultimately would have political 
consequences and further jeopardize Karimov’s political position (a fact most evident in 
the executive turnover in the Baltic states). Concerns over rapid economic decline and its 
potential impact of political stability were not without precedent having occurred in the 
Ferghana valley in 1989, 1990, and again in Tashkent in January 1992. Thus, the safer 
political path for Karimov was one o f gradualism, whereby the president could continue 
to provide economic benefits to Uzbek citizens. By consistently bringing home the bacon 
and weathering any economic vicissitudes, Karimov ensured his political position, since
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the average citizen feels they are better off with the more conservative strategy that 
continues to provide some sense of economic stability.* Long-term growth and 
development remains elusive, but Karimov remains surely entrenched in his political 
position, which as this dissertation seeks to explain is of primary interest to FSU leaders.
In the end, Uzbekistan has been able to adopt a more independent orientation 
from Russia, but the long-term question remains as to how long such a path can persist. 
This is evident in Karimov’s stated goals o f the need to reorient the Uzbek economy 
away from simple raw material extraction, yet the short-term necessities for the country 
have forced the country to continue its exportation of raw materials.
28 According to public opinion data, 56 percent of the people polled felt that life had improved since 
independence, whereas only 32 percent felt it got worse. Wagner, Public Opinion in Uzbekistan, 57.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
139
CHAPTER VI
UKRAINIAN-RUS SIAN SECURITY RELATIONS AND ALIGNMENT PATTERNS
This chapter examines Ukrainian-Russian security relations to provide a basic 
timeline for the understanding of how and when policy shifts occurred. It begins with a 
discussion of the basic differences between the security environment of Ukraine and 
Uzbekistan. Three factors stand out, namely geographic location, military position after 
the Soviet collapse, and historical ties with Russia.
Balance of power and balance of threat theories are then used in a similar way as 
in Chapter HI. That is, if we assume that Russia poses the greatest external threat to 
Ukrainian security, both in terms of capabilities and perceived aggressiveness, then it 
would be the state most likely balanced against. Indeed, because of its vast military and 
nuclear resources, realists would suggest that Ukrainian balancing efforts should be easier 
since Kiev could deter with nuclear weapons and its conventional forces.
Traditional alignment theories lead us astray however, and the case of Ukraine is 
pu ll in g for several reasons. First, why would Ukraine be willing to give up nuclear 
weapons, when they could be used to ensure their security from a potentially neo­
imperial Russia; second, why did Ukraine not balance Russia as strongly as some would 
predict; and third, why would Ukraine choose to return back to Russia after a decade of 
establishing its independence from Moscow in the first place? These are all troubling 
propositions for traditional alignment theories. The IT/ED framework sheds light on this 
puzzle. It provides us with a better understanding of why alignment strategies unfolded as 
they did and what the underlying motivations for leaders’ alignment calculations were.
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As we will see in Chapters VII and VIII, respectively, the best answers are found by 
examining the way in which leaders ensured their political positions in the face of 
internal threats and the extent economic dependence a country had on Russia.
Ukrainian-Russian security relations are presented in two general phases. This 
timeline is used to chronicle security cooperation between Russia and Ukraine, although 
as we will in subsequent chapters, the alignment patterns observed according to the 
IT/ED framework differ. The first phase runs from 1991 until 1997 when relations with 
Russia were normalized and many of the outstanding disagreements between Ukraine and 
Russia were resolved. Much of the initial security focus for Western policy makers was 
on ensuring that Russia would emerge from the Soviet collapse as the only nuclear 
power, which meant that Ukraine would have to join the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
to win the approval of Western countries. The second phase runs from 1997 to present 
where Ukraine worked with both Russia and the West, making sure that Ukrainian 
sovereignty and territorial integrity were not compromised. More recently, there has been 
an even greater willingness of Kiev to cooperate with Russia along a variety of security 
lines, although there has not been a tremendous shift in the overall military capabilities of 
the two states.
STARTING POINTS AND BALANCING OPTIONS
This section first highlights fundamental differences between the initial security 
environments Ukraine and Uzbekistan faced after independence. These differences are 
rooted in geographic location, the military inheritance after the Soviet collapse, and 
historical ties between Ukraine and Russia. First, Uzbekistan is a land-locked state in
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Central Asia with little direct contact with Western security institutions, although it is 
strategically placed in the region because it borders every country in the region. On the 
other hand, Ukraine was the second largest republic within the Soviet Union and located 
strategically between Russia and other European states, and more specifically 
geographically proximate to European security and economic institutions, like the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European Union (EU). This made discussion 
of eventual Ukrainian integration into European institutions possible, although highly 
problematic.
The second major difference between Ukraine and Uzbekistan is in military 
preparedness immediately after the Soviet disintegration.1 Uzbekistan did not possess 
nuclear weapons, unlike Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. As we will see, the 
issue of nuclear disarmament shaped the discourse between Ukraine and Western policy 
makers in the early 1990s, almost to the exclusion of other issues, although it did provide 
Ukraine with some degree of leverage in arms control negotiations. Ukraine possessed 
1,512 warheads, 212 strategic carriers of which 176 were ICBMs and 36 heavy bombers, 
and in fact Ukraine held the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world behind only the 
United States and Russia.2 Moreover, the sheer size of Ukraine’s armed forces totaling
700,000 made it the second largest military power on the European continent and clearly 
a state that needed to be dealt with to assure the security of Europe. These conditions 
were not present in the case of Uzbekistan, although as of recent U.S. engagement-with
1 For good overviews of the Ukrainian armed forces and its adaptation after independence see, Paul 
D! Anieri, Robert Kravchuk, and Taras Kuzio, Politics and Society in Ukraine (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1999); and John Jaworsky, “Ukraine’s Armed Forces and Military Policy.” in Ukraine in the World: 
Studies in the International Relations and Security Structure o f  a .View Independent State, ed. Lubomyr A. 
Hajda (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998).
2 Marta Dvczok, Ukraine: Movement without Change, Change without Movement (Singapore: Harwood 
Academic Publishers, 2000). 113.
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Central Asia has increased dramatically due to the ongoing war on terrorism in use of 
military force in Afghanistan.
There was also a third factor that stemmed more from the historical connection 
between Ukraine and Russia. One o f the greatest obstacles for Ukraine was overcoming 
the stigma of being considered the “younger brothers” of the Russians. Thus, there is an 
immense historical legacy shared between Russia and Ukraine that is not present between 
Uzbekistan. Indeed, as Leonid Kuchma has pointed out, “in Russia they pretend that 
Ukraine as a sovereign, independent state does not exist.. .the stereotype of viewing 
Ukraine as its constituent part or, at any rate, as the sphere of its prevailing influence has 
not yet been eliminated.”3 Similarly, Kuchma’s top national security advisor, Volodymyr 
Horbulin, stated in a 1997 interview that he could not provide a rational explanation for 
why differences remain within the Ukrainian-Russian relationship. Providing one 
impression, he went on to quote Henry Kissinger: “I often recall what former U.S. 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger told me: ‘I never met a single Russian who thought 
that Ukraine could be independent.’”4 Commenting on the importance of Ukraine to 
Russia and its status as a great power (an underlying factor in Russian-Ukrainian 
relations), Zbigniew Brzezinski suggested that “It cannot be stressed strongly enough that 
without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire, but with Ukraine suborned and then 
subordinated, Russia automatically becomes an empire.”5 This sentiment clearly
3 V. Timoshenko, "Leonid Kuchma gotov postupit’sia mnogim radi podpisaniia dogovora s Rossiei” 
(Leonid Kuchma is ready to give up a lot for the sake of signing an agreement with Russia), Nezavisimaia 
Gazeta, 20 February' 1997. 1-3.
4 V. Timoshenko, “Vladimir Gorbulin: Sodruzhestvo Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv perspektivy ne meet” 
(Volodymyr Horbulin: The Commonwealth of Independent States does not have a future), Nezavisimaia 
Gazeta, 5 February 1997. 3.
5 Zbigniew Brzezinski. "The Premature Partnership,” Foreign Affairs 73. no. 2 (1994): 80.
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complicated relations between Kiev and Moscow, and as we will see, it often led to bouts 
of inflamed rhetoric that only exacerbated tensions.6
A related issue involves Russians living abroad. This was more of an issue in 
Ukraine than it was in Uzbekistan, where Russians only made up a fraction of the 
population, approximately 7 percent. The same was not true in Ukraine, where there was 
a clear distinction between Western Ukraine and Eastern Ukraine, which tended to have 
many Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians living there. For instance, throughout 
eastern and southern Ukraine, the percentage of Ukrainian speakers as a share of total 
population is less than one-third.7 Samuel Huntington described Ukraine as a “tom” 
country in his clack of civilizations thesis, in large part because Russian made up 22 
percent and native Russian speakers 31 percent of the total population.8
From the perspective of balance of power and balance of threat theories, Ukraine 
was in a much stronger position to balance Russia based on its own military capabilities 
than Uzbekistan. This is an important factor for realist scholars because it suggests that 
the need to find balancing partners may not have been as pressing given the status of 
Ukraine’s military, notably its possession of nuclear weapons. The nuclear deterrent gave 
Kiev an advantage that Tashkent did not enjoy. Some prominent realists suggested that
6 In one instance, Kuchma identified what he called the “divorce syndrome.” characterizing it as a 
“complicated political-psychological problem that casts an ominous shadow on the entire complex of 
Ukrainian-Russian relations.” A. Bovina. “Chto stoit za ‘chetverkoi' Kuchmy?” (Why does Kuchma grade 
Russian-Ukrainian relations a B minus?) Izvestiia. 24 February 1998,4.
7 Valeri Khmelko and Andrew Wilson, "Regionalism and Ethnic and Linguistic Cleavages in Ukraine,” in 
Contemporary Ukraine: Dynamics o f Post-Soviet Transformation, ed. Taras Kuzio (Armonk, NY: M. E. 
Sharpe, 1998). 73.
8 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash o f  Civilizations and the Remaking o f  World Order (New York: Simon 
& Schuster, 1996), 165-68.
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Ukraine should hold onto them to ensure the country’s security, noting, “nuclear 
proliferation sometimes promotes peace.”9
Given the power disparity between Ukraine and Russia, balance of power and 
balance of threat theories would still predict that Ukraine would increase its security 
cooperation with the West, and inevitably NATO. This would be the most tangible 
evidence of balancing efforts. Hence, the best way to deal with a threat from Russia 
would be to join the principle Western alliance that at one time stood toe to toe with the 
Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. This was an approach adopted by the Baltic states, 
although as we will see, few other FSU states embraced such cooperative relations with 
NATO. Thus in the end, traditional alignment theories would suggest that 1) Ukraine 
would keep its nuclear arsenal as the best security guarantee from a Russian invasion, and 
2) they would work to join the NATO alliance, thereby ensuring Ukraine’s security 
through the pledge of NATO retaliation. As we will see in Chapters VII and VIII, 
traditional alignment logic did not hold true for reasons associated with domestic political 
and economic factors.
The next section identifies the general patterns of security relations between 
Ukraine and Russia, with the U.S. and other Western countries and institutions playing a 
significant counterveiling force to Russia. Throughout negotiations with Russia, the 
overarching concern for both Kravchuk and Kuchma was ensuring Ukraine’s sovereignty 
and territorial integrity, realized through the signing of the Friendship Treaty in 1997, 
which also brought about a new partnership with NATO.
9 John J. Mearsheimer. "The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent” Foreign Affairs 72. no. 3 (1993): 
51.
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UKRAINE (1991-1997): LOOKING WEST AND STRUGGLING WITH THE EAST 
This section examines the first phase of Ukrainian security relations with Russia 
that stretches from independence until the signing of the Treaty of Friendship in May 
1997. The treaty solved a number of long-standing issues with respect to Crimea and the 
Black Sea Fleet (BSF) and Russia’s recognition of Ukraine’s territorial integrity. It 
therefore serves as a defining moment for Ukrainian-Russian relations, although as we 
will see, it did not imply that Ukraine’s foreign policy would be any more or less pro- 
Russian.
The principle objective for the Kravchuk administration in the wake of the Soviet 
collapse was ensuring that Ukraine’s territorial integrity would be respected and that 
independence could be assured free of Russian domination. This was in fact a main 
current throughout the early and mid 1990s, as both Ukrainian presidents Kravchuk and 
later in 1994 Kuchma agreed on this larger principle. This did not always coincide with 
Washington’s approach. Indeed, in the initial days of independence U.S. policy makers 
were uncertain about a more independent strategy for a nuclear Ukraine. This stunted 
Ukrainian cooperation in the beginning of the decade, but as Kuchma came into power in 
the summer of 1994, there was greater talk of working both with Russia and the West.
The Kravchuk Years (1991-1994)
This section discusses the initial phase of Ukrainian foreign policy, which was 
largely defined by the initial collapse of the Soviet Union and Ukraine’s attempt to 
solidify independence from Russia. Kravchuk attempted to sever ties with Moscow in 
favor of working with the West. He tried to assert Ukrainian independence by
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demonstrating an unwillingness to settle a wide range of issues on Russian terms, 
including the ownership of former Soviet foreign assets and the fate of nuclear weapons 
located in Ukraine. His pro-independence sentiment was coupled with a pro-Western 
orientation, aimed at garnering access to Western resources and security guarantees. This 
was a strategy that, as we will see, proved difficult in the initial years of independence 
largely in part to U.S. interests which favored a strong Russia.
As part o f Kravchuk’s initial policy of looking away from Russia, he remained 
critical of CIS integration suggesting that the organization served as a “civilized divorce.” 
In February 1992 Kravchuk described the CIS in starker terms as “a committee to 
liquidate the old structures.”10 Indeed, the Ukrainian parliament ratified the initial CIS 
agreement only after adding twelve reservations, including the affirmation of the 
inviolability of state borders, the right to independent military forces, and the 
downgrading of joint foreign policy activities from “coordination” to “consultation.” 
During the initial years of independence, Kravchuk consistently criticized the 
development of centralized structures within the CIS, stating that Ukraine would not go 
any further than a loose form of economic cooperation. He emphasized that CIS 
structures should base their activities on the principles promoted by the United Nations 
and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and that the CIS should not be 
viewed as a supra-national structure, but rather as an international organization for 
facilitating the resolution of problems and tensions among member-states.11
Greater political and military integration was not a priority for Ukrainian leaders.
10 B. Grushin and V. Tret'iakov. “Chelovek Ianvaria v Rossii -  Leonid Kravchuk” (Leonid Kuchma is the 
man of January in Russia), Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 12 February 1992, 1.
11 "Chu Virute Vu u Perspektuvu SND?” (Do you believe in the future of the CIS?) Uryadovuy Kuryer. 1 
January 1994,2.
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For instance, Ukraine did not join the collective security agreement signed in Tashkent in 
May 1992 by representatives of six CIS governments, as Kravchuk feared that this 
agreement could have been used to legitimate Russian military intervention.
While Kravchuk sought to distance Ukraine from security ties with Russia, he 
actively security cooperation with the West. The difficulty for Kravchuk was that while 
he wanted to strengthen relations with Western countries and institutions, Western 
countries themselves, especially the United States, were unsure if a strong and 
independent Ukraine was a good idea. Moreover, U.S. policy makers focused narrowly 
on the nuclear arsenal of Ukraine and its dismantling, which tended to limit discussions 
between Ukraine and Western countries to these issues. To U.S. policy makers 
supporting reform was secondary, especially for the first George Bush administration, 
what was most important was ensuring that Russia emerged as the only nuclear power 
from the FSU. Bush’s now infamous speech to the Ukrainian Parliament in August 1991 
is a case in point. In his “Chicken Kiev” speech, Bush in effect warned Ukraine 
“ .. .freedom is not the same as independence... [Americans] will not aid those who 
promote suicidal nationalism based on ethnic hatred.”12 This clearly demonstrated that 
the outgoing Bush administration was not in touch with the interests and concerns of 
Kiev, as much as they were with how Ukraine should fit into a collapsing Soviet 
organization.
In the early 1990s Western interaction with Ukraine focused on these larger 
security concerns for geopolitical reasons. Washington preferred to deal with one single 
de facto power on security and economic issues, rather than having to deal with a
12 George Bush, Public Papers o f  the Presidents o f  the United States: 1991. vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office. 1992). 1007.
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multiplicity of new and relatively unpredictable independent former Soviet republics, and 
U.S. policy remained Russo-centric.13 Therefore, during the first year and a half of 
Ukraine’s independence, U.S.-Ukrainian relations were, to a large degree, one side of a 
triangular relationship involving Russia as well.14
Ukraine’s nuclear arsenal provided Kravchuk with a compelling bargaining chip, 
and one that would eventually be used to “blackmail” the United States into meeting, or 
at the minimum addressing, the legitimate security concerns of Ukraine. Since Western 
and U.S. policy makers focused on the fate of Ukraine’s nuclear weapons, Kravchuk’s 
policies initially tried to attract Western attention by questioning the right of Russia to 
ratify the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) on behalf of Ukraine. In response 
to this issue, U.S. Secretaiy of State James Baker and the foreign ministers of Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine signed the Lisbon Protocol on 23 May 1992. The 
protocol recognized all four states as parties to START I and provided for the adherence 
of the non-Russian republics to the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The Lisbon Protocol 
did not resolve the nuclear weapons issue completely, and some problems remained, such 
as the sale of enriched uranium extracted from warheads located on Ukrainian territory. 
Nonetheless, Ukraine demonstrated its willingness to work with the United States on the 
nuclear question, but the road to ratification was anything but simple.
Kravchuk’s approach to START I and the NPT was multifaceted. He made 
ratification conditional on compensation for nuclear weapons materials, security
13 Yaroslav Bilinsky, "Basic Factors in the Foreign Policy of Ukraine." in The Legacy o f History in Russia 
and the New States o f  Eurasia, ed. S. Frederick Starr (Armonk, NY: M. E. Shaipe 1994), 173.
14 James A. Baker. Ill with Thomas M. DeFrank. The Politics o f  Diplomacy: Revolution, War & Peace, 
1989-1992 (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons 1995), 560; and Atlantic Council of the United States, The 
Future o f  Ukrainian-American Relations: Joint Policy Statement with Joint Policy Recommendations 
(Washington, D.C.: Atlantic Council of the United States, 1995), 10.
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guarantees from the nuclear powers, as well as generous economic assistance for its 
disarmament program. Much to the dismay of U.S. policy makers, ratification was also 
difficult. In January 1993 the Ukrainian parliament made no movement on the Lisbon 
Protocol, and by February the speaker of the parliament stated that START ratification 
was not a priority.15 On 8 April the Ukrainian government emphasized that the timing of 
nuclear weapons removal from Ukraine would depend on a wide range of factors, such as 
the progress in Russia-Ukraine talks over the liquidation o f these weapons including the 
issue of compensation for nuclear fuel.16 These sentiments were shared in an open letter 
“on Ukraine’s nuclear status” signed by 162 deputies of the parliament made public in the 
same month. Citing similar considerations about the necessity of financial compensation, 
the letter warned:
at the same time it would be a mistake to agree to promises of insignificant 
monetary compensations in exchange for Ukraine’s immediate nuclear 
disarmament. The question of nuclear disarmament, state independence, 
national security, and territorial integrity cannot become an object for 
bargaining or “monetary compensations.”17
Thus, underscoring the importance for U.S. policy makers of dealing with both Ukraine’s
security and economic needs during the disarmament process
By the end o f 1993, U.S. policy makers were more attuned to the demands of
Ukraine and more willing to address its legitimate security concerns. Early on in the Bill
Clinton administration there was a general policy review of the post-Soviet situation and
especially Ukraine’s nuclear arsenal. The review led to a more balanced policy approach.
15 "Supreme Soviet Chairman on START I Ratification Delay, Further Plyushch Comment,” Foreign 
Broadcast and Information Service-Central Eurasia-93-027 (hereafter cited as FBIS-SOV). 11 February 
1993, 33.
16 "Zayava Press-Sluzby Kabinetu Ministriv Ukrainu” (Statement of the press office of the Cabinet of 
Ministers of Ukraine), Uryadovuy Kurver, 8 April 1993, 2.
17 “People’s Deputies Advocate Country’s Nuclear Status,” FBIS-SOV-93-082, 30 April 1993, 51.
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For instance, in May 1993 then U.S. Ambassador-at-Large Strobe Talbott visited Ukraine 
to discuss ways in which a “turning of the page” could occur between Kiev and 
Washington. Discussions moved beyond nuclear issues to include economic assistance, 
expanded defense and security ties, and a renewed political relationship between 
Washington and Kiev. This was followed by a June visit by Secretary of Defense Les 
Aspin, who was returning from a trip to Russia where nuclear disarmament discussions 
took place. So by October when Secretary of State Warren Christopher traveled to Kiev 
tensions between Ukraine and Washington subsided, and a genuine trilateral negotiating 
process emerged between Washington, Kiev, and Moscow. This led to the signing the 
next January of the Trilateral Agreement in Moscow between the presidents of the United 
States, Russia, and Ukraine.
The Trilateral Agreement was important and proved to be a defining moment in 
the disarmament process. The agreement and its provisions finally addressed Ukraine’s 
basic security requirements. For the first time in both theory and practice, a trilateral 
process had brought about resolution of the nuclear issue, which not only legitimated 
U.S. involvement in the eventual dismantling but also brought much-needed technical 
assistance to the negotiating process.
Furthermore, the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom extended basic 
security assurances to Ukraine upon Ukraine’s signing of the NPT. Clinton also promised 
to expand the assistance to Ukraine beyond the minimum of $175 million already agreed 
to. Indeed, Kravchuk was rewarded for securing his country’s accession to the treaty 
upon his trip to Washington in March 1994, where U.S. aid to Ukraine was doubled to 
$700 million (half of which was provided for nuclear disarmament). While Ukrainian
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officials cited security guarantees as the major reason for joining the NPT, the timing of 
this decision clearly indicates that economic factors were of considerable importance. As 
Sherman Garnett noted, “the key to success in the U.S. policy toward Ukraine was the 
marriage of U.S. nuclear non-proliferation policy with a broad-based policy that 
supported economic and political reform and addressed Kiev’s security concerns.”18
During his years as president, Kravchuk attempted to sever ties with Russia and 
forge new ones with the West. As we have seen, much attention during his term focused 
solely on the nuclear question. Ultimately, given the concerns of Washington little 
constructive dialogue could be pursued until this larger security question was addressed. 
Once this occurred, a new era of U.S.-Ukrainian relations emerged. Kravchuk ushered in 
this new era and began Ukraine’s trajectory towards the West, as for instance, when 
Ukraine joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program with NATO in February 1994 or 
when Ukraine signed a partnership agreement with the European Union in June 1994. All 
the more provocative since Ukraine was the first CIS country to establish such ties with 
European institutions. Yet, Kravchuk would play little role in this new era, since his 
political leadership ended with Kuchma’s victory in the July 1994 presidential elections.
The Kuchma Years (1994-1997)
Kuchma came to power suggesting that Kravchuk’s approach to dealing with 
Russia proved wholly unsuccessful, as evidenced by the staggering energy debt 
(examined in greater length later in Chapter VIII). At times, Kuchma also based this 
reorientation towards Moscow on loftier ideas of Ukraine’s place on the continent. For 
instance, during his presidential inauguration address in July 1994, he suggested:
18 Sherman W. Garnett, “Ukraine’s Decision to Join the NPT." Arms Control Today 25, no. 1 (1995): 7.
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“Ukraine is historically a part of the Eurasian economic and cultural space. Today, the 
vitally important national interests o f Ukraine are focused precisely on this territory of 
the former Soviet Union.”19 As we will see, this more pro-Russian orientation led to a 
softening of policies in both the CIS and over the contested Crimea and BSF, although in 
neither case was Ukrainian sovereignty or territorial integrity compromised.
After the initial pro-Russian honeymoon was over, Kuchma also began to look 
more actively to the West. 1997 proved a watershed year as well because of NATO’s 
enlargement into Central Europe, which culminated in NATO’s creation of a “distinctive 
partnership” with Ukraine in May. Days later Ukraine and Russia finalized the much 
debated Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership. Thus, the security picture for 
Ukraine was largely secured and many of the problematic issues that caused tension with 
Russia were resolved by 1997.
Kuchma continued Kravchuk’s policies towards nuclear disarmament. Domestic 
politics slowed the decision over the NPT until November 1994, when the parliament 
ratified the treaty on the eve of Kuchma’s trip to the U.S. While in Washington, Kuchma 
received an additional $200 million in gratitude for his efforts in implementing economic 
reform and achieving Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament, both of which he supported in the 
parliament. After Ukraine’s accession to the NPT, the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe provided Ukraine with a document during its December 1994 
meeting in Budapest. The document was a memorandum on security assurances 
(although not formal security guarantees) that essentially promised to respect Ukraine’s 
borders in accordance with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act, refrain from the
19 Roman Solchanyk. Ukraine and Russia: The Post-Soviet Transition (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2001), 92.
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threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, 
refrain from economic coercion, and seek UN Security Council action in the event of 
nuclear aggression or the threat of nuclear aggression.20 Interestingly, Ukrainian sources 
published the memorandum suggesting the document represented security guarantees, 
which of course it did not.21 Ultimately, Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament allowed it to 
avoid pariah status, and become a welcome member of the international community.22
Ukrainian-Russian security relations were also strained by the contested Crimea, a 
region dominated by ethnic Russians, and ownership of the Black Sea Fleet. In 1991 
Ukraine recognized the autonomous status of Crimea and allowed the republic to enact 
laws that did not conflict with Ukrainian laws. Although Russian leaders assured their 
Ukrainian counterparts that they fully respected the independence of Ukraine and had no 
intention of reclaiming parts of the country, tensions remained high over Crimea. In May 
1992, for instance, the Russian parliament declared that the transfer of Crimea from 
Russia to Ukraine in 1954 was illegal. Despite threats by some Russian politicians to 
renegotiate its border with Ukraine, Moscow accepted the inviolability of Ukrainian 
borders by June 1992, although a year later Russia’s parliament declared Sevastopol a 
Russian city. Yeltsin did not enforce this resolution, but it aggravated relations between 
Moscow and Kiev, raising fears in Ukraine as to what could happen if hard-liners came to 
power in Moscow.
The most complicated issue was over the ownership of the BSF and its base in 
Sevastopol. While the Minsk agreement of December 1991 clearly stated that the former
20 For the text of this document see, Garnett "Ukraine’s Derision to Join the NPT.” 11.
21 Solchanyk, Ukraine and Russia, 92.
22 Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” 
International Security 21, no. 3 (1996/97): 54-86.
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Soviet navy was under CIS High Command, Kiev viewed strategic forces as only those 
that carried nuclear weapons, and since the BSF did not carry them, it belonged to 
Ukraine. In response, Russia asserted control over the fleet. When the commander-in- 
chief of the CIS joint armed forces resigned to take a high-level position in the Russian 
government, it put an end to the CIS joint military command, and Russia started to form 
its own armed forces, claiming the BSF as a specifically Russian fleet.
Following the spring 1992 war o f decrees between Kravchuk and Yeltsin, 
attempts were made to settle this issue during meetings at Dagomys in 1992 and Moscow 
in 1993. At Dagomys the two leaders postponed discussion of the Crimea to the 
indefinite future and agreed in principle on a division of the BSF. In August 1992 
Kravchuk and Yeltsin agreed to put an end to the CIS joint command and to consider the 
BSF a Ukrainian-Russian fleet under joint command until 1995.23
In June 1995 Yeltsin and Kuchma signed an agreement that resolved in principle 
the dispute over the BSF fleet. Russia argued that for strategic reasons it needed the full 
use of the Sevastopol naval base and insisted on having a long-term lease on the bulk of 
Crimean naval bases and exclusive rights over Sevastopol, while Ukraine insisted that the 
base be used jointly. Under this agreement the port where Ukraine would base its navy 
was not specified, leaving open the opportunity that two navies could share Sevastopol.24 
The two countries agreed in principle to split the fleet, with Russia purchasing most of 
the Ukrainian share, ending up with 82 per cent of the vessels.25
The question of dividing the BSF for all practical purposes was resolved on 31
23 "Yaltunskuy Kompromiss" (Yalta's compromise), Uryaduvoy Kuryer. 7 August 1992, 1.
24 Ustina Markus, "Black Sea Fleet Dispute Apparently Ch er." Transition, 28 July 1995. 31-34.
25 Steven Erlanger. "Russia and Ukraine Settle Dispute over Black Sea Fleet" New York Times. 10 June 
1995, A3.
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May 1997, when Yeltsin and Kuchma signed the bilateral Treaty of Friendship, 
Cooperation, and Partnership. At long last, Russia formally recognized Ukraine’s 
independence and territorial integrity. Ukrainian officials agreed to give Russia 32 
percent of its half-share of the BSF as compensation for its outstanding debt, while the 
remaining 18 per cent would be used either to enhance its own navy or be sold for 
scrap.26 It was also agreed that the Russian fleet would be based in three bays in 
Sevastopol on a 20-year lease; that Ukraine could not enter into any agreements with 
third parties aimed against Russia; and that Ukraine could not allow the stationing of 
NATO troops and nuclear weapons on its territory. As these developments between Kiev 
and Moscow unfolded, Kuchma simultaneously pursued security cooperation with the 
West, notably NATO.
As we saw earlier, Ukrainian relations with the West improved dramatically after 
the signing of the Trilateral Agreement in January 1994, which addressed the issue of 
Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament and potential for security assurances. Since February 
1994, when Ukraine became the first CIS country to join NATO’s PfP program, which 
provides 27 countries with associative membership, and the first to sign the agreement on 
Partnership and Cooperation with the European Council, it has extensively participated in 
alliance activities, particularly in military exercises. Ukraine intensified its participation 
in NATO’s PfP program, and, according to the Individual Partnership Program (IPP), 
agreed to cooperate in all 19 spheres of activities envisaged by PfP, which included 
preparation for joint activities in cases of civil emergencies.27
26 Stephen D. Olynyk, "The State of Ukrainian Armed Forces: ROA National Security’ Report," The 
Officer (November 1997): 27.
Serhiv Tolstov, "Ukrainian Foreign Policy Formation in the Context of NATO Enlargement,’’ The 
Ukrainian Review 44, no. 2 (1997): 9.
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Kuchma’s foreign minister also suggested in 1995 that Ukraine desired to 
participate “in several organs of NATO whose sphere of activity represents a particular 
interest for Ukraine.”28 The visit of President Clinton to Ukraine in May 1995 highlighted 
the improvement of U.S.-Ukrainian relations with the proclamation of the “strategic 
partnership” between the U.S. and Ukraine. Ukraine took part in such activities as NATO- 
PfP field training exercises such as Peaceshield 96, Cooperative Neighbor 97, and 
Peaceshield 99, which were conducted on Ukrainian territory. This strengthening of ties 
between Ukraine and the West was extremely positive for Ukraine, but not surprising to 
Kuchma, since as he suggested, “Ukraine’s return to Europe is a completely natural 
process.”29 Thus, shortly after a year of promising a more pro-Russian orientation, 
Kuchma made sure that his avenues to the West remained open.
By the spring and summer of 1996, Ukraine’s more balanced security policy 
between East and West took form. Kuchma and his advisors had set a course for a return 
to Europe, which was expressed clearly in the president’s address at a meeting with top 
foreign policy officials in July. For Kuchma, Kiev’s most strategic path was to 
“integrate” with European and transatlantic organizations while “cooperating” within the 
CIS framework:
I would also like to note that our foreign policy terminology should reflect 
the principled political line of the state. Along with the strategic choice of 
adhering to the processes of European integration, Ukraine’s firm and 
consistent line is the line of maximum broadening and deepening of bilateral 
and multilateral forms of cooperation both within and outside the framework 
of the CIS while safeguarding the principles of mutual benefit and respect
28 Hale, "Statehood at Stake," 328.
29 Solchanyk, Ukraine and Russia, 90.
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for each other’s interests and abiding by the generally recognized norms of 
international law.30
As Ukrainian Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko stated repeatedly, “Our strategic 
goal is to fully integrate into European and transatlantic structures and to play an 
important role in the economic of East and Central Europe.”31
NATO expansion into Eastern Europe brought much of this debate to the fore. A 
principle difference between Kiev’s and Moscow’s perception of NATO expansion rests 
in the fact that Kuchma acknowledges that expansion is “no menace to Ukraine,” but he 
did caution that the alliance should take Russia into consideration when expanding, since 
“a nation like Russia cannot be left out of processes currently under way.”32 
Nevertheless, Kuchma was not deterred from cooperating with NATO and in fact 
cooperation under the PfP auspices was common. In 1997, for example, 228 joint 
exercises were conducted under the PfP program, 200 with NATO, 70 with the United 
Kingdom, and only 10 were held jointly with Russia over the same span of time.33
Moreover, as NATO expanded to the east, it opened up a greater dialogue 
between the West and Kiev, which enabled Ukraine to improve relations with both the 
West and Russia. Two days after the agreement was signed between NATO and Russia 
on 27 May, Ukraine and NATO signed a cooperation agreement that provided for a 
special partnership with NATO, which would be officially signed on 8 July 1997 at the
j0 Roman Solchanyk, "Ukraine. Russia, and the CIS,” in Ukraine in the World: Studies in the International 
Relations and Security Structure o f  a New Independent State, ed. Ludomyr A. Hajda (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1998). 32.
31 Dyczok, Ukraine, 120. Several bureaucratic changes were made to reflect Ukraine’s interest in 
strengthening ties with the EU. For example, in the fall of 1997. a European Union Department was created 
in the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Similarly, the National Agency of Ukraine for Reconstruction 
and Development was renamed the National Agency of Ukraine Development and European Integration.
32 Marta Kolomayets. "Ukraine to Seek Special Partnership with NATO," The Ukrainian Weekly, no. 26 
(1996): 1.
33 Dyczok. Ukraine, 121.
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Madrid meeting. The document outlined practical areas of cooperation between NATO 
and Ukraine and established a standing mechanism for consultation.
The heightened Western interest in Ukraine also prompted Russian leaders to 
complete the Friendship Treaty and after the NATO-Ukraine accord was signed, Russia 
finally signed the treaty on 31 May that recognized the unconditional borders of Ukraine. 
At long last Ukrainian leaders had been able to ensure the legitimacy of Ukraine’s 
borders irrespective o f Russian interests. With this assurance that Russia would not be 
able to contest Ukrainian territory any more, Ukrainian security relations could continue 
along the dual path of working both with NATO and Russia. This balanced approach 
enabled Kuchma to maximize his security relations, however, as we will see in Chapter 
VII, changes in his domestic standing greatly increased the necessity of fostering greater 
ties with Moscow.
This discussion of security relations appears to fall in line with aspects of balance 
of power and balance of threat logic. That is, Ukrainian leaders did strengthen security 
cooperation with the West and NATO, although it fell short of full membership into 
NATO. However, what is most puzzling is that once normalization occurred and 
Ukrainian inroads to European institutions were laid, Ukrainian foreign policy began to 
shift back to a more pro-Russian alignment. So why did Ukrainian security policy take 
this unexpected path and reverse its original trajectory? The answer rests in domestic 
political and economic factors discussed in Chapters VII and VIII. The following section 
draws attention to some of the primary indicators that highlight Ukraine’s slow drift back 
East.
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UKRAINE (1997-2001): NORMALIZATION AND THE SLOW DRIFT BACK EAST
What became apparent in this second phase of Ukrainian foreign policy is that the 
multi-vectored approach was not without problems. Increasingly, the Western nations, 
who Kuchma had warmed to after his election in 1994, slowly lost patience with the 
reform process, or lack thereof, in Ukraine. As we will see in Chapter VIII, this was most 
evident in Ukraine’s failure to implement economic reform, and in the process 
undermined Kiev’s ability to continue to receive economic assistance from Western 
financial institutions. This was a gradual shift, but one that became visible by the end of 
the decade.
While relations with NATO warmed in 1997, the extent to which Ukraine would 
become an active member remained in limbo. Cooperation and joint exercises were 
embraced by Kiev, as this only strengthened the security of the region while facilitating a 
greater dialogue with Western nations. In 2001 Ukraine continued to cooperate with 
NATO, including 120 joint-participation events with NATO, more than 70 with Poland, 
more than 60 with the United States, and more still with other NATO members.34
Yet, while cooperation continued, actual membership was fraught with 
difficulties. As Volodymyr Horbulin admitted, “We recognize that we are not yet ready 
to become a NATO member both in terms of meeting the necessary criteria and in terms 
of public opinion in Ukraine.”35 This latter consideration raised questions within Ukraine 
about the desirability of membership. Based on 1997 opinion polls, attitudes towards 
NATO membership varied considerably: 42 percent of the people polled could not
34 Carlos Pascual and Steven Pifer. “Ukraine's Bid for a Decisive Place in History.” Washington Quarterly 
25, no. 1 (2002): 185.
35 Volodymyr Horbulin. “Ukraine’s Contribution to Security and Stability in Europe.” NATO Review 46, 
no. 3 (1998): 12.
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answer the question saying it is difficult to say, 19 percent said yes as soon as possible,
18 percent favored the idea but that it should be done later, while 21 percent opposed the 
idea altogether.36 Similarly, according to Deputy Head of National Security and Defense 
Council of Ukraine, Oleksandr Razumkov, almost 60 percent o f the population of 
Ukraine opposes integration of Ukraine into NATO.37 Thus, the reality was that 
Ukrainian cooperation with NATO and formal entrance into the organization were two 
separate issues. Ukraine remained stuck in the middle, but as the years progressed, the 
limits o f security cooperation with the West became clearer, and Kiev began to drift back 
to the East.
The growing Western disengagement that set on by 2000, prompted Kuchma to 
strengthen ties with Russia. In 2000 alone Putin and Kuchma held eight meetings with 
one another, a clear indicator of a burgeoning relationship.38 Indeed, as Kuchma 
proclaimed on several occasions, Russia is a strategic partner of Ukraine aside from 
which “there is no alternative.” In January 2001 Ukrainian and Russian officials signed 
a 52-point military cooperation plan that foresees the creation of a joint command post in 
Sevastopol and a joint rescue detachment of the Russian and Ukrainian BSF.40 After a 12 
February 2001 meeting in Dnipropetrovsk, Ukraine and Russia signed a series of 
agreements culminating in 16 documents on economic cooperation aimed at 
strengthening cooperation in the areas of high technology, industry and energy. 
Additionally, Ukrainian and Russian space agencies signed a memorandum on
36 Solchanyk, Ukraine and Russia, 97; and Maria Kopylenko, “Ukraine: Between NATO and Russia,” in 
Enlarging NATO: The National Debates, ed. Gale A. Mattox and Arthur R. Rachwald (Boulder. CO: 
Lynne Rienner, 2001), 196.
3' T. Ivzhenko. "Ukraina ne vstupit v NATO v blizhaishie 10 let” (Ukraine will not join NATO within the 
next 10 Years), Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 11 February 1999. 1-2.
38 "Politicheskiye Itogi—2000” (Political summary—2000). Zerkalo Nedeli, 30 December 2000, 1-4.
39 “Naveki s Russkim Narodom” (Forever with the Russian people). Zerkalo Nedeli. 21-27 October 2000,
40 “Ukraine. Russia Agree on BSF, But Differ on NATO.” RFE/RL Newsline, 19 January 2001.
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cooperation with rocket and aerospace equipment. The most compelling development, 
however, surrounded the decision to reconnect the Ukrainian and Russian electricity 
power grids with subsequent exportation of Russian electricity through Ukrainian 
territory. The delivery of Russian electricity to Ukraine significantly weakens Ukrainian 
power generating companies, and reduces Ukraine’s long-term capacity to meet its own 
electricity requirements. Besides, such energy exports increase Russia’s ability to 
influence Ukraine in more indirect ways. Furthermore, on 13 June 2001 the Russian and 
Ukrainian prime ministers met in St. Petersburg and agreed to restart the work of a 
permanent intergovernmental commission that will deal with outstanding issues, with 
Kinakh suggesting that the two sides should be more serious in the implementation of 
agreements already signed.41 Kuchma also chose to join the Eurasian Economic 
Community in March 2002, a community that consists of the remaining core of the CIS 
including Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Belarus. His rationale stems 
from his growing awareness that there are fewer alternatives in the world for Ukraine. 
Kuchma explained Ukrainian needs, stating: “We can see that the world isn’t becoming a 
kinder place, and new trade barriers are emerging over time. These barriers have to be 
overcome.”42
While Kuchma strengthened his alignment with Russia in the past few years, the 
real impetus came not from a shift in the military balance or the rise of a newly 
threatening state, but rather the rising political insecurity he felt by late 2000 and the 
lingering effects of Ukrainian economic dependence on Russia. Chapter VII argues that 
the increasing intensity of internal threats to Kuchma made him fear his political security,
41 "Kasyanov, Ukrainian Counterpart Agree to Expand Cooperation." RFE'RL Newsline, 14 June 2001.
42 Neza\’isimaia Gazeta. 19 March 2002. 6. in Current Digest o f the Post-Soviet Press 54, no. 12 (2002): 
14.
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which as the IT/ED framework suggests, typically leads FSU leaders to adopt strong pro- 
Russian alignments. Chapter VHI then examines the constraining effect economic 
dependence on Russia has had on Ukraine’s alignment vis-a-vis Russia.
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has provided a timeline for understanding Ukrainian-Russian 
security relations. In short, two basic security patterns can be observed between Ukraine 
and Russia. The first spanned from 1991 to 1997 and ended with the signing of the 
Friendship Treaty that resolved several outstanding disputes. This was a period of 
normalization that led to a series of agreements signed with the United States and NATO 
that also placed Ukraine in its respective geopolitical light. The second phase highlights a 
gradual return back to Russia, although as we saw there were few changes in the 
immediate security environment that could be used to explain this alignment strategy. 
Indeed, why would Ukraine reverse its trajectory towards the West in the late 1990s, 
when it had proven successful during the mid 1990s? The answer lies not on what was 
happening outside of Ukraine, but rather what was occurring within it.
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CHAPTER VH
UKRAINIAN LEADERS AND INTERNAL POLITICAL THREATS
Whereas Chapter VI focused on security cooperation (and to a lesser extent 
economic cooperation) between Ukraine and Russia, this chapter examines how internal 
political threats to Ukrainian leaders shaped relations with Russia. The IT/ED framework 
suggests that when leaders feel their political positions are threatened, they are more 
likely to align with Russia to obtain direct and indirect assistance. Based on the 
conceptualization of internal political threats used for this dissertation, there were two 
moments in which internal threats to Kravchuk and Kuchma were most evident, and in 
both instances leaders survived by adopting strong pro-Russian alignments. Kravchuk 
met his political fate in the 1994 presidential elections, with Kuchma winning the election 
based on the political support of the eastern and southern regions of the country and 
promising to adopt more pro-Russian policies.
Kuchma’s experience in office is a bit more puzzling. After his re-election in the 
1999 presidential elections, he faced an unprecedented political scandal surrounding the 
mysterious death o f opposition journalist Georgiy Gongadze in the fall of 2000, when 
allegations linked Kuchma and some of his advisors to the killing. This prompted an 
unprecedented level o f political protest in Ukraine’s political system. As the IT/ED 
framework would predict, when internal political threats are high, Ukraine tended to 
strengthen its pro-Russian alignment, a conclusion evident in Kuchma’s pro-Russian 
rhetoric during the 1994 elections and over the past few years as relations with Moscow 
have strengthened. In this sense, the intensity of internal political threats were not
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constants that Ukrainian leaders were concerned with at all times, unlike Karimov’s 
attitude towards Islamic extremism and domestic political opposition in Uzbekistan. Yet, 
when they existed, the leader’s response, in this case Kuchma on two occasions, entailed 
strengthening ties with Moscow.
Another key distinction between Karimov’s experience with internal threats and 
those of Kravchuk and Kuchma is that the latter two gained their positions through a 
relatively open political system where other actors curbed the power o f the president.
This provides insight into how FSU leaders pursued their political security under 
different political conditions. Ukrainian leaders could secure their political positions, with 
Kuchma infinitely more successful than Kravchuk, but they could not rely on open 
repression as Karimov could.
Based on the IT/ED framework, a basic analytical difference exists when 
discussing different types of political systems based on a loose spectrum from 
authoritarianism to democracy. FSU leaders in more democratic systems, or quasi- 
democratic systems as in Ukraine, tended to form winning coalitions from among various 
actors within the state, in essence bandwagoning with powerful domestic actors and 
making sure their political base was strong enough to ensure their position. On the other 
hand, in more authoritarian political systems leaders tended to undermine any and all 
political opponents, whether violent, revolutionary, or mainstream; or in other words, 
authoritarian leaders tended to balance their internal threats as opposed to bandwagoning 
with them.
Once in power, Ukrainian leaders distributed the country’s economic resources 
(both formally and informally) to their political supporters (a political/economic
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transaction discussed at greater length in Chapter VIII). In this regard, Ukrainian leaders 
tend to bandwagon with various groups and issues to build a base of political support, or 
what some have termed the “party of power” discussed below. This is in large part 
because Ukrainian leaders do not have the power to jail and eliminate (or balance) their 
political opponents. Although as we will see, Ukrainian leaders were conscious of threats 
to their positions and attempted to increase their political power. Thus, while means may 
vary, the ends are the same: FSU leaders prioritize their political survival.
Another significant difference between Ukraine and Uzbekistan is that Ukraine 
has a substantial Russian minority (and Russian-speaking Ukrainians) that live 
predominantly in the eastern and southern portion of the country. Kravchuk and Kuchma 
had to walk a tight rope, making sure policies did not drift too far to the West and 
similarly too far East, since either foreign orientation would isolate a significant portion 
of the country’s population. Kravchuk tended to isolate the Russian-speaking portions of 
the population, when he criticized greater integration with Russia. However, Kuchma 
catered to these groups. While this divide played a significant role in politics during the 
early 1990s and still remains an important consideration, the East-West divide was far 
less pronounced in the presidential elections in the fall of 1999 and demonstrated that 
significant changes had occurred within the overall orientation of Ukraine.1
This chapter proceeds as follows. The following section provides a brief historical 
background on parliamentary and presidential relations within Ukraine. Within the first 
five years of independence the constitutional powers of the legislature and the presidency 
were hotly contested, and it was not until the signing of the first post-Soviet constitution
1 Thomas F. Klobucar, Arthur H. Miller, and Gwyn Erb, “The 1999 Ukrainian Presidential Election: 
Personalities, Ideology, Partisanship, and the Economy,” Slavic Review 61, no. 2 (2002): 315-44.
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in 1996 that the overarching constitutional questions about the balance of institutional 
power within the government were resolved. The political system in Uzbekistan remained 
largely unchanged, with the president dominating the policy making process. Within this 
discussion the initial political interaction between Kravchuk and Kuchma is highlighted, 
since the latter served as prime minister under Kravchuk.
The chapter then turns to a more explicit examination of who Kravchuk and 
Kuchma coopted into their party of power (i.e., those political and economic elites that 
made up the pro-leadership coalition in the government). Following this, the role of 
domestic political opposition is analyzed in the recent case of Kuchma and the Gongadze 
scandal. Previously, political opposition to Ukrainian leaders was limited, but in the 
winter o f2000-01 much of this changed, leading Kuchma to adopt a stronger pro-Russian 
alignment.
UKRAINIAN POLITICS: THE EARLY YEARS
Unlike Karimov in Uzbekistan, Ukrainian leaders faced domestic political 
opposition throughout the decade and were forced to obtain their office through relatively 
open elections. In the initial period of independence, Ukrainian presidents were 
challenged by other political forces as well, namely the Parliament. This section sketches 
a brief picture of Ukrainian politics shortly after independence, highlighting specifically 
the tensions between the president, prime minister, and parliament over the distribution of 
governmental power and the political interaction of Kravchuk and Kuchma before 
Kuchma’s election in 1994.2
2 For a good overview o f these events see, Charles R. Wise and Volodymyr Pigenko, “The Separation of 
Powers Puzzle in Ukraine: Sorting Out Responsibilities and Relationships between President, Parliament,
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Strong executive branches are more the norm, than the exception in the FSU, and 
Ukraine is no exception. Within the post-Soviet era, there were two general time frames 
that differentiate executive/legislative tensions. The first period spanned from December 
1991 until June 1996. During this phase Ukrainian leaders struggled with the Parliament 
to both define the appropriate constitutional powers of their respective political 
institutions and pass a political and economic agenda that could meet the needs of the 
leaders (although this did not always mean they would be best for the Ukrainian people 
or economy). Once the new constitution was signed in the middle of 1996, however, 
much of the legal debate concerning the division of power was resolved, although 
tensions did not disappear altogether between Kuchma and the Parliament. The second 
phase spans roughly from the signing of the 1996 constitution until today, characterized 
by a stronger Ukrainian presidency.
Shortly before independence, parliamentary elections held in March 1990 
performed somewhat of a representative function, as a multi-party system emerged for 
the first time. This was not to suggest that Ukrainian politics transformed entirely.
Indeed, opposition political parties had limited participation throughout the country. In 
1991, for example, the total membership of all non-Communist political parties was
35,000 to 40,000 out of a population of nearly 52 million. The Communist Party of 
Ukraine, on the other hand, claimed 2.9 million members at its December 1990 
congress.3 The discrepancies did not end there. The main opposition force within the 
parliament came from the nationalist-democratic movement, and they were able to gamer
and the Prime Minister,” in State and Institution Building in Ukraine, ed. Taras Kuzio, Robert S. Kravchuk, 
and Paul D’Anieri (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999); and Paul D ’Anieri, Robert Kravchuk, and Taras 
Kuzio, Politics and Society in Ukraine (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1999).
3 Taras Kuzio, Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence, 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 156.
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almost one-third of the seats in the parliament during these elections. However, these 
parties were unstructured and loosely organized and lacked a substantial parliamentary 
majority, which made pushing through the national-democratic agenda difficult. What 
compounded this problem for the nationalist-democratic movement was that party 
cohesion was near impossible, whereas the Communists voted along party lines, earning 
them the title of the Group of 239, or the number of Communists in the parliament (See 
Table 7).
In the last days of the Soviet Union, Kravchuk became more concerned with 
increasing Ukraine’s autonomy within the Soviet Union and ensuring the power of the 
Communist Party of Ukraine. The most significant obstacle to this objective was the 
interference of Moscow leaders, but in the wake of the failed August pusch in Moscow, 
centralized power structures weakened. The Ukrainian Parliament declared Ukraine’s 
independence on 24 August 1991, with the notion of a federation controlled centrally 
from Moscow evaporating on 1 December, when Ukrainian voters indicated that 90 
percent were in favor of complete independence.4 The Communist Party of Ukraine was 
subsequently outlawed at the end of August.5
4 Roman Solchanyk, “Ukraine: From Sovereignty to Independence,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 
(RFE/RL) Research Report, no. 1 (1992): 37.
5 Although it was re-legalized in 1993, the new Communist party did not claim to be the successor to the 
former Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
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Table 7
Party Representation in the Ukrainian Parliament, 1990-1991
Political Party Number of Members
Left (239)
Communist Party of Ukraine 239
After August 1991
Socialist Party of Ukraine 38
Peasant Party o f Ukraine 44
Independents 157
Moderate Left (40)
Party o f Democratic Rebirth of Ukraine 36
Social Democratic Party of Ukraine 2
United Social Democratic Party 1
People’s Party of Ukraine 1
Nationalist Bloc (78)
Rukh 40
Ukrainian Republican Party 12
Democratic Party of Ukraine 23
Ukrainian Conservative Republican Party 1
Ukrainian Christian Democratic Party 1
Statehood and Independence for Ukraine 1
Uncommitted/Independents (87)
Total 444
Sources: Bogdan Szajkowski, Political Parties o f  Eastern Europe, Russia, and the Successor States (Essex: 
Longman Information & Reference, 1994); and Dominique Arel, “The Parliamentary Blocs in the 
Ukrainian Supreme Soviet: Who and What Do They Represent?” Journal o f Soviet Nationalities 1, no. 4 
(1990/91): 108-54.
Kravchuk was elected president of Ukraine in December 1991, with over 60 
percent of the vote. For Kravchuk, as we will see below, political support came from the 
more conservative forces within Ukrainian politics, namely the former Communist Party, 
although he also coopted the nationalists into his initial political coalition by insisting on 
Ukrainian independence and sovereignty. When the Communist Party of Ukraine was 
outlawed through the repeal of Article 6 of the 1978 Soviet Constitution, many former 
Communists quickly organized into the Socialist Party of Ukraine, under the leadership
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of Oleksandr Moroz, and remained firmly entrenched in their positions.6 These 
individuals still represented the vast majority of parliament based on pre-independence 
election held in 1990, and therefore remained the dominant political force in Ukraine.
The IT/ED framework suggests that FSU leaders in more democratic systems are more 
likely to bandwagon with the most influential actors in the country as opposed to 
balancing them. This was the precise motivation that drove Kravchuk’s political coalition 
of former Communists and other state apparatchiks.
Over the next few years, Kravchuk relied on the political support of the former 
nomenklatura, or former Soviet officials linked to the state apparatus, and thus any policy 
or reform efforts could not jeopardize the interests of these individuals. If reform 
threatened their interests, then they would be less likely to support Kravchuk, denying 
him much-needed political support. As we will see, the inability of Kravchuk to deal with 
Ukraine’s needs in a long-term fashion based on his narrow self-interests of staying in 
power, ultimately led to his political demise in 1994 as the country plummeted into 
economic crisis.
The major difference between Ukraine’s initial experience with independence and 
that of Eastern Europe is that the old regime was not swept out during the transition, but 
rather they were able to reorganize and remain entrenched in their position of political 
and economic power. Thus, as one commentator notes, the nomenklatura in Ukraine 
“managed to preserve real power and property quite easily after 1991 by means of a 
peculiar political deal—by recruiting to its ranks the most conformist leaders of the 
former counter-elite and by a timely change in its slogans for the sake of a new
6 Article 6 declared the Communist Party the sole means o f political representation.
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‘legitimacy.’”7 This also played out in tensions between the executive and legislatives 
branches.
Much of the difficulty of Ukraine’s political and economic transition came from 
the lack of coordinated policy making and questions over the right to make policy, 
whether this rested in the hands of the parliament, president or prime minister. Initially, 
Ukraine began with a hybrid premier-presidential regime, or a system, which has both a 
prime minister, who depends on the on-going confidence or absence of non-confidence of 
the parliament, and a popularly elected president.8 While the president typically has the 
right to appoint the prime minister, pending parliament’s approval, he or she does not 
have the ability to dismiss the prime minister without the support o f the parliament.
Kravchuk did not push the parliament about expanding presidential powers 
because his political supporters were firmly entrenched there and it would come at a great 
political loss if he took on the parliament. Instead, Kravchuk chose to accept the division 
of policy making in Ukraine, while making sure his political supporters would not be 
influenced adversely. As Charles Wise and Trevor L. Brown conclude, “While 
opportunities existed to expand the role and function of the presidency, Kravchuk 
preferred to work within the boundaries of the executive branch, shoring up his power in 
the bureaucracy through patronage and kickbacks. Rarely did Kravchuk enter into policy 
confrontations with the Parliament.”9
7 Paul D’Anieri, “The Impact of Domestic Divisions on Ukrainian Foreign Policy: Ukraine as a ‘Weak 
State,’” in State and Institution Building in Ukraine, ed. Taras Kuzio, Robert S. Kravchuk, and Paul 
D’Anieri (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 87.
8 M. S. Shugart, “Of Presidents and Parliaments,” East European Constitutional Review, no. 2 (1993): 30- 
32.
9 Charles R. Wise and Trevor L. Brown, “Laying the Foundation for Institutionalisation o f Democratic 
Parliaments in the Newly Independent States: The Case of Ukraine,” Journal o f  Legislative Studies 2, no. 3 
(1996): 231.
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While Kravchuk was nonconfrontational towards the parliament, his view of a 
subordinate prime minister was much clearer. As he suggested in 1992, “The president 
should be responsible for building the state, while the prime minister should manage the 
economy.”10 The obvious implication was that prime ministers were more expendable 
than the president since their objectives were more narrowly defined than the president’s. 
Moreover, the economic transition in Ukraine was a more daunting undertaking than that 
of building a nation. Initially, Kravchuk chose Vitold Fokin as his prime minister, a 
former head of the State Planning Committee and much like Kravchuk a member of the 
Communist Party of Ukraine’s administrative apparatus. Fokin’s policies were anything 
but spectacular, but they were designed to secure economic advantages for Kravchuk’s 
political supporters. Indeed, important governmental and industrial elites relied heavily 
on their ties to the former state planning apparatus to preserve state subsidies, lobby for 
favors, and maintain existing privileges.11 This was necessary for the political trade-off to 
ensure Kravchuk’s position. Shortsighted policies and rapid economic decline strained 
the government, and the democratic opposition in parliament, led by Viacheslav 
Chomovil, forced Fokin out in September 1992.
To replace Fokin, Kravchuk turned to Kuchma, another former Communist 
official. Kuchma’s appointment, however, drew from a different party constituency. He 
was from the industrial-managerial faction of the Communist Party as opposed to Fokin 
formerly o f the command administrative faction. During the Soviet era, Kuchma
10 Ilya Prizel, “Ukraine between Proto-Democracy and ‘Soft’ Authoritarianism,” in Democratic Changes 
and Authoritarian Reactions in Russia. Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova, ed. Karen Dawisha and Bruce 
Parrott (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 345.
11 Paul Kubicek, “Post-Soviet Ukraine: In Search of a Constituency for Reform,” Journal o f Communist 
Studies and Transition Politics 13, no. 3 (1997): 103-26; and Adrian Karatnycky, “Ukraine at the 
Crossroads,” Journal o f Democracy 6, no. 1 (1995): 117-30.
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managed the largest rocket manufacturing plant in the Soviet Union, so his ties were 
rooted deeper in the industrial sector. Kuchma also promised to renew ties with Russia. In 
his view there was a direct connection between economic decline and anti-Russian 
policies. By restoring economic ties with Moscow, Kuchma sought to address the 
growing economic crisis and more specifically Ukraine’s dependence on Russian energy 
supplies. On this latter issue, he was particularly critical of his predecessor. For instance, 
he argued that Fokin allowed substantial amounts of inexpensive Russian energy 
(approximately 10-20 percent or world prices in late 1992) to be re-exported at world 
prices, with corrupt individuals benefiting tremendously while the Ukrainian state 
accumulated a massive energy debt.12
While Kuchma pushed for a more reformist path and was critical of the slow pace 
of privatization, he was unwilling to engage in shock therapy, preferring a more gradual 
approach to reform. Initially, he promised to continue Fokin’s policies, calling for a 
process of “evolutionary change” and a search for a “Ukrainian model” of reform.10 In 
essence, he assured that the political/economic trade-off occurring between Kravchuk and 
the former Communist elite would remain unchanged. Parliament ensured this by keeping 
anti-reform actors in the Kuchma’s Cabinet o f Ministers, including two Fokin appointees, 
Hryhorii Piatachenko and Vadim Hetman, who kept their positions as the minister of 
finance and the chairman of the National Bank, respectively. Reform would have to wait 
until Kuchma returned to power as president in 1994, although even then reform efforts 
were not without problems.
Once in power (13 October 1992), Kuchma was given ten days to formulate an
12 Prizel, “Ukraine between Proto-Democracy,” 347.
13 “Dream On,” The Economist, 17 October 1992, 56.
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economic recovery program. One of the boldest steps taken was when Kuchma asked the 
parliament for a six-month emergency power “to rule the economy by decree,” which 
was subsequently passed. This enabled Kuchma to forward his economic program, which 
received broad support in Western financial circles. His initiative was impressive, and it 
forced Kravchuk to accept reform measures given the momentum of the new 
government. This also placed Kuchma in the spotlight, a factor that was not wasted on 
Kravchuk.
Tension between Kravchuk and Kuchma intensified in the spring of 1993 when 
Kuchma requested an extension to his six-month emergency powers. In an attempt to 
strengthen his grip on economic policy, Kravchuk issued a decree that would establish an 
“extraordinary committee” of the cabinet to deal with economic issues and assert the 
president’s control over the government. The political struggle was inflamed by a ten-day 
strike of coal-miners in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine, who demanded an increase 
in wages and a national referendum of confidence in the president and the parliament. 
Kuchma addressed the strikers by articulating an even more detailed plan of economic 
reform. Tensions remained high between Kuchma and Kravchuk as economic crisis set 
on, but parliament was unwilling to accept Kuchma’s resignation in hopes of balancing 
Kuchma off Kravchuk. Nonetheless, by September 1993, Kuchma’s resignation was 
accepted and a no confidence vote was passed on the entire cabinet.
Ultimately, throughout Kuchma’s tenure as prime minister, Kravchuk remained 
unaware of Ukraine’s vast economic problems, while he tended to attack Kuchma’s 
policy o f easing relations with Russia.14 As we will see later, this was a shift that 
eventually led to Kravchuk’s demise and Kuchma’s ascendancy. With Kuchma’s exit as
14 Prizel, “Ukraine between Proto-Democracy,” 347.
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prime minister, Kravchuk turned to the former mayor of Donetsk, Yukhym Zviahilskyi, 
to be his new prime minister, but little changed over the next few months except the 
continued decline of the Ukrainian economy.
Kuchma remained in the background of Ukrainian politics, until the presidential 
elections of 1994. In the first round of elections on 26 June, Kravchuk received 37.7 
percent o f the vote with Kuchma gaining 31.3 percent, and the Socialist leader, Moroz, 
obtaining 13.1 percent. However in the runoff election on 10 July, Kuchma picked up the 
majority of Moroz’s supporters and defeated Kravchuk, receiving 52.1 percent of the vote 
to Kravchuk’s 45.1 percent. Kravchuk lost the elections in large part because of the poor 
economic conditions, but the road ahead for Kuchma was not without obstacles.15
The first major difficulty Kuchma faced once in office was the lack of a basic 
constitution that clearly defined the separation of powers between the president and the 
parliament. When he was prime minister, Kuchma attempted to expand his power to 
implement reform, and when he became president he similarly sought to increase the 
power o f the presidency. As we saw above, increasing presidential power was not critical 
to Kravchuk because he held power in more informal ways through his contacts with 
conservatives in the parliament. Kuchma, however, sought to consolidate power in the 
executive branch.
Kuchma dramatically changed the role of the president in Ukrainian politics. His 
first tactic came in the form of presidential decrees, which were highly explicit. Much 
like Boris Yeltsin’s successes in Russia, this enabled the president to bypass the 
parliament’s legislative power, in effect turning the president into a law-making entity.
15 Regional differences also played an important role. Andrew Wilson, “Parties and Presidents in Ukraine 
and Crimea, 1994,” Journal o f Communist Studies and Transition Politics 11, no. 4 (1995): 362-371.
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His decrees have been far-reaching in the areas o f privatization, the vertical structure of 
governance, and the reorganization of the agricultural and energy sectors.
Kuchma remained concerned with the separation of governmental power. Under 
the existing constitution, the Cabinet of Ministers was accountable to the parliament. 
Thus, the government (under the guidance of the Cabinet) was responsible to both the 
president and parliament. This meant that the parliament had the constitutional power to 
remove an individual or an entire government through a no-confidence vote without the 
expressed consent of the president. The Speaker o f the parliament also was afforded 
tremendous powers to submit candidates for many leading political institutions, including 
the Constitutional Court, the National Bank Chairmanship, and the Prosecutor General of 
Ukraine. In short, policy decisions were shared by the president, prime minister, and 
speaker or the parliament, although consultation was not necessary for some actions to be 
taken. This complicated the issue of implementing economic reform because the left 
dominated the parliament, and they were unwilling to hand over power to the executive 
branch.
Despite this, by the end o f 1994, Kuchma expanded his presidential powers. For 
starters, Kuchma’s relative approval rating was much higher than that of the parliament’s, 
and this afforded him a fair degree of political leverage. In early December 1994 he 
presented the Law on State Power and Local Administration in Ukraine, or the so-called 
“Power” bill. This served as an interim constitution until the final draft passed. The 
original version o f the “Power” bill eliminated regional parliaments, providing the 
president with the authority to appoint regional administrators, and it concentrated power
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at the national level, by allowing the president to appoint a Cabinet and a prime minister 
without parliamentary approval.
The accord served as a preliminary constitution, but parliament was reluctant to 
act. In return, Kuchma utilized the bully pulpit. By the end of May 1995, he threatened to 
hold a national plebiscite on the “Power” bill on national television, only to have the 
parliament reject it on constitutional grounds. Shortly thereafter, he formalized his 
plebiscite order in a written decree, and the parliament reconsidered because of a lack of 
public support in the legislature. According to one poll conducted from 28 April 1995-10 
May 1995, Kuchma had on average a 37 percent approval rating and a 37 percent 
disapproval rating, compared to the parliament, which had on average a ten percent 
approval and a 64 percent disapproval rating.16 In the court of public opinion, Kuchma 
was much more secure, and therefore more willing to engage in political brinkmanship 
with the left-leaning parliament. Parliament yielded, and the “Power” bill was passed 
with a 240-81 vote before any nationwide referendum of confidence could be held on 
him, or more importantly the parliament.17 The president obtained the exclusive right to 
form the government, issue decrees, and overrule local councils that blocked reform. 
Institutional wrangling between the executive and legislature branched continued, but it 
did provide the basic framework of leadership, which not unlike most FSU states 
provided for a strong executive.
For one year, the accord restricted Parliament’s formal powers over approval of 
the budget, ratification of the government’s program, and drafting of ordinary legislation.
16 Wise and Brown, “Laying the Foundation,” 244.
17 Chrystyna Lapychak, “Showdown Yields Political Reform,” Transition 1, no. 13 (1995): 3-7; and Taras 
Kuzio, Ukraine under Kuchma: Political Reform, Economic Transformation and Security Policy in 
Independent Ukraine (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 99-109.
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The president, however, gained the exclusive right to form a government, issue decrees, 
appoint elected chairman of local and regional councils as heads o f their respective state 
administrations, and dismiss the heads of local administrations for violations of the law, 
Constitution, or presidential decrees. Kuchma’s appointment power was unprecedented. 
He could appoint the prime minister, cabinet, and the heads of power ministries, such as 
defense, foreign affairs, internal affairs, security service, and so on, without 
Parliamentary confirmation. The prime minister was now subordinate to the president. 
Parliament could express “no confidence” in the entire government or individual 
ministries, but they could not appoint successors, which remained within the newly
•  1Rdefined presidential powers.
Thus, over the course of the first five years of independence, Ukrainian leaders 
wrestled with other political institutions within Ukraine, namely the parliament.
Kravchuk was more passive in his confrontation with the parliament, since most of his 
political supporters were found in the left-leaning parliament. Yet, when Kuchma came 
into office, he sought to reorganize governmental power, and in the process, establish a 
strong Ukrainian presidency, which enabled him to maintain relative political security for 
the rest of the decade. With this historical background, the following section turns more 
specifically to the political parties that were coopted by Kravchuk and Kuchma over the 
years to give some explanation as to where their political base of support rested. In 
essence, answering the question who did Ukrainian leaders bandwagon with?
18 For more on parliamentary attitudes towards this separation of power see, Vladimir Pigenko, Charles R. 
Wise, and Trevor L. Brown, “Elite Attitudes and Democratic Stability: Analysing Legislators’ Attitudes 
towards the Separation of Powers in Ukraine,” Europe-Asia Studies 54, no. 1 (2002): 87-108.
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POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE PARTY OF POWER
The IT/ED framework suggests that FSU leaders in more democratic political 
systems tend to bandwagon with influential domestic actors to provide for their political 
survival. This contrasts with the more authoritarian systems, like Uzbekistan, in which 
leaders tend to balance or eliminate political opponents. In the case of Ukraine, Kravchuk 
and later Kuchma adopted this domestic bandwagoning strategy as they forged winning 
political coalitions to ensure their political positions. This section focuses more attention 
on which political parties or factions made up the pro-leadership coalition.
Throughout much of the former Soviet space, the previous political leadership 
was replaced with leaders more in tune and often more representative of the interests of 
the people or the country itself. This was not the case in Ukraine where the former 
Communist leadership was able to reinvent itself. As Mykola Riabchuk contends, what 
emerged in Ukraine shortly after independence was a “new nomenklatura” reminiscent of 
its predecessor under the Soviet system. The new “party o f power,” or partiia vlady, is a 
group of “pragmatically oriented and de-ideologized high ranking members from the old 
nomenklatura, including representatives of the state apparat, the mass media, and 
directors of traditional sectors of industry and agriculture.”19 These political actors wield 
tremendous influence over Ukrainian politics, but they rarely embrace reform and often 
seek to undermine it. Those in the party of power, or pro-leadership coalition, gain
19 One important distinction between the Soviet and post-Soviet eras is worth noting. That is, the new 
nomenklatura operates differently than the Soviet one. The Communist Party previously played a “leading 
and directing” role in policy making, however the new party of power works behind the scenes (and often 
behind closed doors), while playing a more “manipulative” role than in the past Riabchuk cited in Paul 
Kubicek, Unbroken Ties: The State, Interest Associations, and Corporatism in Post-Soviet Ukraine (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), 42. Some Ukrainian observers contend that it is more accurate 
to call the party of power the “party of chameleons” since individuals are free to change colors as they see 
fit; or others have drawn distinctions between the “economic nomenklatura” and the “administrative 
nomenklatura.” Kubicek, Unbroken Ties, 46-47.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
180
substantial political and economic advantages, and those that are not are on the fringes of 
policy making in Ukraine.
Kravchuk’s party of power was a timely political alliance of convenience. In 
effect, Kravchuk, a former Communist himself, adopted the strongest position of the 
nationalists, namely the insistence on Ukrainian independence, and forged a political 
alliance between these forces and his former Communist colleagues. His most telling 
success was that he “succeeded in co-opting both the Rukh program and its top leaders” 
into the new government through a series of high-level appointments.20 The nationalists, 
lacking the institutional support to translate their goal of national independence into a 
political reality, similarly welcomed this political alliance. Thus, Kravchuk and other 
former Communists became “national” Communists. As Alexander Motyl writes, 
Kravchuk transformed himself from “guardian of the Soviet state to guardian of the 
Ukrainian state, from supporter of all things Soviet to critic of all things Soviet, from 
enemy of Ukrainian nationalism to Ukrainian nationalist par excellence,”2’ Unlike other 
former Communist leaders in Eastern Europe, Kravchuk then was not swept away by the 
nationalist movement.
Kravchuk’s political supporters were primarily his former Communist cronies, 
and he made sure that he did not undermine the previous system. As Volodymyr 
Zviglyanich comments, “[UJnder pretext of moving towards liberal democracy, rule of 
law and.. .a market economy, a revamped collectivist elite entrenched itself in power,
20 Roman Solchanyk, “Ukraine: A Year of Transition,” RFE/RL Research Report, no. 1 (1993): 59.
Alexander Motyl, Dilemmas o f Independence: Ukraine After Totalitarianism (New York: Council of 
Foreign Relations Press, 1993), 150.
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with Mr. Kravchuk as its leader and symbol.”22 Radical institutional or political reform
would only threatened the interests of these entrenched elites, and inherently intensify the
level of internal threats to Kravchuk’s leadership. The end result is that conservative,
anti-reform elements tended to dominate the political arena. In many ways, former
Soviet officials merely reinvented themselves. They chose not to build and develop new
institutional relationships, but rather adjust former practices to the new environment. In
the end, ruling elites sought to maintain their positions at all cost and through informal
practices and political and economic trade-offs. As one report concluded in 1993:
Political conditions remain almost the way they were over two years ago 
(1991) when a minority, in the form of the Communist Party, had uncontrolled 
and undemocratic monopoly of political, economic, and social power over 
the people.. .Now government leaders seek to legitimize their rule by claiming 
to be “building an independent democratic state.” In fact, during the past 
two years Ukraine has not drawn even one step closer to “real” democracy.23
The nationalist dimension of Kravchuk’s political base dwindled in late 1992. At
the end of 1992, Rukh split, but without an economic power base the party was left at the
fringes of the policy making process, and became increasingly marginalized politically.
As Vyacheslav Chomovil, leader of Rukh, the leading national-democratic group,
suggested, “the party of power, headed by the President, is straining all its muscles to
prevent any reformers from achieving power.24 Rukh was no longer a part o f Kravchuk’s
political base, which also meant that their political voice would be diminished and
~  Volodymyr Zviglyanich, “Analysis: Stability and Reform Pose Challenges to New President,” The 
Ukrainian Weekly, 16 October 1994,2.
23 Kubicek, Unbroken Ties, 44.
24 V. Skachko, “Vlast’ govorit o vyborakh, oppozitsiia -  o reformakh” (The authorities are talking about 
elections, the opposition is talking about reforms), Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 4 January 1994,3.
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therefore less problematic for Kravchuk.25 To fall out o f the pro-leadership coalition only 
limited the political and economic power of groups in the future.
In the end, Kravchuk adopted a political alliance of convenience between his 
former Communist colleagues and the more nationalist groups in Western Ukraine that 
supported Ukrainian independence. Little reform was implemented under his 
administration (a consideration examined at greater length in Chapter VIII) primarily 
because economic reform threatened the entrenched interests of the new nomenklatura, 
and threatening these interests only threatened Kravchuk’s political supporters. This 
practice ultimately led to economic crisis in 1993-94, and with it Kravchuk’s political 
demise.
In the 1994 presidential elections, Kuchma defeated Kravchuk by drawing on 
support from the eastern and southern regions of the country, while Kravchuk was more 
successful in the extreme Western regions.26 Ultimately, the election came down to the 
issue of the economy, and as we saw in Chapter VI, Kuchma suggested warming up to 
both the West and Russia. His message resonated in the western and central parts of the 
country since he was suggesting the need for greater reform and interaction with the 
West, while talk of increasing cooperation with Russia reassured those in the other side 
of the country. Kuchma capitalized on issues that were embraced by both those on the left 
and right, and in turn he developed a base of support that settled more in the center of the 
Ukrainian political spectrum.
Beyond the presidential turnover, the parliament itself underwent significant
25 Prizel, “Ukraine between Proto-Democracy,” 345.
26 For more on the elections see, Taras Kuzio, “Kravchuk to Kuchma: The Ukrainian Presidential Elections 
of 1994,” Journal o f Communist Studies and Transition Politics 12, no. 2 (1996): 117-44.
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changes, especially since the 1994 election was the first since Ukraine became 
independent. Not surprisingly, incumbents faired poorly, which represented a form of 
house cleaning from the Soviet past. Over one-third of the deputies ran for re-election, 
yet only 66 were re-elected.27
A few peculiarities of the Ukrainian party system are worth noting before 
discussing these results. First, the nature of Ukrainian electoral laws made it more 
difficult to win a seat in parliament under a recognized political party as opposed to 
running as an independent. Candidates who ran under a political party had to gamer 
more signatures to participate, as well as support through district branch party 
conferences, which enabled entrenched party leaders to undermine democratic and 
nationalist groups. As Bilous and Wilson assert “it is not in the interests o f either the 
president, the leaders of the military-industrial complex, the heads of the collective farms, 
or those who work in the government executive to associate themselves with any 
party.”28 Second and related, because of the multiplicity of political actors within the 
parliament as well as the number of independents, deputies were encouraged to form and 
align into factions.29 The concept of factions is different in Ukrainian politics, than it is in 
the Western sense of the term. In the West, faction is used to describe a portion of a 
larger group, but in Ukraine it is used to define an assemblage of parties as a 
parliamentary group (i.e., bloc), including members from one or more parties and
27 Victor Chudowsky, “The Ukrainian Party System,” in State and Nation Building in East Central 
Europe: Contemporary Perspectives, ed. John S. Micgiel (New York: Institute on East Central Europe, 
Columbia University, 1996), 337. Adrian Karatnycky suggested that 56 deputies out of 188 that ran for re- 
election won. Karatnycky, “Ukraine at the Crossroads,” 124-25.
28 Andrew Wilson and Artur Bilous, “Political Parties in Ukraine,” Europe-Asia Studies 45, no. 4 (1993): 
693-703.
29 For instance, deputies who organize into factions were afforded office space, staff, technical support, 
and a seat on the powerful Presidium, while those that continue to work as independents did not. Wise and 
Brown, “Laying die Foundation,” 226-27.
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additional independent deputies. This was an attempt to streamline the rather fractured 
Ukrainian parliament and enhance the process of legislating.30
One surprise of the 1994 parliamentary elections was that the left, consisting of 
the Communists, Socialists, and Agrarians, showed up well, although there support was 
limited to the southern and eastern regions of the country. The Communist stronghold fell 
from 239 deputies in the March 1990 parliament to 90 deputies, with other members of 
the left wing adding some leverage to the bloc (See Table 8). As a bloc, the left tends to 
favor a state-run economy, restoration of the former Soviet Union, and Russian as a 
second official language. The Socialist and Peasant Parties share similar views, stressing 
the necessity o f subsidies to industry to the agricultural sector, although the Peasant Party 
does not take any position on the language issue.
30 For the March 1998 parliamentary elections, a different electoral law was implemented, which was 
aimed at increasing party cohesion and encouraging party coalitions. In this election, half o f the seats of the 
parliament were elected by proportional representation and individual seats were allotted by the percentage 
of votes each party received, while parties that received less than 4 percent were excluded. D’Anieri, et. al., 
Politics and Society in Ukraine, 156.
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Table 8
Faction Membership in Ukrainian Parliament, October 199431















Source: D’Anieri et. al., Politics and Society in Ukraine, 157.
The more liberal and nationalist parties hold the opposite view of those on the 
left. These parties, most notably Rukh, favor Western European parliamentary democracy 
for Ukraine. They tend to be pro-market, want to leave the CIS in favor of integration 
within European structures, are concerned with the revival of Ukrainian language and 
culture, and are against a federal system. Based on the pro-Western orientation it is not 
surprising that the base of support for these groups is found in Western Ukraine.
While there are clear distinctions between the left and more liberal political 
parties, the center is a particularly gray political area in which confusion and complexity
31 For other estimates of faction memberships between 1994 and 1998 see, Chudowsky, “The Ukrainian 
Party System,” 340-41; Wise and Brown, “Laying the Foundation,” 228; Kataryna Wolczuk, “The Politics 
of Constitution Making in Ukraine,” in Contemporary Ukraine: Dynamics o f Post-Soviet Transformation, 
ed. Taras Kuzio (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), 126, 128; Wilson, “Parties and Presidents in Ukraine 
and Crimea, 1994,” 362-71; Taras Kuzio, “The 1994 Parliamentary Elections in Ukraine,” Journal of 
Communist Studies and Transition Politics 11, no. 4 (1995): 335-61; and Marko Bojcun, “The Ukrainian 
Parliamentary Elections in March/April 1994,” Europe-Asia Studies 47, no. 2 (1995): 229-49.
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are par for the course.32 A variety of factions made up the center in the 1994-1998 
Parliament including, the Inter-Regional Deputies Group, Social-Market Choice, Unity, 
Independents, Center, and Constitutional Center. The center favors close economic ties 
with Russia, although it opposed greater political and military integration with Russia, 
and they favor economic reform as well. Language and cultural matters play less of a role 
in the orientations of these parties. Kuchma gained his greatest support from these 
centrist forces.
Under most circumstances, centrist forces would be considered a positive for 
democratic development; however, the center does not always work in positive ways. As 
Artur Bilous writes, the various centrist factions “can only be distinguished by their 
amorphousness and an absence of direction in terms of their political and economic 
orientation. For this reason, this agglomerate of forces can sooner be described as a gray 
void than as a political center in the European sense of the term.” Similarly, Rukh 
chairman, Chomovil, sees the political center in Ukraine as a “parliamentary sludge.” As 
he criticized, “Sometimes they side with the leftists and sometimes with the rightists. 
They represent what might be called a situational majority, which, unfortunately, does 
not want to be constructive, and which, in the event of any weakening, disappears.”3j As 
we will see, Kuchma turned to this burgeoning center for his political support. In many 
ways, the 1994 election of Kuchma brought to life a new party o f power as Kravchuk’s
32 In the 1994 elections, as stated above, there were a significant number of deputies that won seats in 
parliament (218) that did not run under a political party, but rather as independents, joining factions once in 
office. Non-party members of parliament were represented in every faction, but the centrist (Unity, 
Reforms, Inter-Regional, and Center) and Agrarians attracted most independents. The Agrarian faction 
absorbed 16 percent of them, Center gained 16 percent, Independents, 10 percent, Inter-Regional, 12.4 
percent, Reforms, 13 percent, and Unity, 14 percent. Few independents chose to the communist, socialist, 
or Rukh factions. Chudowsky, “The Ukrainian Party System,” 341.
33 Bilous and Chomovil are quoted in D’Anieri et. al., Politics and Society in Ukraine, 159.
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gave way. Yet, the implementation of reform was not guaranteed since it similarly 
threatened many of Kuchma’s political allies.34
Kuchma’s parliamentary support came largely from centrists and democratic 
reformers, and the primary policy divisions revolved around those that supported 
Kuchma’s economic reform program and those that opposed it.35 Kuchma first flirted 
with the InterRegional Bloc of Reforms (MRBR) and then threw in his lot with the 
People’s Democratic Party (NDPU) and the Agrarians (See Table 9). The power of the 
Agrarians was in the rural communities that tended to vote with the left, thus, Kuchma 
could enhance his position in the eastern and southern portions of the country 
traditionally dominated by conservative, Communist politicians. Simultaneously, he 
suggested the necessity of economic reform and capitalized on the interests of those in 
the center that sought a greater Western orientation.
34 For more on why pro-reform elements are lacking in Ukraine see, Kubicek, “Post-Soviet Ukraine.”
35 Wise and Brown, “Laying the Foundation,” 224.
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Table 9
Factions in the Post-March 1998 Ukrainian Parliament















Source: D’Anieri et. al., Politics and Society in Ukraine, 158.
As we will see in Chapter VIII, Kuchma ensured his political survival in the same 
way Kravchuk had. The main difference is who benefited from a given leader. Under 
Kravchuk, it was the former Communists and nomenklatura that was resistant to change 
and reform. Under Kuchma, it was groups that sought to capitalize on the economic 
opportunities provided by greater interaction with the West and privatization within the 
country. In this sense, both leaders required a solid base of political support to ensure 
their political positions, which required bandwagoning strategies. What was also common 
was to place a leader’s political allies and friends in political and economic positions to 
make sure the rank and file did not stray. For example, there was a mass migration of 
officials from Dnipropetrovsk, where Kuchma served as the director of Pivdenmash, the 
largest missile factory in the FSU, to Kiev upon Kuchma’s presidential victory. By one 
estimate, there were over 60 officials from Dnipropetrovsk in the executive branch by
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April 1995, with over 160 by the middle of 1996.36 This was yet another method for 
obtaining political survival in the FSU, and it falls in line with the traditional neo- 
patrimonial and nepotistic practices common throughout the FSU political systems.37 The 
following section looks more specifically at the internal political threats that Kuchma 
faced in the latter part of the decade, and the impact they had on a stronger pro-Russian 
alignment.
INTERNAL THREATS AND PRO-RUSSIAN ALIGNMENT PATTERNS
The IT/ED framework suggests that the more internal threats to leaders exist, the 
more likely a pro-Russian alignment will be adopted to secure the political position of the 
present leader. As we have seen, internal political threats to Ukrainian leaders (in the 
form of political violence and domestic political opposition) have been relatively low 
throughout the decade. They peaked for Kravchuk in the summer of 1994 and led to his 
defeat in the presidential elections. On the other hand, as the IT/ED framework would 
predict, Kuchma came to power promising to strengthen relations with Moscow. As we 
will see in Chapter VIII, the root of Kravchuk’s internal threats came from the economic 
crisis that set on by 1993 and domestic dissatisfaction with his pro-Westem, anti-Russian 
orientation.
The second experience with internal threats for Kuchma occurred in the fall of 
2000, in the wake of a political scandal surrounding the death of journalist Georgiy
36 Sherman W. Gamett, “Like Oil and Water: Ukraine’s External Westernization and Internal Stagnation,” 
in State and Institution Building in Ukraine, ed. Taras Kuzio, Robert S. Kravchuk, and Paul D ’Anieri (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 113.
37 For a good discussion of this point see, Hans Van Zon, “Neo-Patrimonialism as an Impediment to 
Economic Development: The Case of Ukraine,” Journal o f Communist Studies and Transition Politics 17. 
no. 3 (2001): 71-95.
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Gongadze. Audiotapes were released that allegedly contained the voices of Kuchma, 
Internal Affairs Minister Yuriy Kravchenko, and Presidential Administration Head 
Volodymyr Lytvyn. The tapes linked the president and two of his top aides to the 
disappearance o f Gongadze. Gongadze’s disappearance and the ensuring scandal led to 
some of the most outspoken acts of political protest in Ukraine to date. For instance, on 
19 December 2000 over 5,000 protesters marched to the parliament and demanded 
Kuchma’s resignation. Since the protests were so massive and included an array o f 
political parties, such as Communists, Socialists, the Christian Democratic Party, the 
extreme nationalist party (UNA-UNSO) and the more centrist party (SOBOR), Kuchma 
met with the leaders of the movement. During this meeting he agreed to conduct an 
independent analysis of the audiotapes and seek independent forensic testing on the 
corpse found outside Kiev in November, which turned out to be Gongadze’s.
Protests continued in Kiev. Yet as Kuchma intimated, forces within the state were 
attempting to turn the death of Gongadze into “a political weapon designed to destabilize 
Ukraine.’08 Accordingly, in two separate incidents, he authorized the removal of 
protesters who had established a “tent city” on Kiev’s main street and a local park.39 
During a state ceremony at the statue of Ukrainian national poet Taras Shevchenko in 
early March 2001, police confronted over 200 people when Kuchma arrived to lay 
ceremonial flowers.40 On 9 March in response to this incident between 5,000 and 10,000 
people protested outside of the presidential administration building in Kiev, the largest 
political demonstration since independence.
38 Financial Times, 27 February 2001.
39 “Ukrainian Police Dismantle Tent City, Arrest Anti-Kuchma Protesters,” RFE/RL Newsline, 1 March 
2001; and “Authorities Sweep Away Second Anti-Kuchma Tent City,” RFE/RL Newsline, 8 March 2001.
40 “Ukrainian Police Clash with Anti-Kuchma Protesters,” RFE/RL Newsline, 9 March 2001.
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Similarly, the sacking of Yulia Tymoshenko in January 2001 demonstrated the 
extent to which Kuchma favored entrenched interests, sparking further protest against the 
president. Tymoshenko’s dismissal was a response to her efforts to introduce transparent 
rules in the energy sector, which threatened the interests of Ukrainian oligarchs. 
Tymoshenko was later arrested and accused of smuggling gas and forging documents by 
Kuchma. Protests continued outside of the prison in which she was held demanding her 
release. However, Kuchma dismissed much of this political protest, suggesting that the 
majority of demonstrators were paid to protest, and therefore do not accurately reflect the 
interests o f the average Ukrainian. Tymoshenko was eventually released and formed a 
political movement called “Ukraine without Kuchma,” but she continues to be hassled by 
the Ukrainian government concerning her alleged improprieties when in Kuchma’s 
government.
Thus, as internal political threats to Kuchma rose and economic dependence 
remained high, Kuchma adopted an even stronger alignment with Russia, discussed in 
Chapter VI. In the words of Taras Stetskyv, a member from the Forum for National 
Salvation, the recent Putin-Kuchma agreements came about as a result of “the 
strengthening of the opposition to Kuchma.”41 That is, by cooperating with Russia, 
Kuchma strengthened his domestic position, particularly since Russian president 
Vladimir Putin described the Gongadze case as a matter of Ukrainian internal affairs. In 
this regard, Russia was the only country willing to diplomatically and politically support 
Kuchma in the face o f increased domestic opposition.
41 Ukrainian News Agency, 12-18 February 2001.
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CONCLUSIONS
This chapter examined the domestic political setting within Ukraine, and 
attempted to explain how Ukrainian leaders secured their political positions. As the 
IT/ED framework posits, FSU leaders tend to prioritize their political survival in 
alignment calculations. While leaders in more authoritarian systems are more likely to 
balance internal threats, leaders in more democratic systems are more likely to 
bandwagon or join with the strongest political and economic actors. This latter theoretical 
assumption was evident in the domestic political strategies of Kravchuk and Kuchma, 
although the political bases of support differed. Kravchuk relied on his former 
Communist connections to secure his position, which worked well until Ukraine spiraled 
into economic decline. Indeed, internal threats are likely to emerge under conditions of 
rapid economic decline; such was Kravchuk’s experience.
Kuchma pledged to strengthen relations with Russia and the West. This 
undermined his credibility with the left factions in the parliament, although he was able 
gamer the support o f the Agrarians in eastern and southern Ukraine. Kuchma built his 
party of power from centrist parties, which were willing to work with Russia on 
economic matters, while continuing to look to the West.
Ukrainian leaders did not eliminate domestic political opposition in an overt 
manner, but rather they worked around opposition through informal channels based on 
personal relations with various political groups. However, the political scandal that 
rocked Ukraine beginning in the fall o f2000, led to a dramatic and unprecedented rise of 
internal threats to Kuchma, with many groups such as “Ukraine without Kuchma” calling 
for the leader to step down. The IT/ED framework posits that the more internal threats to
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leaders occur, the more likely a strong pro-Russian alignment will be adopted. As we saw 
in Chapter VI, this has taken shape in recent years, but another driving force underlying 
Kuchma’s alignment calculations is that of economic dependence on Russia, a factor 
examined in the ensuing chapter.
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CHAPTER VIE 
UKRAINE AND ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE ON RUSSIA
This chapter examines the second independent variable of the IT/ED framework, 
economic dependence on Russia, and assesses its impact on Ukrainian alignment patterns 
towards Russia. The IT/ED framework suggests that the more economically dependent a 
country is on Russia, the more likely a pro-Russian alignment will be adopted. However, 
when leaders can mitigate or sever this dependence, then leaders are less constrained in 
their relations towards Russia, allowing for a more independent alignment strategy.
As we will see, Ukraine has been unable to sever its dependence on Russian trade 
and energy throughout the decade, which has severely limited Kiev’s foreign policy 
options. After independence, Kravchuk sought to break ties with Russia, but because his 
political supporters were conservative, including many former Communists, they did not 
favor economic reform, which hindered access to Western economic assistance. Upon his 
election in 1994, Kuchma adopted a more balanced approach that combined economic 
reform, designed to attract Western assistance, and a willingness to expand economic 
cooperation with Russia. Yet, by the end of the decade, Western support dwindled as 
reform stalled.
This chapter assesses the extent o f Ukrainian economic dependence on Russia 
based on the three indicators elaborated on in Chapter II: 1) the structure of trade, 2) 
access to energy supplies, and 3) access to alternative resources from Western countries 
and financial institutions. Ukraine’s structure of trade, namely its heavy reliance on
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Russian energy supplies, served as the most significant factor influencing (and limiting) a 
pro-independence and pro-Westem orientation.
The economic crisis that afflicted the country by 1994, brought on by Ukraine’s 
heavy reliance on subsidized Russian energy supplies, led to the removal (albeit 
peacefully) of Kravchuk. Kuchma was much more successful than Kravchuk at obtaining 
economic resources from Western sources, primarily because of his initial willingness to 
implement economic reform. The rest o f the decade did not prove as promising, and 
economic assistance fizzled when the implementation of reform slowed. This exacerbated 
Ukraine’s economic dependence on Russia, prompting a more pro-Russian alignment.
The lack of reform in Ukraine is a result of how Ukrainian leaders consolidated 
their positions. Ukrainian leaders distributed economic resources to their allies to obtain 
political support. This political trade-off tended to strengthen conservative forces within 
Ukraine, who permitted reform but only so far as it could benefit them personally. In the 
process, Ukrainian leaders facilitated the growth of a powerful anti-reform constituency, 
such as oligarchic and informal networks, which manipulated the uncertain economic 
conditions in Ukraine to their financial advantage, often at the expense of the Ukrainian 
state. Once in office Vladimir Putin sought to bring in the oligarchs in Russia, but the 
same cannot be said for Kuchma in Ukraine.
ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA AND THE CIS: THE EARLY YEARS 
As we saw in Chapter VI, Kravchuk was reluctant to cooperate with Russia on 
security matters. However, after the first year of independence, Ukrainian leaders began 
to understand the necessity of working with Russia, especially on economic issues.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
196
Leonid Kuchma’s appointment as prime minister in the fall of 1992 underscored the 
necessity of working with Russia. As Kuchma stated bluntly, “anti-Russian actions in 
politics [lead] to anti-Ukrainian economic consequences.”1 Ukraine could not sever all 
ties with Russia, as Kravchuk had hoped, but rather the country needed to adopt a 
moderate approach to cooperation with Russia and the CIS.
Accordingly, by late 1992 Ukrainian leaders spoke more about the possibility for 
greater cooperation within the CIS framework, although economic discussions proved 
more successful than political and military ones. This was evident at the January 1993 
summit. Kravchuk refused to sign the CIS charter, which had been on the table since May 
1992.2 He argued that the agreement was less about improving the situation for the CIS, 
and more about a ploy by “certain political forces” (Russia) to exploit the document for 
political reasons.3 However, Ukraine signed a number of documents related to economic 
cooperation at the Minsk summit. Most notably, Ukraine signed a declaration signed by 
all CIS states, which suggested that the main priority of the organization was economic 
improvement. Ukraine also signed an agreement, which would establish an “Interstate 
Economic Bank.” This body would help restore trade ties between CIS states. The bank 
was never established, but it did suggest that Ukrainian leaders were more willing to 
work with Russia to address pressing economic concerns. Furthermore, in April 1993 
Ukraine signed the agreement to form the CIS Coordination Consultative Committee, 
which was prefaced on the understanding that it would be limited to economic issues.
1 Solchanyk, “Ukraine, Russia, and the CIS,” 29.
2 O. Oliynuk, “Pru Yeduniy Diyi. Do Pidsumkiv Vizuty Delegaziyi Verxovnoyi Radu Rosiyi do Kuyeva” 
(Joint activities. Summarizing the results of the Supreme Soviet visit of Russia to Kiev), Uryadovuy 
Kuryer, 23 March 1993,1.
J Hale, “Statehood at Stake,” 321.
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Later in September, Ukraine took a half-hearted position towards the creation of the 
Economic Union, opting for the undefined status of “associate member.” Indeed, until 
early 1994 Ukrainian leaders consistently resisted attempts to create an institutional 
structure within the CIS, while supporting the idea of loose economic cooperation 
through the consultative organ of the CIS Inter-Parliamentary assembly.
Much as he had during his term as prime minister, Kuchma emphasized the merits 
and necessity o f strengthening economic ties with Russia. As Kuchma stated, “Ukraine 
no longer looks upon economic cooperation with Russia and the CIS as an unfortunate 
necessity but as an urgent requirement.”4 Accordingly, Kuchma moderated Ukraine’s 
stance towards economic cooperation with Russia and the CIS. In October 1994 Kuchma 
continued to foster economic relations within the CIS, by signing on to set up the 
Interstate Economic Committee (TEC). The IEC dealt with such transnational activities as 
energy systems, communications, gas and oil pipelines, agriculture, and transportation 
and helped coordinate economic and social policy, which represented the first 
supranational organ to be created in the CIS. Afraid of going too far in a pro-Russian 
direction, however, Ukrainian officials refused to join a proposed monetary union, citing 
the absence of a common payments system as the reason. Ukraine also signed customs 
legislation and joined the CIS Common Air Defense Structure in February 1995. To be 
fair, Ukraine’s involvement in the CIS is characterized more accurately as “fake 
participation.” This was clearly evident by mid-1998, when Ukraine had signed only 130 
out of the 910 CIS documents, with its parliament ratifying only 30 of these.5 But it was
4 Taras Kuzio, Ukraine: Back From the Brink (London: Institute for European Defense and Strategic 
Studies, 1995), 31.
5 Taras Kuzio, “Geopolitical Pluralism in the CIS: The Emergence o f GUUAM,” European Security 9, no. 
2 (2000): 84.
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in the economic realm that Ukraine most required Russian assistance, and despite his 
election time rhetoric, as we saw in Chapter VI, Kuchma was no more receptive to 
political, military, and security cooperation with Russia in the CIS than Kravchuk.
Indeed, Kuchma stated forcefully that he did not become president o f Ukraine “in order 
to become a vassal of Russia.”6 The rest o f this chapter turns to a more explicit discussion 
of the indicators o f economic dependence as outlined in Chapter II.
STRUCTURE OF TRADE WITH RUSSIA
The balance of trade between Ukraine and Russia is the first indicator that 
Ukraine remained economically dependent on Russia throughout the 1990s. With respect 
to exports, Ukraine was successful at finding alternative trading partners besides Russia. 
For example, between 1994-1996, Ukraine on average exported about 40 percent of its 
total exports to Russia (See Table 10). This figure improved during the period 1997- 
2000, where Russia received only 23 percent of Ukrainian exports. Much like 
Uzbekistan, Ukraine was able to increase its exports to OECD countries to offset the 
diminished trade to Russia. Trade levels were nominal between 1994-1996, averaging 
roughly 17 percent of total Ukrainian exports. They rose considerably in the last four 
years o f the decade to approximately 28 percent o f exports. The United States specifically 
played a minor role in importing Ukrainian exports, representing only 3.5 percent of total 
Ukrainian exports.
6 V. Skachko, “la ne budu nich’im vassalom” (I will not become anybody’s vassal), Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 
28 October 1994,3.
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Table 10
Ukrainian Foreign Export Trade, 1994-2000 (millions o f US dollars)
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Total















































Sources: International Monetary Fund, Direction o f Trade Statistics Yearbook (Washington, D.C.: 
International Monetary Fund, 2000), 466-67; and International Monetary Fund, Direction o f Trade 
Statistics Quarterly (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, June 2001), 258.'
While these figures suggest Ukraine has been successful at finding countries 
willing to accept its exports, the import picture is less optimistic. In 1994 Ukraine 
imported 54.1 percent o f its total imports from Russia (See Table 11). This percentage 
dropped to 37.8 percent in 1995, but for the next five years Ukraine imported on average 
46 percent o f its total imports from Russia. Thus, the extent of Ukraine’s economic 
dependence on trade with Russia is extensive, with Russia receiving approximately 30 
percent o f Ukrainian exports and responsible for just under half of its total imports.
7 Primary sources are largely consistent with these figures. CIS Interstate Statistical Committee, 
Sodruzhestvo Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv i strani mira. Statisticheskii Sbomik (Commonwealth of 
Independent States in the world. Statistical yearbook) (Moscow: CIS Interstate Statistical Committee, 
1999), 280,292; State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, Schorichnuk Ukrainu za 1998 rik (Ukraine 
yearbook for 1998) (Kiev: State Statistics Committee o f Ukraine, 1999), 289; State Statistics Committee of 
Ukraine, Statustuchnuy Schorichnuk Ukrainu za 1996 rik (Statistical yearbook o f Ukraine for 1996) (Kiev: 
State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, 1997), 327; and CIS Interstate Statistical Committee, Sodruzhestvo 
Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv v 1994 godu (Commonwealth of Independent States in 1994) (Moscow: CIS 
Interstate Statistical Committee, 1995), 65.
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Imports from OECD countries gradually increased over the decade from 12.8 percent of 
total imports in 1994, to 26.6 percent in 1997, and 30.3 percent in 2000.
Table 11
Ukrainian Foreign Import Trade, 1994-2000 (millions o f US dollars)
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Total















































Sources: International Monetary Fund, Direction o f Trade Statistics Yearbook, 466-67; and International 
Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Quarterly, 258.
The real vulnerability for Ukraine rests not only in the overall balance of trade, 
but also in the types of goods that are traded. Russia is the dominant trading partner of 
Ukraine, not unlike many FSU states, but Ukraine suffers from one o f the most strategic 
vulnerabilities, the lack of indigenous oil and gas supplies (discussed at greater length in 
the following section). For instance, in 1997 Russia supplied Ukraine with 100 percent of 
its oil, 81 percent of gas supplies, and 50 percent o f its raw materials.8 While Ukrainian 
exports are not as concentrated as imports, Russia still serves as the most important 
market for Ukrainian goods accounting for 63.7 percent of food exports, 51.4 percent of
8 D ’Anieri, et. al, Politics and Society in Ukraine, 174; and Gregory V. Krasnov and Josef C. Brada, 
“Implicit Subsidies in Russian-Ukrainian Energy Trade,” Europe-Asia Studies 49, no. 5 (1997): 825-43.
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machinery and equipment exports, 37.3 percent of vehicles, and 21.3 percent of 
chemicals.9
Ukraine steered clear of greater integration with Russia in the CIS, unless on a 
limited basis in the economic realm. Ukraine did not want any part of the Russia-Belarus 
Union, and they also opted against the CIS Customs Union, which includes Russia, 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan.
Throughout the 1990s, trade tensions also existed between Kiev and Moscow. For 
instance, in January 1996 Kuchma complained that Russia continued to levy a value- 
added tax (VAT) of 20 per cent, and an additional special tax of 3 per cent on its exports 
to Ukraine. As a result of this policy, raw materials imported from Russia were sold in 
Ukraine at a price 50 per cent above the domestic price in Russia. In retaliation, the 
Ukrainian government increased excise duties on vodka, cigarettes, and pipe tobacco 
imported from Russia. Due to high import taxes, Ukrainian exports to Russia in the first 
eight months of 1997 fell by more than 27 per cent compared to the same period of 1996.
To alleviate economic pressure what was needed was a more moderate pro- 
Russian approach. This led to an agreement signed by Russia and Ukraine in March 
1997, which allowed Russia to use two Soviet-era ballistic-missile radar stations located 
in Ukraine in exchange for spare parts for Ukraine’s military sector.10 Later in the year, 
Russia also announced that it would import an annual quota o f 600,000 tons of Ukrainian 
sugar. Within the quota framework, Ukrainian sugar was exempted from the 25 per cent 
duty on imported sugar introduced by Russia in March 1997. In a further attempt to 
improve trade relations between the two countries, Ukraine and Russia concluded the
9 Oleksandr Bilotserkivets, “Ukraine’s Foreign Trade: Structure and Developments,” Ukrainian Economic 
Monitor, no. 6-7 (1998): 23-28.
10 “Chronicle o f Events,” The Ukrainian Quarterly (Spring-Summer 1997), 173.
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Interstate Economic Treaty in March 1998. In accordance with the agreement, the two 
countries dropped the value-added tax (VAT) and other trade barriers between them. It 
was anticipated that this agreement would help expand trade between the two countries 
by some 10-15 percent.11
By the end of the decade, Ukrainian trade dependence served as a major 
constraint on Ukrainian foreign policy. Indeed, Ukraine’s trade deficit with Russia grew 
from an estimated SI.4 billion in late 1992 to over SI2.5 billion by the end o f 1998.12 
There was little that could be done because the root of the problem rested in Ukraine’s 
inability to find alternative energy suppliers other than Russia. This dilemma is examined 
below.
STRATEGIC GOODS
By 1993-94 Kravchuk and later Kuchma were forced to contend with a severe 
energy crisis. The problem came with Kravchuk’s decision to sever economic ties with 
Russia, which meant an end to subsidies, and the two countries would trade at world 
prices. This decision proved perilous, and the importance of energy subsidies became 
increasingly evident. Previously, Russia subsidized Ukraine by supplying around 50 
million tons of oil and a substantial amount of gas each year at a fraction of world prices. 
Since Ukraine could not meet its energy needs domestically, it imported 30 to 35 million 
tons of oil and 85 billion to 90 billion cubic meters of gas per year. These purchases 
required allocation of S9 billion to SI5 billion for this purpose annually.13 Considering 
that oil and gas prices within the FSU were roughly 35-45 per cent o f world prices,
11 D’Anieri, et. al., Politics and Society in Ukraine, 175.
“ Ibid., 176.
u Ustma Markus, “Debt and Desperation,” Transition, 14 April 1995,14.
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Russia’s removal of energy subsidies to Ukraine had a series of negative economic 
consequences for Ukraine, most notably the creation of sizable trade deficits to Russia.
By this time, Ukrainian leaders were aware of the inherent flaws of this strategy. 
Kravchuk suggested that miscalculations were made in the initial days of independence, 
which demonstrated Ukraine’s underlying dependence on Russia. In the spring of 1993 
he stated:
Working out the economic strategy, we obviously underestimated the 
capabilities of the Ukrainian economy, and did not consider that it 
structurally was built on the principle of incompleteness, was deprived of 
integrity, harmony, completion. We were not aware also of the great degree 
of dependence on the economies of the other states of the former Union. From 
this arose the energy and payments crisis, which today are the most dangerous 
factors. We also with tardiness realized the danger of dependence of the 
monetary system of Ukraine on the unified emissions bank in the borders 
of the CIS, and thereby on the new monetary policy of Russia.14
This dependence was in large part due to a lack of sufficient energy sources within
Ukraine itself. In his speech to the Supreme Council in 1993, Kuchma noted bluntly that
Ukraine must face the fact of “total dependence” on Russia, which was “a key factor in
Ukraine’s economic development.”15
If Ukraine relied on Russian energy imports and was therefore significantly
dependent on Russia, the IT/ED framework would predict that a leader would either try
to promote domestic production or conservation or that a leader would try to find
alternative trading partners willing to provide the necessary energy supplies. Unlike
Uzbekistan, which had proven energy reserves, Ukraine was not as fortunate. Whereas
Ukraine produced twice as much oil as Uzbekistan did in 1991 (4.9 million tons to 2.8),
by 1997 Uzbekistan completely reversed this figure, in that Uzbek oil production had
14 Quoted in Hale, “Statehood at Stake,” 320.
15 Oles M. Smolansky, “Ukraine’s Quest for Independence: The Fuel Factor,” Europe-Asia Studies 47, no. 
1 (1995): 80.
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increased to 7.9 million tons while Ukrainian production steadily declined to 4.1 million 
tons. Thus, with limited reserves at home, Ukraine was forced to look abroad to find 
energy, which inexplicably meant working with Russia (and to a lesser extent 
Turkmenistan).
Russia remained the primary source of energy for Ukraine after independence.
The underlying dilemma for Ukraine was that oil and gas together accounted for about 60 
percent of Ukraine’s overall energy needs, and what is even more striking is that Russia 
provided Ukraine with 40 percent of its overall energy needs.16 Coupled with the fact that 
Russia accounted for more than 54 percent of total Ukrainian imports and Ukraine had no 
alternative port or pipeline facilities to import oil from other sources, this placed Ukraine 
in a highly dependent position. Ukraine was thus forced to negotiate with Russia in the 
short-term given the magnitude of trade between the two countries, and what became 
apparent was that Russia was willing to continue to extend credits to Ukraine allowing a 
massive debt to accumulate. There was one factor, however, that favored Ukraine.
While Russia enhanced its power through pipelines and transit routes, Ukraine, at 
times, could exert counter-pressure on Russia, given its position between Europe and 
Russia and its extensive pipeline infrastructure. Indeed, Ukraine did try to exploit 
Russia’s dependence on Ukrainian pipelines, since 90 percent of Russia’s natural gas 
exports ran through its territory. This is not surprising, as Albert Hirschman points out, 
because countries that handle transit trade have the ability to gain tremendous influence 
through trade, provided the commodity traded is indispensable and it only superficially
16 Paul J. D’Anieri, Economic Interdependence in Ukrainian-Russian Relations (Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 1999), 73.
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affects the state profiting from this transit trade.17 Ukraine could always secure 50 
million to 80 million cubic meters of gas daily as a transit fee because a full shutoff was 
too costly for Gazprom. When Russia cut off gas to Ukraine in March 1994, Ukrainian 
leaders openly warned that a cutoff might result in the siphoning of pipelines.18 
Ukrainian leaders continued to negotiate with Russian policy makers over the issue of 
pipelines and more specifically the siphoning of gas throughout discussions over 
Ukraine’s energy debt to Russia.
Since Ukraine lacked domestic energy reserves, the only other option open to 
Ukrainian leaders was to find alternative sources o f energy, with Turkmenistan, Iran, and 
Uzbekistan being the most likely candidates although they were not always the most 
willing and receptive. Attempts were made, such as from Turkmenistan, but this could 
not bring any significant results because full payment for energy supplies could not 
always be assured.19 At times, such as in March 1992 and February 1994, Turkmenistan 
too halted gas deliveries to Ukraine because of outstanding debt. Possibilities of working 
with Iran and Uzbekistan also fizzled as the Ukrainian government moved slowly at 
building its own port and pipeline facilities at Odessa, without which Ukraine remained 
dependent on Russian pipelines.
The downfall of Kravchuk was his inability to handle the energy dependence on 
Russia, which led to an energy crisis by 1993 and the amassing of a sizable debt to 
Russia. This influenced Kravchuk’s policies towards Russia in a way predicted by the
17 Hirschman, National Power and the Structure o f Foreign Trade, 33-34.
18 “Russia Cutting Fuel to Neighbors,” New York Times, 4 March 1994, A6.
19 Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma emphasized this fact in 1993. “Ne Plutaymo Syogodnishni Zluudni z 
Nashum Realnum Potenzialom. Vustyp Premyer-Ministra Ukrainu L.D. Kuchma na Sasidanni Verxovnoyi 
Radu Ukrainu 31 Serpnya 1993 r.” (Do not mix present impoverishment with our real potential. The speech 
of the prime minister o f Ukraine L.D. Kuchina at the session of Verkhovna Rada on 31 August 1993), 
Uryaduvoy Kuryer, 2 September 1993, 5.
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IT/ED framework. That is, when a country is economically dependent on Russia, there is 
a greater likelihood that leaders will adopt more pro-Russian alignments.
Kravchuk first attempted to deal with Ukraine’s energy needs in a pragmatic 
fashion at the September 1993 Massandra summit. At the meeting Kravchuk reportedly 
agreed to surrender the fleet to Russia in return for the forgiveness of Ukraine’s energy 
debt to Russia. The deal proved too costly domestically for Kravchuk, as many 
Ukrainians looked to the issue o f Crimea as an important litmus test for Russian- 
Ukrainian relations and were therefore unwilling to give strategic assets away hastily. 
However, this demonstrated that while Kravchuk was unable to find alternative sources 
of energy, he did attempt to address the issue on some instances, and by his actions, 
demonstrated that economic dependence on energy was a primary factor shaping 
Ukrainian-Russian relations.
The emergence of GUUAM in 1996 also represents an attempt by Kuchma to 
confront Ukraine’s energy dependence on Russia through more multilateral initiatives 
that work around Russia. GUUAM was seen as an important element in deepening 
economic and energy cooperation among its members, with priority given to gaining 
access to Caspian oil and gas. However, such GUUAM cooperation is at best a long-term 
solution to the economic dependence Ukraine retains on Russian energy supplies.
In an attempt to foster even greater economic ties between GUUAM members (a 
consideration that would presumably increase Ukrainian access to non-Russian economic 
resources), Kuchma stressed the need to create a free trade zone within GUUAM at the 
June 2001 Yalta summit of GUUAM presidents. Yet, while this proposal was not 
accepted at the meeting due to minor “formalities,” GUUAM members did sign a formal
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charter that stressed the goals of socio-economic development of its members, resolution 
of regional security problems, and the fight against international crime and the narcotics 
trade.20 What became apparent was that Kuchma could not find a quick fix for Ukraine’s 
economic situation through immediate GUUAM cooperation. He was inevitably forced to 
continue his pro-Russian orientation. This is unlikely to change from the perspective of 
GUUAM either, given Uzbekistan’s decision to pull out of the regional organization in 
June 2002.
Little progress has been made in alleviating Ukraine’s energy dependence on 
Russia, which according to the IT/ED framework, leads to a more pro-Russian alignment. 
What has begun to occur is that Ukraine will make significant concessions in a variety of 
realms to Russia and Russian companies and businessmen to alleviate debt problems 
associated with energy imports. Indeed, this has been a mainstay o f economic relations 
between Moscow and Kiev, and unfortunately for the long-term prospects of Ukraine, 
Russian capital finds the Ukrainian economy very attractive but not always in ways that 
will benefit the overall development of the country.
In 1999, for example, Russian officials attempting to resolve the gas debt problem 
provided a Ukrainian delegation with a list o f Ukrainian enterprises that Russia, in 
exchange for writing off part of the energy debts, was interested in seeing privatized and 
in which it could later acquire shares.21 Thus, Ukraine’s indebtedness and need to 
maintain constructive ties with Russia potentially opens the Ukrainian economy to
20 With respect to formalities, Uzbek President Islam Karimov noted that Moldova and Georgia are 
members o f the World Trade Organization and have no right to sign such an accord without the approval of 
the WTO. “GUUAM Countries Sign Charter But Fail to Adopt Free Trade Accord,” Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) Newsline, 8 June 2001.
21 A list of enterprises Russia expressed its interest in can be found in “Zenu Otday Dyade, a Sam Idi k ... 
Tyete?” (Give your wife to your uncle and yourself to ... the aunt?) Zerkalo Nedeli, 11-17 December 1999, 
1.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
208
Russian companies seeking to become major stockholders. This setting creates favorable 
conditions for Russian oligarchic networks interested in Ukrainian enterprises and could 
have serious long-term consequences.22 Officials have also stated that Ukraine may 
provide up to one-third of its fiiel-pipeline network as a “concession” to Russia.23 
Similarly, Ukraine softened its approach towards Russia on some military matters. For 
example, in 1999 Ukraine gave Russia eight Blackjack TU-160 and three Bear TU-95 
strategic bombers along with 674 cruise missiles in exchange for writing off $285 million 
of Ukraine’s natural gas debts.24
Staving off such serious steps, Ukraine and Russia reached a breakthrough 
agreement on the debt issue in early November 2000. Ukraine agreed to stop siphoning 
Russian natural gas piped through its territory in exchange for a Russian agreement to 
defer collecting Ukraine’s gas debt for 10 years, while maintaining a low rate of interest. 
Moreover, Russia agreed to give Ukraine an eight-to-ten year break on debt payments for 
half of future gas supplies, if  Ukraine pays for the remaining half in cash and stops 
siphoning off gas.25
In the end, Ukraine remains heavily dependent on Russian energy, and little 
changed with this picture over the years, other than the daunting size of Ukraine’s debt to 
Russia. The subsequent section examines how effective Kravchuk and Kuchma were at 
obtaining economic resources from the West. As we will see, Kuchma was more 
successful, which at times enabled him to adopt a more independent foreign policy.
~  See, for example, Hirschman’s discussion o f the “commercial fifth column” that evolves through 
extensive trade. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure o f  Foreign Trade, 29.
23 Peter Byme, “Report: Kyiv May Toss Moscow a Pipeline,” Kyiv Post, 3 August 2000.
24 “Sales of Bombers Irk US,” Kyiv Post, 10 August 2000.
25 “Ukraine, Russia Reach ‘Breakthrough’ Deal on Gas Debts,” RFE/RL Newsline, 4 December 2000.
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ALTERNATIVE RESOURCES FROM THE WEST
The IT/ED framework suggests that FSU leaders can turn to Western countries 
and financial institutions for economic assistance, but aid is largely conditioned of 
promises to both enact and implement economic reform necessary for a successful market 
transition and reorientation towards Western trading partners. If the assistance is 
significant enough and it helps a country stabilize its economy and eventually grow, then 
leaders may be less constrained if  economic dependence on Russia decreases. There were 
ups and downs in the case of economic reform, Western assistance, and Ukraine during 
the 1990s, and unfortunately for those in the West and Ukraine, the partnership has 
stalled and remains largely unfulfilled. Much of this is a result o f Ukrainian leaders and 
their pursuit of political survival, which enables members of the pro-leadership coalition 
to benefit economically through their political connections.
Without economic reform, a leader’s access to Western resources is likely to be 
more limited; such was the case during the Kravchuk years. As we saw in Chapter VI, 
some of Kravchuk’s difficulties were the result of Washington’s insistence that Ukraine 
get rid of its nuclear weapons and its Russo-centric outlook towards the FSU. 
Nonetheless, Kravchuk’s was unable to gamer significant economic resources from the 
West because of a general apathy towards economic reform. In many ways, Kravchuk’s 
foreign policy priorities (independence from Russia and a pro-Westem orientation) took 
precedence over internal reform, for instance, in the case of foreign trade liberalization, 
which ran far ahead of domestic liberalization.26 This made sense, as we saw in the last 
chapter, because it shored up Kravchuk’s political support and ensured his position. The
26 Neil Malcolm, “Introduction: Economic and Society,” in Contemporary Ukraine: Dynamics o f Post- 
Soviet Transition, ed. Taras Kuzio (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe 1998), 161.
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practices that sealed this trade-off were also the primary reasons why Western economic 
assistance to Ukraine remained limited during the Kravchuk years.
Kravchuk’s political supporters preferred rentier capitalism and economic
instability because of their ability to convert political positions from the previous system
into financial and economic power in the new transition economy.27 As Oleh
Havrylyshyn notes:
The so called “new” rentier capitalists are an amorphous and ill-defined 
group including Directors of enterprises, kolhosps and radhosps, heads of 
trade groups and new private, “commercial” group entities formed as 
spin-offs from state enterprises... Illegal actions occur, of course, but they 
have been incidental or they have been built upon the main tendency of 
earning large “rents” from having a privileged position to obtain large credits 
and special licenses to trade or export.28
The privatization process in eastern Ukraine during 1992-1994 was indicative of 
how Kravchuk and the elites who supported him benefited during the economic 
transition. A large majority of privatization in the region was done by local political and 
economic elites, with 80 percent of these privatizations acquired through a lease-to-buy 
system (in contrast to full-scale privatization) and the majority of them obtained despite 
legal violations.29 As Paul Hare, Mohammed Ishaq, and Saul Estrin conclude: 
“Privatization is often about power and the distribution of property to those already close 
to power—the nomenklatura.”30 This distribution occurred in myriad ways under 
Kravchuk.
Anti-reform elements within Ukraine based their relationships on informal
27 R. Shpek, “Zuttia Stane Krashchum” (Life would become better), Uryadovuy Kuryer, 4 February 1995, 
1.
28 Quoted in Prizel, “Ukraine between Proto-Democracy,” 348.
29 Kuzio, Ukraine under Kuchma, 157.
30 Paul Hare, Mohammed Ishaq, Saul Estrin, “Ukraine: The Legacies of Central Planning and the 
Transition to a Market Economy,” in Contemporary Ukraine: Dynamics o f Post-Soviet Transition, ed. 
Taras Kuzio (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), 194.
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networks institutionalized under the Soviet system, and acquired many mechanisms to 
pursue private gains with official means. Indeed, Ukraine’s first two years of 
independence were marked by massive credits to heavy industry and the agricultural 
sector, with regulations on foreign trade allowing top government officials and other 
members of informal networks to enrich themselves.31
For instance, substantial administrative control over exports allowed bureaucrats 
to continue extracting rents through a complicated set of licenses and quotas designed to 
control trade and access to hard currency. Particularly attractive for personal enrichment 
were the energy supplies because prices of oil and gas charged by Russia for the former 
Soviet republics in 1991 were approximately 35-45 percent of the corresponding world 
levels. This allowed bureaucrats and their cronies to purchase gas and oil from Russia at 
subsidized prices and then re-sell it to the West at world prices.32 Naturally, the quotas 
and permissions for trading the energy supplies were provided to a limited number of 
actors who maintained personal ties with the political leadership and provided their 
political support in exchange for these economic benefits.
One of the most widespread devices was to spin off private “daughter 
companies,” owned by managers and their close allies. Such companies acquired the 
output o f the enterprise and sold it at market prices; meanwhile, the main enterprises 
accumulated debt, withheld taxes, and delayed wages. Particularly impressive in its 
“achievements” was the symbiosis of corrupted state bureaucrats and entrepreneurs 
operating on the energy market. In the absence of transparent rules regulating the energy
31 John Jaworsky, Ukraine: Stability and Instability, McNair Paper, no. 42 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for 
National Strategic Studies, 1995), 8.
',2 V. Ilchenko, “Teche Nafta v Ukrainu, ale y Vutikaye” (Oil flows to Ukraine, but flows out as well), 
Uryadovuy Kuryer, 9 December 1992, 1.
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market, the companies operating on this market were not only protected from potential 
competitors but also were granted a tax-free status. This resulted in billions hryvnas 
losses for the state budget. Similarly, a former head of the Parliament was in the 
management of a company that received an S80 million credit for purchase of agricultural 
equipment under government guarantees. The company ultimately went bankrupt and the 
money was never returned.33
Kravchuk also provided capital to inefficient state enterprises to keep them afloat. 
Instead of adjusting to market reforms, managers of these enterprises began to incur debt. 
The solution to the debt problem was usually socialist in spirit: managers of large 
inefficient state enterprises, relying on their informal contacts with state banks, received 
credits at the expense of new private and potentially more efficient enterprises. The 
informal links were also widely exploited in the horizontal inter-firm relations where 
suppliers extended credits to their customers with a purpose of protecting their markets, 
while customers made loans to suppliers to guarantee the flow o f necessary supplies. As a 
result, enterprises were engaged in complex cross-indebtedness relations where delay or 
postponement of past-due payments was a common practice.
As the Ukrainian economy plummeted, Kravchuk sought to renew the command 
economy in late 1993. State orders and contracts were issued for certain critical goods 
and consumer products. Kravchuk’s goal was to stabilize production. However in the 
process, he contributed to greater capital flight as the government supported inefficient 
firms. Much like Soviet times, enterprises that met state goals received fuel, raw
3-> Kateryna Fonkych, “Rent-Seeking and Interest Groups in Ukrainian Transition,’' Ukrainian Journal 
Economist (March 2000): 58.
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materials, and other privileges.34 Thus, in the end, economic reform was not a top priority 
for Kravchuk, which limited access to alternative Western resources because it would 
only jeopardize the economic interests of his political supporters. As we saw previously, 
his economic strategy placed Ukraine in a position of massive debt to Russia, and with 
the election of Kuchma in the summer of 1994 the situation appeared more optimistic.
The probability that economic reform would be implemented increased 
dramatically by 1994 with the onset o f economic crisis, which in turn increased the 
probability that Western assistance would be more accessible to Kuchma than it had been 
to Kravchuk. Kuchma was forced to reassess potential security consequences of 
preserving the economic status quo. In one instance, he suggested that only radical 
economic reform could assure Ukraine’s sovereignty.35
Compared to those of his predecessor, Kuchma’s efforts in economic reform were 
serious and warranted the attention of Western countries and financial institutions. His 
reform program was characterized by cuts in state subsidies, gradual progress on 
privatization, the deregulation o f many prices, reductions in government spending, the 
reduction of heavy tax burdens, and the establishment of markets for state securities 
including bonds.36 These measures fell in line with the conventional logic emanating 
from Washington and other international financial institutions and helped Kuchma attract
34 D’Anieri, et. al., Politics and Society in Ukraine, 194.
35 “Gluboki Ekonomichni Reformu—Shlyax do Vidrodzennya Ekonomiku, Zabezpechennya Suverenitetu 
Ukrainu. Vustyp Presudenta Ukrainu Leonida Kuchmu na naradi u Lvovi 13 lyutogo z.r.” (Radical 
economic reform—the way o f restoring the economy, securing sovereignty of Ukraine. The speech o f the 
president of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma at the meeting in Lviv on 13 February), Uryadovuy Kuryer, 16 
February 1995, 3-4.
36 Hare, et. al, “Ukraine,” 188-91; and D’Anieri, et. al., Politics and Society in Ukraine, 195.
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much needed Western resources, despite the fact that reform fell short of what we would 
identify as radical reform in the spirit of shock therapy.37
By the fall of 1994 Western financial institutions began to extend Kuchma much 
needed economic assistance. A marked turn in the Western attitude toward Ukraine was 
evident at the October 1994 G-7 meeting in Winnipeg, where Ukraine was promised S4 
billion in aid. This contrasted sharply with the April 1993 Vancouver summit, where 
Russia was offered SI.6 billion in U.S. aid and Ukraine nothing. The International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a S371 million stabilization loan on 26 October and the 
World Bank approved a S500 million credit on 22 December to support ambitious plans 
for economic reform, including price liberalization, quicker privatization, and banking 
reform announced on 11 October. The World Bank also supported a comprehensive 
privatization program, including the creation of investment funds, the launch of mass 
privatization and acceleration of small-scale privatization with a rehabilitation loan in 
1994. The approval of the 1995 Ukrainian budget, by both the Ukrainian parliament and 
the IMF, also paved the way for the IMF to release almost $2 billion in aid, which 
consisted of a one-year Stabilization Fund ($1.5 billion), to be given in conditional 
tranches, and the second portion of the Systematic Transformation Facility (S392 million, 
the first half of which was released in October 1994).38
However, by the following spring, the initial economic measures that Kuchma 
announced as a part of his fall 1994 reform program (measures that largely followed the
37 Alexander Motyl reasons that Ukraine was not in a position to enact shock therapy: “The structural 
legacy o f the USSR’s collapse, in particular, the kinds o f elite Ukraine inherited and its resource 
endowment, has kept Ukraine on die path of evolutionary change.” Alexander J. Motyl, “Structural 
Constraints and Starting Points: The Logic of Systemic Change in Ukraine and Russia,” Comparative 
Politics 29, no. 4 (1997): 435.
For an excellent overview o f these events see, Kuzio, Ukraine under Kuchma, chap. 5.
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prescriptions of Western financial institutions) were openly criticized by Ukrainian 
leaders. Instead of adhering to the blind monetarist policy prescribed by Western 
institutions, Kuchma increasingly saw the need for a more state-regulated transition. 
Addressing the parliament in early April 1995, he stated that economic reform should be 
state-regulated, more gradual, and should provide a greater social safety net.39 A few 
months later, Kuchma disregarded IMF conditions, when he outlined a fundamental 
policy correction that dropped the IMF target of 1 or 2 per cent monthly inflation to 4 or 
5 per cent by the end of the year.40 While Kuchma continued to speak about ensuring that 
economic reform was irreversible, his more gradualist approach was accepted 
overwhelmingly by parliament in October 1995. This solidified the pace of economic 
reform in Ukraine. Indeed, ever since this “correction,” economic reform in Ukraine has 
failed to get back on track, although several major reforms were implemented after 1995, 
such as the establishment of a new currency in September 1996 and large-scale 
privatization completed between 1996-98.
Privatization was slow going in Ukraine, since as we saw in the previous section, 
both Kravchuk and Kuchma engaged in trade-offs between the distribution of economic 
resources for the political support of important elites in the country. The overall pace of 
privatization remained low during the Kravchuk years. As a World Bank study found, the 
total number of privatized objects was approximately 11,852 during 1992-94, while in 
1995 (after Kuchma’s efforts at reform) 16,227 enterprises were privatized, with 19,487
“Zvemennya Prezudenta Ukrainu Leonida Kuchmu do Verxovnoyi Radu Ukrainu 4 kvitnya 1995 roku" 
(The address of the president of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on 4 April 
1995), Holos Ukrainu, 6 April 1995, 3.
40 “Vid Polituchnoyi do Ekonomichnoyi Stabilizaziyi: Vustyp Prezudenta Ukrainu Leonida Kuchmu v 
Uzgorodi na Urochustomu Zasidanni z Nagodu 50-yi Richnuzi Vozzyednannya Zakarpattya z Ukrainoyi” 
(From political to economic stabilization: The speech o f the president o f Ukraine Leonid Kuchma in 
Uzhorod during the anniversary meeting dedicated to the 50 anniversary of the reunification o f Zakrpattia 
with Ukraine), Uryadovuy Kuryer, 1 July 1995,2-4.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
216
privatized in 1996.41 These were not favorable figures if  Kravchuk hoped to obtain 
greater Western economic resources.
Kuchma was more effective in some aspects of the privatization process, but less 
so in others. The real successes came in small-scale privatization, such as of shops, 
restaurants, small service establishments, in which existing managers and employee 
groups sought to purchase small enterprises. For instance, by 1997 over 90 percent o f the 
estimated 45,000 small enterprises in Ukraine were privatized. The same cannot be said 
for medium- and large-scale enterprises, since by mid 1997 only 9,649 of the over 18,000 
medium and large firms had entered the preprivatization stage, and only 5,087 had 
transferred more than 70 percent o f their shares to private hands.42
As we saw in the previous chapter, the parliament also had a hand in slowing the 
privatization process down. The left-leaning parliament sought to block further 
privatization in the wake of Kuchma’s election by voting to suspend the process, enacting 
a moratorium on the sale of medium and large firms. Parliament also refused to lift the 
moratorium unless “strategically important” firms were earmarked and exempt from 
privatization, of which many were in the energy, transportation, and communications 
sectors. While the moratorium lasted four months until the cabinet excluded the best 
industries o f the economy, immense debate ensued as to which types of firms should be 
included on the list, just as the sheer numbers of firms fluctuated over time.43
In the fall of 1996, the IMF actively worked with the Ukrainian government and
41 World Bank, Ukraine: Restoring Growth with Equity, A Participatory Country Economic Memorandum 
(Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1999), 205.
42 D’Anieri, et. al., Politics and Society in Ukraine, 185.
43 For instance, in February 1995 the cabinet expanded the list to 5,600 entities; in March 1995, the list was 
increased to 6,102; by November 1996 the number increased again to 7,111; only to decline again in early 
1997 to 5,125. Ibid., 186, n. 59.
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the National Bank of Ukraine on its new reform package. These reforms became the 
basis o f the Extended Fund Facility (EFF), a three-year loan program targeted at both 
macroeconomic and structural reform. However, it became increasingly apparent by the 
summer of 1997 that neither the Ukrainian government nor the parliament were interested 
in the implementation of such reform. Aware of this, the IMF concluded a minor one- 
year stand-by agreement with limited conditions and few dollars attached (slightly under 
$400 million). As some observers have noted, by the summer of 1997, Ukrainian 
authorities became strangely seized by a sense that financial constraints were easing, at a 
time when Western institutions were suggesting continued conditionality.44
The death of the EFF agreement by the summer of 1997 and Ukraine’s inability to 
meet IMF conditions also blocked World Bank funding, which in 1996 totaled over SI 
billion. The majority of World Bank assistance went to projects in the sectors of 
electricity power and energy development, agriculture, mining (related to coal 
adjustment), and the private sector. In line with the approach of the IMF, the World Bank 
released no monies to Ukraine during 1997, and it was not until well into 1998 that other 
assistance was extended.
The deadlock over economic reform continued, and little Western assistance was 
extended during the first half of 1998. Yet, on 18 June Kuchma ended the stalemate and 
declared that given parliament’s paralysis over the question of reform, he would adopt 
several presidential decrees, among them reduction of the tax burden, elimination of
44 Anders Aslund and Georges de Menil, “The Dilemmas of Ukrainian Economic Reform,” in Economic 
Reform in Ukraine: The Unfinished Agenda, ed. Anders Aslund and Georges de Menil (Armonk, NY: M. 
E. Sharpe, 2000), 12.
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arrears in the budget sector, and measures aimed at encouraging business activity.45 Many 
of these decrees had been part of the initial economic reform package outlined in 1996. 
Thus, in the span of one month Kuchma was able to accomplish many of the reforms 
sought after for the past several years. The IMF deemed the reform efforts as sufficient 
for the conclusion of an EFF agreement during the summer of 1998, one that would 
replace the aborted agreement of spring 1997. The agreement was eventually completed 
in September 1998 and provided just under S2 billion in assistance. However, the 
trajectory of reform continued to decline and with it so has access to Western resources.
The IT/ED framework suggests that access to Western economic resources 
enables leaders to adopt more independent alignments. Such a foreign policy is largely 
conditioned by a leader’s willingness to implement economic reform. In this regard, 
Kuchma’s implementation of economic reform upon his election in 1994 brought about 
much needed aid. However, his inability to continue the reform process led Western 
institutions to slow their assistance programs.
Several factors led to a suspension of IMF funds. First, many conditions placed on 
IMF funding never came to fruition, including stalled discussions over the gas sector, 
restructuring the bank sector, the privatization process, and the writing off of debts and 
unpaid taxes by the Ukrainian government.46 The lack of reform led the IMF to suspend 
the disbursement of funds to Ukraine in September 1999. Although lending was resumed
45 “Zvemennya Prezudenta Ukrainu L.D. Kuchmy do Ukrainskogo Narodu vid 18 chervnya 1998 roku” 
(The address of the president o f Ukraine L. D. Kuchma to the Ukrainian people on 18 June 1998), 
Uryadovuy Kuiyer, 20 July 1998,1-3.
46 “IMF Unlikely to Give Money to Ukraine in March,” RFE/RL Newsline, 8 February 2001. See also 
Aslund and Menil, Economic Reform in Ukraine.
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after a 14-month break in December 2000, the IMF chose not to extend a scheduled 
March 2001 tranche.47
Another factor leading to the suspension of IMF aid is that IMF officials became 
aware that between 1996 and 1998 Ukraine’s Central Bank conducted almost Si billion 
worth o f transactions that moved several hundreds of million of dollars through Credit 
Suisse First Boston, a Swiss-owned investment bank. These transactions gave a false 
impression of healthy currency reserves, and Ukraine received funding that otherwise 
would have been withheld. Ukraine’s interaction with the IMF has changed substantially 
from the mid-1990s, in that assistance has been less forthcoming (See Table 12).
Table 12
IMF Summary of Disbursements and Repayments to Ukraine (in SDRs)











Source: “Ukraine: Financial Position in the Fund,” (■www.imf.org/extemal/countryAJKR/index.htin, 31 
May 2001).
In reality, the relationship between IMF/World Bank assistance and economic 
reform is not so clear-cut. Indeed, as critics point out, repeated failures of FSU states 
(with much of the attention focusing on Russia) to meet the conditions of Western
4' “IMF Withholds Loan Tranche to Kyiv,” RFE/RL Newsline, 19 February 2001.
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institutions were only met with temporary delays in funding, during which time monetary 
commitments were scaled back or delayed (but rarely cancelled) to allow these states 
time to substantiate claims that they had met particular conditions.48 As one former top 
Russian official in several Yeltsin administrations stated cynically: “The IMF was 
pretending that it was seeing a lot of reforms [while] Russia was pretending to conduct 
reform.”49
With respect to Ukraine in a geopolitical sense, the U.S., through its leadership 
position in the IMF and World Bank, supported Kuchma, provided that he steered clear 
of Russia, regardless of the seriousness of Ukrainian reform. U.S. willingness to tolerate 
corruption and a lack of reform is considerably lower than Russia’s. This gives Russia a 
geopolitical advantage, but the difference is one of degree, not of category.50 
Nonetheless, the IMF still strongly links reform to continued aid, as it demonstrated 
recently by not releasing expected tranches in 2001. Thus, faced with IMF delays, 
Kuchma began to question the usefulness of the IMF, suggesting that the need for 
assistance has passed and that Ukraine could live without it.51 When leaders fail to 
implement economic reform, their access to Western resources diminishes and as a result 
their foreign policy is more likely to shift in a pro-Russian direction. This shift has 
become increasingly apparent in Kuchma’s foreign policy towards Russia.
There are other indicators that substantiate an increasingly pro-Russian 
orientation. In September 2000, for instance, pro-Western Foreign Minister, Borys
48 For good recent studies see, Cohen, Failed Crusade-, Wedel, Collision and Collusion-, and Peter 
Reddaway and Dmitri Glinski, The Tragedy o f  Russia’s Reforms: Market Bolshevism Against Democracy 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2001).
49 Boris Fyodorov is quoted in Cohen, Failed Crusade, 59.
50 I am indebted to Paul D’Anieri for suggesting this point.
51 “Kuchma Wants Ukraine to Learn to Live Without IMF,” RFE/RL Newsline, 6 April 2001.
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Tarasyuk, who Moscow disliked, was removed and replaced by Moscow-oriented 
diplomat, Anatoly Zlenko. As one observer noted, Tarasyuk dismissal was a “major 
concession to Russia and a slap to the West.”52 In a similar manner, the sacking of 
Energy Minister Yulia Tymoshenko in January 2001 demonstrated the extent to which 
Kuchma favored anti-reform interests in Ukraine. Her dismissal was a response to efforts 
to introduce transparent rules in the energy sector, which threatened oligarchic interests. 
As Oleksandr Turchynov, Batkivschyna Party faction leader, concludes, Tymoshenko’s 
dismissal was a result of oligarchic activities rooted in one of the most corrupt sectors of 
the economy.53 Moreover, Tymoshenko went on to become one of the leaders of the 
Forum for National Rescue, an opposition movement aimed at removing Kuchma from 
office after allegations of his involvement in the death of journalist Georgy Gongadze. In 
May 2001 the replacement of the pro-reformist premier Viktor Yushchenko with 
Anatoliy Kinakh led many in the West to question the sincerity of Ukrainian leaders’ 
commitment to continued reform, not to mention their overall orientation towards 
Europe. These developments were complemented by Vladimir Putin’s appointment of 
former Russian Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin as Russian Ambassador to Ukraine. This 
appointment is seen by critics as a further attempt to promote Russian interests in Ukraine 
(presumably to the detriment of Ukrainian interests).54
52 Quoted in Oleksandr Pavliuk, “An Unfulfilling Partnership: Ukraine and the West, 1991-2001,” 
European Security 11, no. 1 (2002): 88.
53 “Prazdnik na Ulize Oligarxov” (Celebration on the street of oligarchs), Zerkalo Nedeli, 20-26 January 
2001,3.
54 “Moscow to Step Up Economic Pressure on Kyiv Following Chernomyrdin’s Appointment?” RFE/RL 
Newsline, 11 May 2001.
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CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has assessed Ukrainian economic dependence on Russia based on the 
indicators presented in Chapter II. The findings of this chapter reveal that Ukraine has 
remained heavily dependent on Russia in its trade relations, especially in the import of 
Russian energy supplies. The dependence on energy contributed to billions of dollars of 
debt owed to Russia, which fundamentally constrained the alignment choices of 
Ukrainian leaders.
Perhaps the underlying issue with Ukrainian dependence on Russia is that 
Ukrainian leaders failed to address the dependence in any long-term fashion, and instead 
did what was necessary to secure their political positions in the short-term, which 
inherently meant distributing economic resources and benefits to political allies. This 
tendency, as we saw in Chapter VII, undermined Ukraine’s fledgling democracy, and its 
ability to reorient its economy towards the West.
Ultimately, Ukraine faced a common problem when leaders have difficulties 
mobilizing support, both popular and among the most powerful elites, for economic 
reform. Without a pro-reform constituency in Ukraine, it makes the deeper penetration 
and implementation of reform less effective because strong domestic actors have a vested 
interest in maintaining the status quo system in which they have mastered the rules of the 
game. The unofficial or shadow economy of Ukraine has also been difficult to curb, 
contributing to the loss of sizable sums of taxable income.
The dominance of anti-reform actors also undermined the development of 
transparent institutions, since transparency only threatened informal networks. Oligarchs 
and other anti-reform actors shaped the pattern and character of reform in Ukraine and
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made sure that reforms got stuck at the first stage and did not proceed too far in terms of 
deregulation.55 Privatization enhanced the power of anti-reform actors tremendously, 
where bureaucrats and oligarchs became the new owners. They then benefited from 
favorable interpretations of the privatization process and stripped the best assets of the 
former Soviet economy for their own narrow interests. New owners continued to exploit 
their good connections with their old buddies in the bureaucracy to get subsidized credits, 
tax breaks and other privileges.
In short, even though Kuchma came to power in 1994 promising reform, the 
reality of the political game was that Kuchma’s supporters, similar to those of Kravchuk, 
were interested in controlling the economic status quo or making sure that any reform 
measures would serve their interests. In this regard, widespread corruption, a lack of rule 
of law, inadequate protection of property rights, a lack of transparency and predictability 
in state’s policy decisions, and all other arrangements that can be qualified as informal 
institutions reflected the dominance of anti-reform actors on the Ukrainian political 
scene. Informal practices meant that oversight and accountability would be much more 
elusive and allow strategically positioned individuals the opportunity to amass 
tremendous wealth. By the end of the decade the lack of economic reform coupled with 
the political crisis in the fall o f2000 meant that the West was no longer a receptive 
audience, and were less willing and less trustworthy of Kuchma’s talk of reform and 
change. This led Ukraine back to the East and continued cooperation (and dependence) 
on Russia.
55 Anders Aslund, “Why Has Ukraine Failed to Achieve Economic Growth?” in Economic Reform in 
Ukraine: The Unfinished Agenda, ed. Anders Aslund and Georges de Menil (Aimonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 
2000), 268.




This chapter summarizes the findings from the empirical discussions of this 
dissertation. It also returns to some of the theoretical and policy-oriented concerns raised 
in Chapter I.
More specifically, it connects the IT/ED framework with what has and is going on 
within the FSU today, and illustrates the relevance of the framework’s logic for larger 
issues, such as the ongoing war on terrorism, efforts at nation-building, and the politics of 
economic reform. The chapter ends by discussing the applicability of the IT/ED 
framework in the larger global context.
SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
This dissertation developed an original and unique way of thinking about 
alignment patterns between Russia and its former Soviet republics in general terms, 
arguing that the most fruitful way for doing so involved closer examination of two critical 
variables—internal political threats to leaders and economic dependence on Russia.
In particular, the findings are robust against the IT/ED framework. They suggest 
that when internal political threats to leaders were high and the extent of economic 
dependence on Russia was severe, leaders are more likely to adopt strong pro-Russian 
alignments (HI). Reciprocally, when internal threats to leaders were low or absent and 
the level of economic dependence was low, leaders are more likely to adopt more pro­
independence (and often anti-Russian) alignment patterns (H4). When the values o f the
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independent variables were mixed, leaders are more likely to adopt moderate pro-Russian 
alignments (H2 and H3).
This is interesting because it reveals an aspect of the international and domestic 
politics of FSU states previously neglected by international relations scholars as well as 
comparative politics researchers. Indeed, a central objective of the IT/ED framework was 
to develop a theoretical understanding that bridged this rather artificial intellectual divide 
between these disciplines, and create an explanation that would be appreciated by both 
sets of scholars.
The first independent variable (internal threats to leaders) underscores the 
centrality of FSU leaders to the policy making process. When FSU leaders wanted 
something, they were more times than not able to accomplish this through their ability to 
leverage and manipulate the political process. There were few institutional constraints on 
FSU leaders such as strong legislative and judicial branches capable of curbing their 
power. The public by and large played only a minor role in the policy making process, 
which was dominated by former Soviet bureaucrats, state officials, and newly emerging 
oligarchs.
However, not all FSU leaders were able to eliminate political threats to their 
positions alone or through the repression of domestic opponents. This is most evident 
when leaders faced political violence. This violence emanated from a variety of sources, 
most prominently secessionist movements, civil conflict, and religious extremism. 
Leaders at times even faced assassination attempts on their lives. The presence of these 
violent political threats often meant, especially in the initial days of independence, that 
Russia was the only state willing or able to help prop up status quo leaders, many of
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which were products of the Communist systems themselves. Moreover, in some 
instances, Russia was actually the instigator o f and supplier for secessionist movements 
that were designed to destabilize regimes and ultimately lead to more active requests for 
Russian involvement.
The second independent variable (economic dependence on Russia) addresses the 
asymmetrical economic positions that FSU countries found themselves in after the Soviet 
Union’s collapse. FSU states were tied to the Soviet command economy to such an extent 
that few were capable of sincerely pursuing an independent path without the assistance of 
Russia. This was especially true for those states that lacked energy supplies, which were 
by in large subsidized by Russia both before the Soviet collapse and after for those 
willing to cooperate more readily with Russia. (The most notable exceptions were the 
Baltic states, who despite their continued need for Russian energy supplies were able to 
reorient their economic towards the West through the implementation of political and 
economic reform.)
The empirical findings of this dissertation were robust against the IT/ED 
framework in the cases o f Uzbekistan and Ukraine examined in Chapters III through 
XIII. In particular, when internal threats to leaders rose, the strongest alignment patterns 
towards Russia were observed. However, both variables are necessary to explain 
alignment outcomes and variations in the strength of a given alignment (i.e., strong pro- 
Russian, moderate pro-Russian, and strong pro-independence alignments).
This was true in the Uzbek case in two different moments in time. The first was in 
the initial days of independence when instability led to civil war in Tajikistan. These 
events led to a great deal of concern over regional security, which prompted Karimov to
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join the CIS Collective Security Treaty and forge a strong alignment towards Russia. 
However, as the instability in neighboring Tajikistan waned by 1997, the necessity of 
stronger security relations with Russia declined, and Karimov chose not to renew Uzbek 
membership in the Collective Security Treaty in 1999.
Th second moment of rising internal threats to Karimov came shortly thereafter. 
When Islamic extremists began to operate out of Tajikistan and Afghanistan in the areas 
o f southern Kyrgyzstan and the Ferghana Valley in Uzbekistan in the summers of 1999 
and 2000, security cooperation with Russia increased. This led Karimov to soften his 
stance towards Russia and adopt a more moderate pro-Russian alignment. As we will see 
below, what changed in the post 9/11 security environment is that the United States was 
willing to assist regional leaders in their combat against Islamic extremists, thereby 
lessening the importance of Russia as a guarantor of regional stability.
In the case of Ukraine, Kravchuk faced a dire economic crisis brought on by 
attempts to sever economic ties with Russia. This led to his political demise in the 1994 
presidential elections. Kuchma came to power, as the IT/ED framework would suggest, 
by promising to strengthen relations with Russia, capitalizing on the anti-Western 
sentiment widespread in the eastern and southern portions of the country. Kuchma (as 
well as Kravchuk) relied on a different political strategy for maintaining his political 
positions that contrasted sharply from Karimov’s in Uzbekistan. The latter president 
eliminated political opposition and inhibited the opening of the political process, whereas 
the former coopted influential sectors of Ukrainian political and economic circles, 
promising behind the scenes to distribute economic resources to these groups in exchange 
for their continued political support.
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This practice was successful for Kuchma, as outright repression would have 
undermined his quest for political survival. However, in the wake of “Kuchmagate,” or 
the scandal linking Kuchma to the death of a Ukrainian journalist in the winter of 2000, 
political protest emerged in an unprecedented fashion. Hence, with a rise in the level of 
internal threats to his leadership, Kuchma turned to Russia for greater assistance, as the 
IT/ED framework would suggest. This opened the way for the strongest pro-Russian 
alignment from Ukraine in the past decade, culminating in the decision to declare 2001 
the year o f Russia in Ukraine and vice versa in 2002.
Economic dependence on Russia also influenced alignment patterns in ways 
predicted by the IT/ED framework. When economic dependence on Russia is high, 
leaders are more likely to adopt pro-Russian alignments. This was true in Uzbekistan in 
the early 1990s. Karimov initially favored stronger economic ties with Russia in hopes of 
maintaining the level of economic subsidies obtained during the Soviet system. Yet, as 
Russia altered the terms for economic cooperation, the asymmetrical nature of relations 
became more apparent. Karimov became acutely aware that continued economic 
cooperation would come at a lofty price to FSU states. Accordingly, he addressed the 
most significant aspect of Uzbek economic dependence strategically, namely its reliance 
on Russian oil supplies, through the development and production of domestic oil 
supplies. The strategy proved highly effective, and by 1995 Uzbek dependence on 
Russian oil imports was severed. Indeed, Karimov’s economic approach was targeted at 
self-sufficiency, and despite his lack of economic reform, which undermined 
Uzbekistan’s ability to gamer Western economic resources, the country maintained a 
degree o f economic stability, although economic growth was limited. This coupled with
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the declining level of internal threats enabled Karimov to adopt a strong pro­
independence alignment by the late 1990s. However, as we saw above, a more moderate 
alignment emerged when Islamic extremists reemerged as a threat to Karimov’s regime.
In Ukraine’s case, economic dependence on Russia served as the strongest 
impediment to a pro-independence alignment. Ukraine was unable to sever its 
dependence on Russian energy imports. Attempts to find substitute trading partners 
proved futile since Ukraine was often unable to pay for energy deliveries from other 
suppliers. Coupled with a lack of domestic energy reserves, Ukraine remained dependent 
on Russian energy. The staggering energy debt that accrued over the decade exacerbated 
Ukrainian dependence on Russia.
Similar to Uzbekistan, Ukraine was unable to obtain continuous Western 
economic assistance. Kravchuk failed to implement economic reform, and it was not until 
Kuchma came into power in 1994 that reform measures were taken in line with IMF 
prescriptions. Access was short-lived, however. By the spring of 1995, reform efforts 
slowed, and within a few years they ground to a halt. This led to a suspension of IMF and 
World Bank funds to Ukraine, and by the end of the decade Kuchma strengthened 
economic ties with Russia, especially given Ukrainian dependence on Russian energy 
supplies.
Thus, in the cases of alignment patterns of Uzbekistan and Ukraine the IT/ED 
framework provides compelling explanations as to why leaders were willing to cooperate 
with Russia under certain circumstances and other were not. This does not suggest that 
the IT/ED framework can explain everything. More testing of the framework is needed to 
assert its validity throughout the FSU. Nonetheless, the confirmatory evidence offered by
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the cases of Uzbekistan and Ukraine can be seen as plausibility studies. If for instance, 
the IT/ED framework did not provide sufficient evidence in these cases then the 
applicability of the framework would already be in question. Yet, since it offers ample 
evidence in explaining Uzbek and Ukrainian alignment patterns the framework carries 
more theoretical and empirical weight. Further testing of its propositions and logic 
against more cases of the FSU, however, are necessary to suggest it is the best 
explanation for FSU alignment patterns.
INSIGHTS OF THE IT/ED FRAMEWORK
One work is unlikely to capture all the trends and patterns in the international 
relations of the FSU. But the IT/ED framework provides us with a short cut for 
understanding critical aspects of these relations as well as highlighting under what 
conditions FSU leaders are most likely to cooperate with Russia. Below, I elaborate on 
the theoretical insights offered by the framework as well as some of the security, 
political, and economic implications of the framework.
This dissertation began with a straightforward puzzle about alignment patterns 
between FSU states and Russia. Why have the most powerful FSU states tended to adopt 
the strongest pro-Russian alignments, whereas the weakest states adopted the most pro­
independent and anti-Russian foreign policies? Balance of power and balance of threat 
theories were highlighted given their prominence in the field o f security studies.
However, their logic was inconsistent with the realities of alignment patterns in the cases 
of Uzbekistan and Ukraine, as argued in Chapters III and VI respectively. These states 
did not actively balance Russia as they would predict, and in the case of Ukraine it
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actually relinquished its nuclear weapons in the early 1990s and then adopted strong pro- 
Russian policies by decade’s end.
Moreover, balance of threat theory conceptualizes the notion of external threat 
(i.e., power, geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and aggressive intentions) in a 
way that is less compelling in the context of the FSU. For instance, in the Uzbek case 
such a conceptualization would miss the threat posed by Islamic extremists, since they 
would score low according to Walt’s definition. Not to mention his theory is primarily 
state-centric, and would have difficulty accounting for transnational threats.
As discussed in Chapter I, there are contextual and situational factors that these 
theories are unable to account for. Two are perhaps most illuminating. First, the FSU as a 
region is not one in which systemic anarchy prevails, but rather given the extensive 
connections and historical relations between Russia and other FSU states, the region is 
epitomized more by hierarchy and anarchy. Second, FSU leaders represent major forces 
in the policy making process within these countries. Accordingly, the IT/ED framework 
built on and refined the work of Steven David, who placed the analytical focus on leaders 
when explaining alignment patterns in Third World or quasi-state nations that lack much 
of the political institutionalization found in the Western world. As we have seen through 
the findings o f this dissertation, this theoretical nuance provides greater insight into 
alignment patterns within the FSU, than traditional alignment theories. Beyond this 
theoretical contribution, the insights generated from the IT/ED framework touch on other 
compelling security, political, and economic issues that dominate discussion both in 
academic and policy circles.
The FSU remains a critical region in world affairs. Despite the collapse of the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Soviet system and the subsequent waning of Russian military power, the international 
system is greatly influenced by events that occur within this region. Most recently, the 
expanding war on terrorism in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks brought new attention 
to the centrality of Central and South Asia to U.S. national security. Whereas the Bill 
Clinton administration focused on economic interaction and concerns over human rights, 
the George W. Bush administration focused more on the security dimension, namely 
bringing pressure on (and eventually overthrowing) the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.
As we saw in Chapters III and IV, the threat of Islamic extremism greatly influenced the 
alignment calculations of Karimov in Uzbekistan. The threat posed by religious 
extremists to Karimov’s political security prompted the Uzbek leader to cooperate with 
Russia immediately after independence as the Tajik civil war unfolded and later in the 
decade when a resurgence of political violence left few alternatives but a return to 
Russian assistance.
However, in the wake of 9/11, Karimov found that Russia was not the only 
country willing to assist in the pursuit of his political survival. In this regard, the Bush 
administration was less constrained by concerns with human rights violations, and more 
willing to aid both directly and indirectly in Karimov’s struggle with Islamic extremists, 
namely the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). This was especially true after 
Bush’s 20 September 2001 speech to Congress in which he specifically highlighted the 
destabilizing effect the EMU had on regional security. His acknowledgement of the IMU 
had less to do with the IMU within the ranks of other international terrorist groups, and 
more to do with securing the support of a critical regional ally in the military campaign 
against the Taliban. This cooperation continues today, and the U.S. military presence in
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Central Asia is unlikely to decline in the near future. The emergence o f terrorism in the 
region also touches on aspects o f the political development of these countries, whereby 
the role of political openness and dissent has largely been confined.
The fall of the Soviet empire brought with it tremendous change in the way in 
which FSU states themselves organized their newly independent political and economic 
systems. The Clinton administration focused a great deal of attention and Western funds 
on the large-scale nation-building enterprise throughout the FSU. Western assistance and 
guidance fueled this process, but by the end o f decade it had proven largely futile in the 
development of more transparent and formal political and economic institutions. In this 
regard, the billions o f dollars of Western assistance channeled through bilateral and 
multilateral means did not always bring about the intended results. This was largely 
because these international institutions were unable to accept FSU states for what they 
were and instead focused naively on what they thought they could become. The end 
product was that much was wasted and directly and indirectly channeled to individuals 
who manipulated the political process for their own narrow benefit.
This dissertation underscores this dilemma with its principal focus on the FSU 
leader as the primary actor in post-Soviet politics. Few in the West in the beginning of 
the 1990s fully appreciated the power of FSU leaders in the post-Soviet political systems, 
and more specifically, their willingness to do whatever it took to maintain their political 
positions throughout the post-Soviet transition. This in turn led to development strategies 
that were not tailored made for FSU states, but rather ones that were imposed based on 
the presumed wisdom of past development successes. Indeed, by the end of the decade 
leaders in both the IMF and World Bank openly acknowledged their failure in adjusting
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preconceived notions of what would work in favor of ideas of what could work in the 
post-Soviet context. This is also an institutional concern for these organizations because 
as many in the IMF structure will reveal the IMF does not attempt to solve these domestic 
issues. While these international organizations cannot be tasked with every objective 
under the sky, they nonetheless played a role in the post-Soviet transition that was not 
always productive.
The lessons derived from the nation-building enterprise offer additional insight. 
Not surprisingly, in those countries that embraced political and economic reform, the role 
of Western assistance proved very effective. This is especially true in the context of 
transitions in Eastern Europe with many of these states looking more actively to Europe, 
first in the form of NATO enlargement, and second in the more difficult path to EU 
accession. Yet, this dissertation is about the FSU and there are far fewer examples of 
success in this context. The sole examples in the FSU are the Baltic states, which as 
mentioned earlier fall outside of the parameters of the IT/ED framework in large part 
because of their willingness to embrace change and reorient both their political and 
economic systems towards Western norms and practices. As Abraham Lowenthal noted 
in a sweeping study of efforts to export democracy to Latin America, democratic 
consolidation was only possible when conditions within a country were propitious.1 
Without a sincere desire to follow through on reform measures, little political change can 
occur, and little did occur throughout the FSU over the past decade.
Nation-building efforts were thwarted from within, as this dissertation argued. 
FSU leaders were primarily concerned with securing their own political positions and
1 Abraham Lowenthal, Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1991).
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such an assumption undermines the capacity to reform a political system, since reform 
would likely threaten a leader’s political position. As Joel Heilman points out, in those 
countries where the governments were most susceptible to the threat o f en electoral 
backlash, reform efforts were adopted and comprehensive reform programs flourished.2 
Thus, the desire to transform FSU states into more open, politically free, and transparent 
societies was untenable from the beginning because few political leaders were willing to 
relinquish it for such an endeavor.
This also raises broader concerns about the politics of economic reform, and the 
ability to implement economic reform. Traditional logic in international political 
economy suggests that leaders need to be insulated from those parties that would most 
likely suffer from reform measures. That is to say, the short-term losers of economic 
reform, such as striking workers, resentful former state officials, impoverished 
pensioners, or masses of unemployed, are the greatest threats to debunking reform 
because they are the groups most likely to suffer the greatest costs.3 Thus, traditional 
thinking was that leaders must be protected and insulated from these groups since if  they 
are not then these groups are likely to push for a change in the present regime, which 
could ultimately lead to the collapse of the reform effort.4
When applied to the FSU, such logic proved counter-productive because it only
2 Joel S. Heilman, “Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions,”
World Politics 50, no. 2 (February 1998): 232.
3 For a good overview of the literature see, Hector E. Schamis, “Distributional Coalitions and the Politics 
of Economic Reform in Latin America,” World Politics 51, no. 2 (January 1999): 236-68.
4 Variations of this theme stress the merits of autonomous states in Peter Evans, “The State as Problem and 
Solution: Predation, Embedded Autonomy, and Structural Change,” in The Politics o f Economic 
Adjustment, ed. Stephen Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); 
powerful executives in Haggard and Kaufman, The Political Economy o f Democratic Transitions', and 
insulated technocrats in John Williamson, “In Search o f a Manual for Tecbnopols,” in The Political 
Economy o f Policy Reform, ed. John Williamson (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Studies, 
1994).
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fed the interests of those leaders that were already in power. FSU leaders did not want an 
electoral backlash, which would threaten their positions, and often, as we saw in the case 
of Ukraine in Chapter VII, leaders ensured their political survival by trading economic 
resources for the political support of powerful elites within the society. In short, as 
Heilman argues, the greatest threat to economic reform came not from the short-term 
losers, but rather the short-term winners, or those individuals that benefited from an 
unstable and highly volatile economy.5 The short-term winners, such as enterprise 
insiders, commercial bankers, local corrupt officials, and the mafia, manipulated the 
reform process for their own advantage and stripped their respective countries of valuable 
assets that ultimately left the country worse off than when it started to implement reform, 
while increasing their personal coffers. The IT/ED framework addresses this 
phenomenon in its analysis of how FSU leaders maintained their political positions.
In the end, the international and domestic politics of the FSU have gone through 
tremendous change over the decade since independence. Many things have changed such 
as in the nature of relations between Russia and its former Soviet republics.
Unfortunately, many things have stayed the same as evident in the rather conservative 
orientation of most FSU leaders. They did not embrace political and economic reform as 
wholeheartedly as others did in Eastern Europe or in the Baltic states. Instead, most FSU 
leaders sought to ensure their political positions in the near future, and since many of 
today’s FSU leaders are former Communist leaders themselves, they have clearly been 
highly successful at this pursuit. Only time will tell how the issues in this dissertation 
play out.
5 Heilman, “Winners Take All.”
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THE IT/ED FRAMEWORK IN THE REST OF WORLD
This dissertation examined alignment patterns in a fairly limited geographical 
space and time frame—relations between CIS countries and Russia since independence in 
1991. But the themes of leadership survival and political threats and economic 
interdependence and dependence also resonate in different spatial and temporal contexts. 
David’s work on alignments began with one qualification. That is, internal threats as an 
explanatory variable are most illustrative in weak states that lacked political institutions. 
In such countries domestic politics is not highly formalized; the state apparatus tends to 
possess a disproportionate share of the nation’s wealth; and there are often competing 
subnational groups that are prone to violence.
These types of conditions exist today, and leaders throughout the world often 
focus on internal threats to their political positions. For instance, in 1998 Andres 
Pastrana, the then new president of Colombia, announced his intention to engage in a 
peace process with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the 
National Liberation Army (ELN), armed groups that controlled regions of the country, 
generally for the production of narcotics such as cocaine. These groups are heavily armed 
and often funded by drug cartels to serve as security forces against the national 
government. As negotiations stalled and eventually collapsed the same policy of 
combating these groups emerged. In August 2002, a new president was elected, Alvaro 
Uribe, who has promised yet again to crackdown on the country’s left-wing insurgents 
and right-wing paramilitaries.6 In line with the logic of the IT/ED framework, Uribe is 
strengthening his external alignment with the United States to combat his internal threats, 
and more importantly gain much needed access to U.S. funds, military hardware, and
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training. This has been received warmly in Washington, and as one commentator wrote, 
the Bush administration is supporting Uribe’s war plans with an “open wallet.”7
Similarly, the royal family in Saudi Arabia is unable and unwilling to crack down 
on Islamic extremists within its own country for fear of the political backlash. This is all 
the more real since 15 of the 19 highjackers that participated in the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
were of Saudi descent. To move aggressively on such groups would only serve as catalyst 
for greater extremism within the country itself, potentially leading to the ouster of the 
royal family. The same can be said for General Pervez Musharraf in Pakistan. Few would 
disagree that Islamic extremism continues to fester in Pakistani schools, but for 
Musharraf to rid the country of extremists would ultimately lead to his removal, probably 
violent, which would then place nuclear weapons in the hands of such radical elements.
The public statements of Arab countries against a U.S. attack on Iraq can be seen 
from a similar perspective. Arab countries have openly spoken out against such an attack, 
at one time claiming after an Arab summit that an attack on Iraq would be seen as an 
attack on the Arab world. However, such public posturing has more to do with the 
interest of Arab leaders than it does about any sincere resistance to U.S. plans in Iraq. If 
Arab leaders took a weaker stance towards U.S. policies, then their political longevity 
would be highly questionable, since those in the Arab streets would inevitably see this as 
selling out to the United States. Accordingly, these leaders are forced to take a particular 
foreign policy stance to ensure their domestic political security.
In other areas o f the world, such as in Africa and Southeast Asia, these themes 
continue to carry both practical and theoretical weight. The domestic politics in these
6 Julia E. Sweig, “What Kind of War for Colombia?” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 5 (2002): 122-41.
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countries is anything but predictable and peace is often as elusive as leadership survival. 
Thus, while this dissertation emphasized the importance of internal threats in the context 
of the CIS that does not suggest that the internal political threats as an explanatory 
variable cannot be utilized in other regional contexts.
Economic interdependence and dependence similarly resonates in other areas of 
the world. The world is increasingly interdependent, and with organizations like the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) growing and expanding, this interdependence will 
expand tremendously in the next century. As this dissertation argued, the most 
constraining aspect o f economic relations is when a country is dependent on another, 
meaning that they cannot find alternatives and substitutes from other countries. Energy 
supplies were seen as a major factor influencing a country’s dependence, and this is true 
for countries throughout the world. One of many reasons that European countries, such as 
France, are reluctant to openly support an invasion of Iraq is because of their continued 
need for oil from the Middle East and their desire to receive the billions o f dollars owed 
to it by Iraq. This touches on a larger issue as to how OPEC has been able at times to 
leverage its dominant position in the world’s energy market because of the world’s 
dependence on its energy supplies.
China is also a priority issue for the United States today, and this issue of 
economic interdependence/dependence is often inteijected into policy discussions. The 
United States welcomes expanded trade ties with China because of the vastness o f the 
Chinese market and the access to inexpensive imports from the country. In essence, 
everyone benefits from this increased trade, but as a realist may argue, by increasing
7 Jeremy McDermott, “Colombia Imposes Democratic Authority,” Jane's Intelligence Review 14, no. 10 
(2002): 21.
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Chinese dependence on the United States and the WTO this could serve as a powerful 
constraint on Chinese foreign policy in decades to come. Extending the argument further, 
one might suggest that the more trade is expanded in the future, the more access there 
will be to Western ideas and practices. This could in time lead to a rise of internal 
political challenges to the Communist regime, challenges that already exist today in their 
infancy but are unable to gain significant momentum. Moreover, Chinese energy 
consumption has risen by 250 percent since 1980, in large part as a result o f economic 
growth and development.8 This rise in consumption has outstripped domestic resources 
and China itself is starting to alter its external relations to address its energy needs, 
furthering confirming the importance of energy dependence in shaping a country’s 
foreign relations.
8 Christoph Bluth, “Energy Needs Shape China’s External Relations,” Jane's Intelligence Review 14, no. 
10 (2002): 40-43.
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